18MAR

Migrant workers bear the Gulf's losses

3 min read

06:00UTC

Human Rights Watch documents 11 dead and 268 injured across Gulf states from Iranian strikes — the majority migrant workers with no political voice in the conflict killing them.

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Key takeaway

Pezeshkian's broken apology proves Iran's civilian government does not control IRGC targeting decisions.

Human Rights Watch documented at least 11 civilian deaths and 268 injuries across Gulf States from Iranian strikes since 28 February ¹. Migrant workers comprise the majority of victims. The report catalogues strikes on residential buildings, hotels, civilian airports, embassies, and financial centres — infrastructure with no military function, staffed and inhabited overwhelmingly by foreign labour.

The demographics explain the casualty pattern. Expatriates make up roughly 88% of the UAE's population, 85% of Qatar's, and 70% of Kuwait's — overwhelmingly South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East African workers who run the ports, oil terminals, airports, and construction sites Iran is now striking. Many live in densely packed housing without access to reinforced shelters. Many work under the Kafala sponsorship system, which restricts their ability to leave the country without employer permission. When Oman suffered its first wartime deaths — two foreign nationals killed by a drone in the al-Awahi Industrial Area — the dead were workers, not soldiers or citizens. The first fatality inside Abu Dhabi was a person of Palestinian nationality struck by a missile in Al Bahyah .

Pezeshkian's 8 March apology and pledge to stop targeting neighbouring states produced no change in Iranian fire ². The UAE intercepted 10 ballistic missiles and 45 drones on 17 March alone, closing its airspace for hours. Cumulative Gulf interceptions exceed 2,000 since 28 February. The Security Council's Resolution 2817 — passed 13–0 with a record 135 co-sponsors condemning Iran's attacks on neighbours — has had no observable effect on targeting. The IRGC has declared all US interests in the UAE 'legitimate targets' , a designation encompassing the commercial infrastructure where migrant workers spend their days. These workers cannot vote, cannot petition their governments for protection, and in many cases cannot leave. They face the war's highest civilian exposure and hold no voice in how it ends.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When a country's president apologises for attacking civilian targets and the attacks continue without pause, it reveals who actually controls the military. In Iran's governance structure, the IRGC reports to the Supreme Leader — not to the civilian president. Pezeshkian's 8 March apology was either disregarded by the IRGC or was never intended to bind its operations. This matters enormously for diplomacy. Any ceasefire negotiated with Pezeshkian's government cannot be reliably assumed to halt IRGC missiles. The gap between civilian government statements and IRGC actions is not a malfunction of Iranian governance — it is a documented structural feature that any negotiation framework must explicitly account for.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

Pezeshkian's unimplemented apology simultaneously provides diplomatic cover for the civilian government — which can claim moderation to Western interlocutors — and operational freedom for the IRGC. This dual-track structure has been analytically documented since at least 2009 and represents a deliberate governance arrangement rather than a coordination failure. Any ceasefire or de-escalation framework that does not separately and explicitly bind IRGC operational decision-making is structurally inadequate to the institutional reality it must address.

Root Causes

The kafala sponsorship system in Gulf states ties migrant workers' legal residency to individual employers, preventing voluntary evacuation without risking deportation. Workers concentrated in dense labour camps and non-reinforced residential buildings lack access to hardened shelter infrastructure built for citizens. These structural conditions — not incidental targeting — systematically expose the migrant population to disproportionate casualty rates during any strike campaign.

Escalation

HRW's finding that Pezeshkian's apology was followed by uninterrupted attacks is a structural indicator that Iranian civilian diplomatic signals carry no operational weight. This creates a fundamental verification problem for any ceasefire mechanism: civilian government assurances alone cannot bind IRGC behaviour, and no alternative binding authority has been identified.

What could happen next?

Meaning
IRGC disregard for Pezeshkian's apology confirms that Iran's civilian government cannot deliver operational compliance in any ceasefire agreement without explicit IRGC buy-in.
Immediate · Assessed
Consequence
Migrant worker casualties will generate diplomatic pressure from South Asian governments whose remittance-dependent economies are directly exposed to Gulf labour market disruption.
Short term · Assessed
Risk
Kafala system prevents voluntary worker evacuation, meaning migrant casualty exposure will grow proportionally with strike tempo without any legal self-protection mechanism available.
Immediate · Assessed
Precedent
HRW's evidentiary documentation of civilian targeting patterns establishes a foundation for future international humanitarian law accountability proceedings against identifiable IRGC commanders.
Long term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States

United States

Primary parallel: During the Iran–Iraq War's Tanker War phase (1984–88), Iran struck Kuwaiti tankers and infrastructure to coerce Gulf States backing Baghdad, then denied civilian targeting intent while attacks continued — the same rhetorical pattern now visible in Pezeshkian's apology followed by uninterrupted strikes.

Counter-parallel: Libya's targeting of civilian aviation (Lockerbie 1988, UTA 772 1989) produced sustained international sanctions rather than immediate military response. The Gulf case differs materially: the US is already militarily engaged, removing the delayed-accountability dynamic that characterised the Libyan precedent.

