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Iran Conflict 2026
13JUN

France and Japan pay Iran's toll

2 min read
10:52UTC

Two G7 nations paid Iran in yuan to transit the Strait of Hormuz, breaking the collective coalition posture Washington built.

ConflictAssessed
Key takeaway

The US-led coalition is fracturing as allies pay Iran for passage in Chinese currency.

CMA CGM Kribi, a Malta-flagged container ship owned by France's CMA CGM (the world's third-largest container line), became the first Western European vessel to transit the Strait of Hormuz since 28 February. It paid Iran's toll in yuan. Before entering Iranian territorial waters, the ship changed its AIS designation to "Owner France", signalling nationality for the IRGC's sorting mechanism. 1

Hours later, Mitsui OSK Lines' LNG carrier Sohar LNG crossed in ballast, the first Japanese-affiliated vessel to transit. Three Omani ships also passed through . The toll system charges $1 per barrel for oil tankers or roughly $2 million flat for container ships, payable in yuan or stablecoins.

France and Japan are nominal US allies. Both coordinated with Iranian maritime authorities. Both implicitly accepted Tehran's sovereignty claim over the strait, the precise claim Trump's 6 April energy deadline threatens force to break. Both paid in yuan, not dollars. The Philippines cut its own bilateral deal two days earlier . The coalition posture Washington has relied on since the blockade began is dissolving into bilateral licensing arrangements administered by Tehran.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

France and Japan are close US allies. On 4 April, their shipping companies paid Iran a fee in Chinese currency to sail through the Strait of Hormuz. This matters for two reasons. First, they implicitly accepted Iran's right to charge for use of an international waterway. Second, they paid in yuan, not dollars, chipping away at US financial influence. The Philippines cut a similar deal two days earlier. The alliance the US built around Hormuz is dissolving one bilateral arrangement at a time.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

France's CMA CGM faces existential commercial pressure: the world's third-largest container line cannot absorb indefinite Hormuz closure without route restructuring at scale.

Japan's LNG dependency on Gulf supply creates energy-security vulnerability that outweighs diplomatic solidarity costs. Both governments calculated that collective posture imposed costs their economies could not sustain, while defection imposed only reputational costs the US would absorb rather than escalate over.

What could happen next?
  • Precedent

    Yuan payment for Hormuz passage creates a non-dollar settlement precedent for strategic waterway access that will outlast this conflict.

    Long term · High
  • Consequence

    Each bilateral deal reduces the political viability of US military action to reopen Hormuz, as enforcement would require overriding arrangements US allies have themselves accepted.

    Short term · High
  • Risk

    General License U expiry on 19 April could force a confrontation with France and Japan if Treasury declines to renew, criminalising transactions both nations have already completed.

    Medium term · Medium
First Reported In

Update #58 · First US aircraft fall over Iran

Euronews / Bloomberg· 4 Apr 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Brent fell to near $87.33 on 80 per cent deal-probability pricing, but Lloyd's has not de-listed Hormuz from its war-risk register and shipping diversions continue at 139 vessels. Insurance markets are lagging futures: physical risk remains while financial markets have spent the good news before the paper exists.
India
India
Modi is expected to raise the deaths of three Indian sailors in the 11 June CENTCOM strike on the MT Settebello with Trump at G7 sidelines, the first non-party leader to put the blockade's human cost into a formal bilateral. New Delhi is also a major Iranian oil buyer whose import volumes the sanctions-relief terms will govern.
Israel (Netanyahu)
Israel (Netanyahu)
Netanyahu stated Israel is not party to the deal on 12 June; Defence Minister Katz ruled out the Lebanon withdrawal Iran's draft demands, inserting a third blocker the US-Iran negotiating channel cannot resolve. Israel's position tethers Hormuz reopening to a Lebanon settlement Washington has not brokered.
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Sharif declared a final agreed text on 12 June before either principal confirmed it, running two Tehran visits in under a week without securing a written IRGC or Khamenei response. Islamabad's incentive to claim a diplomatic win outpaces its standing to deliver either capital's signature.
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Araghchi declared digital signing within days while setting dilute-in-Iran as a non-negotiable red line on the 440.9 kg HEU stockpile, a standing Tehran position he cannot override without authorisation from Khamenei, reachable only by courier. The FM track is sprinting to close before the IRGC reasserts control.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Vance called the deal still TBD on 12 June while CENTCOM downed Iranian drones over Hormuz for a second consecutive night and the White House register stayed blank. Washington holds the ship-out position on HEU and has not signed an Iran instrument in over 100 days of conflict.