21SEP

Netanyahu sidelined by the deal on Iran

3 min read

15:34UTC

The Washington Post called the memorandum an informal referendum on Netanyahu's tenure; he was excluded from the diplomacy that ended the war and his cabinet now repudiates its terms.

← Back to Russia and China kill Iran's UN monitor Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Netanyahu faces an autumn election on a deal he was excluded from negotiating.

For Benjamin Netanyahu, the deal reads at home as a verdict on him. The Washington Post called the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding "an informal referendum on Netanyahu's tenure" ahead of Israeli elections this autumn ¹; a PBS analyst called it a "strategic defeat" for Israel; Haaretz called it Netanyahu's "second worst fiasco" after 7 October ². Critics say he led Trump into the war while overpromising the result, then misjudged the President's appetite for a long fight.

Netanyahu was sidelined from the diplomacy that ended it. The mediation ran through Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, none of it through Jerusalem . His own cabinet has repudiated the terms he was not consulted on: National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir says "Trump's agreement does not bind us", and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich rejected the memorandum from the Knesset floor.

At a press conference Netanyahu insisted "as long as I am Prime Minister, Iran will not get nuclear weapons". That is a promise about the exact question the memorandum he was excluded from has deferred for 60 days. A leader who staked his standing on stopping Iran's bomb now faces an autumn election on a deal he did not write, cannot bind and which postpones the one outcome he built his career on guaranteeing.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Israeli newspapers and media commentators are treating the Islamabad deal as a personal verdict on Benjamin Netanyahu, separate from foreign policy as a whole. He pushed the US into military action against Iran, promised it would end the nuclear threat, and found he had no seat at the table when the deal was made. Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey ran the mediation; Netanyahu did not attend any round. The deal defers the nuclear question for 60 days, which was the exact question Netanyahu said military action would answer. His coalition partners Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have said publicly the deal does not bind Israel. Netanyahu at a press conference promised Iran would never get nuclear weapons on his watch, but the 60-day talks, from which he was excluded, now control that question.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Netanyahu's exclusion from the Islamabad process has a structural cause separate from any personal failing. The mediation ran through Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey because all four maintain active diplomatic channels with Tehran. Israel and Iran have been in active military confrontation since February 2026; no mediation requiring Iranian consent can include the party Iran is fighting as a co-mediator.

The political crisis at home follows from a promise Netanyahu could not keep: that the US military campaign, which Israel helped design, would produce verifiable Iranian nuclear disarmament. The Islamabad MOU defers that question for 60 days, which his coalition partners, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, have read as a failure of the campaign's explicit goal.

What could happen next?

Risk
If Israel's autumn election produces a coalition including Ben-Gvir and Smotrich in stronger roles, Israeli repudiation of the MOU's Lebanon terms becomes government policy rather than ministerial dissent.
Consequence
Netanyahu's exclusion from the Islamabad process has permanently altered the US-Israel alliance dynamic: Washington negotiated a Middle East settlement that its closest regional partner repudiated on the day of signing.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from Israel and Qatar

Israel

Qatar

Primary parallel: In 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin was excluded from the US-Egypt Camp David process at key stages, yet the resulting agreement, a US-brokered peace that traded Sinai for Egyptian normalisation, ultimately strengthened his domestic standing. The structural difference in 2026: Begin was at Camp David even when marginalised; Netanyahu was not at the Islamabad process at all, and the mediation ran through Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Counter-parallel: After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned following the Agranat Commission's findings on intelligence failure. The parallel is limited: Meir's intelligence failure was about enemy action; Netanyahu's political failure is about losing the diplomatic channel to an allied president.

Consensus view: Israeli coalition governments have historically fallen when a security event produces a gap between what the prime minister promised and what the military delivered. Netanyahu's specific vulnerability: he publicly pushed Trump into the conflict, promised Iran would be denuclearised, and was excluded from the diplomacy that ended it.

Haaretz's characterisation of it as his "second worst fiasco after 7 October" reflects the structural comparison: both events involved intelligence and diplomatic failures that hardliners in his coalition exploited.

Counter-view: Netanyahu's defenders argue he delivered the bombing campaign that degraded Iran's military, and that the ceasefire's nuclear provisions, however deferred, buy Israel time. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich's public repudiation of the deal may strengthen Netanyahu internally by allowing him to distance himself from terms he was not consulted on.

Key tension: Whether the autumn Israeli election produces a coalition that repudiates the MOU's Lebanon provisions and resumes the southern Lebanon offensive, or whether Netanyahu survives by positioning himself as the one leader who warned about the deal's nuclear weakness.

First Reported In

Update #130 · Trump signed the war over; it kept going

Haaretz· 17 Jun 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Israel rejects a deal it never signed

The 15 June cabinet rejections by Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and Gantz escalated into broader Israeli and international commentary framing the MOU as a referendum on Netanyahu's tenure.

Occurred 15 Jun 2026

Read story →

Iran deal signed, no register entry

The Vance-Ghalibaf signing excluded Israel's government, which is the direct cause of Israeli commentary framing the deal as a referendum on Netanyahu's leadership.

Occurred 15 Jun 2026

Read story →

This Event

Netanyahu sidelined by the deal on Iran

Netanyahu promised at a press conference exactly what the deal he was shut out of has deferred for 60 days.

Different Perspectives

Shipping and insurance industry

UKMTO counted about 20 US-facilitated Hormuz transits a day to 11 September against only 6 visible on AIS, with traffic still around 90% below the 138-a-day pre-war baseline. War-risk underwriters cannot price hulls they cannot see, or resolve whether the tanker El Gaia hit a mine, as Iran claims, or a missile and drone, as CENTCOM says.

European refiners

European refiners, including Poland's Orlen, absorbed a roughly $26 gap between Dated Brent at $130.80 on 15 September and ICE Brent futures settling at $103.87 on 18 September, a spread that widened from $13.45 on 9 September rather than newly opening. Their futures hedges no longer cover what they now pay for physical barrels.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Aramco zeroed European term customers' October allocations and rerouted roughly 60 million barrels to Asia through Ras Tanura and Sohar, using Red Sea and Gulf terminal capacity built years ago to cut Hormuz exposure. Riyadh reallocated existing supply rather than negotiating a shortfall with Europe.

Qatar

Qatar's energy minister Saad al-Kaabi told Bloomberg at the Qatar Economic Forum on 20 September that Bessent's two-year Hormuz-obsolescence forecast is wrong, and that Doha has deliberately built no bypass pipeline. Qatar's gas exports run through one waterway by choice, not oversight.

Iran (foreign ministry and Majlis)

Iran's foreign ministry and 130 Majlis deputies moved toward NPT withdrawal this week, with lawmaker Hossein-Ali Haji Deligani filing a triple-urgency bill on 20 September that Speaker Qalibaf has not yet scheduled. Tehran treats treaty membership as leverage still on the table, not yet spent.

Russia and China

Moscow and Beijing vetoed the Panel of Experts' renewal, maintaining Resolution 2231 lapsed in October 2025 and the 2025 snapback was never validly triggered, so the sanctions architecture the Panel enforces has no current legal standing. Both governments frame the veto as upholding law, not shielding Tehran.