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Iran Conflict 2026
6AUG

ISW finds no trace of Gerasimov's gains

2 min read
15:43UTC

Gerasimov presented fresh Donetsk captures on 18 July. ISW's assessment the same day reported no evidence Russian forces had entered any of the five named settlements.

ConflictAssessed
Key takeaway

Claims of settlement capture now travel faster than any evidence that the settlements changed hands.

Valery Gerasimov, chief of Russia's general staff, presented fresh captures in Donetsk Oblast on 18 July. The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington research group that publishes a daily geolocated assessment of the front, stated the same day that it "has observed no evidence to assess that Russian forces have entered Dobropillya, Hannivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, Svitle, or Krasnoyarske" 1. That is an absence of corroboration rather than a contradiction: ISW did not geolocate Ukrainian control of those villages, it recorded that nothing supported the Russian claim. No Russian milblogger reported entry either, and milbloggers normally publicise gains within hours of them happening.

ISW has taken apart a named Gerasimov claim once before this year. On 21 April it examined his figure of 1,700 square kilometres and 80 settlements captured since January, including all of Luhansk Oblast and 70% of Lyman. ISW found no evidence Russia controlled any part of Lyman, and capped even the most generous Russian estimates of real advances at 715 square kilometres 2. Two dated instances make a comparison, not a habit.

Between 13 and 19 July neither army captured or lost a confirmed settlement. The static line matches what ISW assessed in early June, when it found Russia had been net-losing territory rather than gaining it . ISW reads Gerasimov's presentations as part of a Kremlin cognitive-warfare effort aimed at persuading Western audiences that Ukraine's defences are collapsing, which is the institute's own framing and should be weighed as such.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Russia's top general, Valery Gerasimov, announced new territorial gains in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk region on 18 July. But the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a Washington-based research group that tracks the war closely using satellite imagery and open-source reporting, published its own assessment the same day saying it found no evidence Russian forces had actually entered any of the towns Gerasimov named. Neither side gained or lost a confirmed settlement in the week before his announcement. This matters because it is not the first time this has happened. ISW caught Gerasimov making a similarly inflated claim in April, when it found no evidence backing his numbers either. It does not mean every Russian battlefield claim is false, but it shows a pattern worth watching whenever Moscow announces sweeping gains.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The front has held at roughly the same scale since June, when Russia was losing men at seventeen times Ukraine's daily rate for ground that barely shifted, and Russia was already net-losing territory before June. A static front with heavy attritional losses for minimal territorial return creates political pressure on Moscow to produce a battlefield narrative that outruns what is actually happening on the ground.

The pressure is compounded by domestic audience management: Russian information operations have separately substituted fabricated progress footage for real territorial gains during the same static period, indicating the narrative gap is a recurring management tool rather than a one-off claim.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    ISW's rebuttal establishes a second dated instance this year of Gerasimov's public battlefield claims outrunning verifiable evidence.

  • Precedent

    Repeated, dated rebuttals give independent monitors a track record to weigh future Gerasimov announcements against, rather than assessing each claim in isolation.

First Reported In

Update #24 · Fedorov sacked as the front stands still

Institute for the Study of War· 19 Jul 2026
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