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Iran Conflict 2026
11JUN

Ghalibaf declares new world order, quoting Xi

4 min read
09:17UTC

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on Sunday the world is 'at the cusp of a new order', quoting Xi Jinping's 'transformation unseen in a century' and crediting Iran's '70-day resistance' with accelerating the shift.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Ghalibaf is selling the war as Global South vindication while Araghchi still tries to keep a back-channel open.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran's Majlis, declared on Sunday 17 May that the world is "at the cusp of a new order", lifting Xi Jinping's formulation "transformation unseen in a century" and crediting Iran's "70-day resistance" with accelerating the shift 1. The declaration coincided with the morning Donald Trump's AI-generated storm image went up on Truth Social (Event 3). No bilateral instrument followed.

The framing is calibrated to the readout problem out of Beijing. The Trump-Xi summit on 14 May produced a Chinese readout that omitted the Iran specifics Trump had publicly claimed Xi pledged in person . Tehran has chosen to read that gap as a Chinese refusal to deliver the isolation Washington wanted. Ghalibaf, who sits inside the parliamentary bloc that suspended IAEA cooperation last year, is appropriating Xi's signature phrase to reframe Iran's 70 days of war as the operational accelerant of a global power shift Beijing is endorsing by silence.

The declaration also exposes Iran's two-track foreign policy at its widest aperture this month. Abbas Araghchi's diplomatic channel runs through Islamabad on the assumption that civilian negotiation remains possible; Ghalibaf's pulpit broadcasts historical vindication on the assumption that it is unnecessary. The Western maritime mission Iran's Majlis just declared its toll regime over (Event 0, and the BRICS deadlock at Delhi (Event 4) both sit inside the framing Ghalibaf is inverting. Whether Tehran can run both registers simultaneously without the bounty-bill threshold (Event 6) collapsing the diplomatic side is the question the Foreign Ministry now has to answer.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the Speaker of Iran's parliament, a senior position in a country where parliament matters considerably more than in many authoritarian states. On 17 May he made a speech declaring that the world is on the verge of a 'new order', using a phrase that China's President Xi Jinping has used to describe the shift in global power away from the United States. Ghalibaf credited Iran's 70 days of resisting US and Israeli attacks with helping to cause this shift. This kind of rhetoric serves a domestic purpose, telling Iranians that their hardship during the war is historically meaningful, and an external one, claiming that China and the Global South support Iran's position even though Beijing has not said so explicitly.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Ghalibaf's declaration serves two structural functions simultaneously. Domestically, it repositions Iran's 70-day war from a catastrophic failure of deterrence, US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran's air defences in the opening hours, into a historical pivot point that validates the hardliner wing of the Majlis. This framing is essential for the parliamentary bloc that suspended IAEA cooperation 221-0 and is now advancing the Hormuz toll bill and the Trump bounty bill simultaneously.

Externally, Ghalibaf is exploiting the Beijing readout gap. China's summit communique named only 'the Middle East situation' without Iran-specific language, which Iran's leadership has interpreted as Beijing refusing to endorse Washington's demands. Reading that refusal as Chinese endorsement of Iran's resistance is interpretively aggressive but internally consistent: if China will not say Iran is wrong, Iran can say China believes Iran is right.

Escalation

Ghalibaf's declaration that Iran's resistance is historically vindicated runs directly counter to any settlement that frames the war as a negotiated compromise. The parliamentary leadership is publicly committing to a narrative that makes ceasefire-as-capitulation domestically toxic, limiting Araghchi's flexibility in the Islamabad channel.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Ghalibaf's public framing of the war as Global South vindication creates a domestic political cost for any ceasefire that does not include explicit US concessions on Hormuz sovereignty, extending the likely duration of the maritime disruption.

    Short term · Medium
  • Risk

    Tehran's annexation of Chinese rhetorical authority without Beijing's endorsement risks a Chinese public clarification that explicitly distances Xi's 'transformation unseen in a century' from the Iran-US conflict, producing a diplomatic humiliation at the worst possible moment.

    Short term · Low
  • Meaning

    The simultaneous Ghalibaf declaration and Araghchi negotiation represent the widest public divergence between Iran's legislative and diplomatic tracks since the war began, signalling institutional stress inside the Tehran policy framework.

    Immediate · High
First Reported In

Update #100 · Tehran prints the toll book; Delhi joins the queue

ANI News· 17 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.