Why it’s relevant now

The Tanker War precedent shows Gulf state tolerance for Iranian coercion has limits that, once crossed, produce lasting strategic realignment — Kuwait's 1987 request for US Navy convoy protection permanently transformed Gulf–US defence relationships. The current pattern of migrant worker casualties creates a parallel pressure on South Asian governments whose political economies depend on remittance flows.

Gulf migrant workers collectively remit approximately $100–120 billion annually to South and Southeast Asia. Mass casualty events and evacuation waves would disrupt this flow with macroeconomic consequences in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Philippines — countries where remittances constitute 6–12% of GDP. India receives approximately $35–40 billion annually from Gulf-based workers; a major evacuation scenario would create foreign exchange pressure on the rupee.

Gulf States' economic dependence on migrant labour creates a secondary vulnerability: if casualty rates accelerate voluntary departures or trigger home-government evacuation orders, labour shortages in construction, hospitality, and logistics would compound the economic damage from direct strike impacts. This labour-supply channel is entirely separate from the energy and infrastructure damage already priced into markets.

Consensus view: Human Rights Watch's documentation methodology — field interviews, satellite imagery cross-referencing, and hospital record verification — has been validated in previous Gulf conflict reporting and carries strong evidentiary credibility for casualty attribution in this context.

Counter-view: Migrant-Rights.org and The Gulf Labour Rights Network have consistently argued that Western human rights frameworks undercount migrant worker casualties because documentation depends on identity papers and hospital access that migrant workers disproportionately lack — making HRW's 11-death figure a probable floor, not a representative count.

Key tension: Whether IRGC civilian targeting constitutes a systematic pattern or incidental collateral damage determines whether International humanitarian law accountability mechanisms can be meaningfully activated.

First Reported In

Update #40 · Larijani dead; Israel hunts the new leader

Human Rights Watch· 18 Mar 2026

Read original →

Different Perspectives

Gulf shipping and insurance markets

With Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb both hostile at once, war-risk underwriters face their first dual-chokepoint pricing problem; the rerouting hedge that absorbed one closure is gone for Israeli-linked hulls. Any deal that reopens Hormuz without a Houthi stand-down clause delivers only partial shipping relief.

Russia and China

Russia and China met IAEA chief Grossi jointly in Geneva on 5 June to coordinate an advance blocking position against Washington's censure resolution, the first documented instance of proactive pre-session obstruction rather than reactive post-vote dissent. Beijing's move came four days after OFAC designated Shanghai Qianye Energy under Iran energy sanctions.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia was left out of the emergency $4.01 billion Patriot waiver Qatar received on 2 May as its own PAC-3 stocks ran near-empty from intercepting Iranian salvoes over Aramco facilities. Riyadh is on a standard 18-month FMS queue behind a production line booked through 2030, with no equivalent priority to Qatar's Al Udeid basing role.

Houthis (Ansar Allah)

The Houthis declared a complete ban on Israeli Red Sea navigation on 8 June and struck Jaffa, their first attack on Israeli territory since April, seven days after the Tasnim authorisation to activate other fronts including Bab el-Mandeb. The declaration put both chokepoints under hostile authority simultaneously.

Iran

Iran agreed the 9 June mutual halt after the Mahshahr exchange and coordinated with Russia and China to block Washington's IAEA censure resolution, using the Board as a second front while the bilateral pause held on the military one. Tehran's acceptance of the Lebanon carve-out contradicts the linkage position it stated on 1 June.

Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF

Israel struck the Karun Petrochemical plant at Mahshahr on 8 June over Trump's explicit objection, then agreed a halt with Iran the following day scoped on Israeli terms with Lebanon carved out. Netanyahu's posture is that the IDF will not accept Iranian missile factories as off-limits regardless of US diplomatic timelines.

Key Figures

Gulf civilian deaths documented by HRW11+

Gulf civilian injuries documented by HRW268

In everyday terms

Workers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka who comprise the Gulf's migrant labour force face life-threatening exposure with limited access to shelters and no legal pathway to leave without risking deportation under kafala sponsorship rules. Casualties and evacuation waves would disrupt remittance flows that constitute 6–12% of GDP in several South Asian economies.

What’s Uncertain

Migrant casualty undercounting likelyDocumentation relies on hospital records and identity papers that migrant workers disproportionately lack access to, making the 11-death figure a probable floor rather than a representative count.

IRGC targeting intent unverifiedWhether civilian infrastructure is being deliberately selected as a target type or struck incidentally during military targeting has not been independently confirmed.

Civilian–IRGC authority split disputed officiallyIran formally denies that the civilian government and IRGC operate on separate targeting authorities; the dual-track reading is an analytical inference, not an official Iranian admission.

Sources

1 centre

United States

Centre-left

Human Rights Watch Iran: Unlawful strikes across Gulf endanger civiliansUS international human rights NGO

Entities Involved

Iran →United Arab Emirates (UAE) →Qatar →Kuwait →Oman →

Evidence & sources

3 sources