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Iran Conflict 2026
1JUN

Trump threatens new target groups

2 min read
08:32UTC

A Truth Social post expands stated US war aims to unnamed categories of targets — language without precedent in modern presidential rhetoric and with direct implications under the laws of war.

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President Trump posted on Truth Social on Saturday morning: "Today Iran will be hit very hard! Under serious consideration for complete destruction and certain death, because of Iran's bad behavior, are areas and groups of people that were not considered for targeting up until this moment in time." Bloomberg ran the headline: "Trump Says US May Target New Parts of Iran." The phrase has no precedent in modern US presidential targeting rhetoric. Prior targets in this campaign have been military: IRGC bases, missile sites, naval vessels, air defences, command infrastructure.

The statement extends a trajectory documented across eight days. Trump demanded unconditional surrender on 5 March , then issued immunity-or-death ultimatums directly to IRGC commanders via social media . CENTCOM was subsequently directed to "dismantle the Iranian regime's security apparatus" — a war aim encompassing the IRGC, Basij, MOIS, and internal security forces , materially different from the campaign's opening framing of nuclear facilities and missile infrastructure. Each step broadened the stated objective. None was accompanied by a diplomatic mechanism to give it operational meaning. Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly closed the door on negotiations . The Egypt-Turkey-Oman mediation has produced no confirmed participants. Congress has rejected war authorisation in both chambers — 212–219 in the House and 47–53 in the Senate .

"Areas" not previously considered could mean cultural heritage sites, civilian government buildings, or infrastructure sustaining the civilian population — power grids, water treatment, telecommunications. "Groups of people" could refer to remaining IRGC leadership, civilian government officials, or religious figures. The United States is not party to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions but is bound by customary International humanitarian law, including the principle of distinction — the requirement to differentiate between military objectives and civilian objects. The DoD Law of War Manual, which governs US forces, prohibits attacks directed at the civilian population as such. Commanders who receive orders derived from this statement must evaluate them against these requirements. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, personal criminal liability attaches to service members who knowingly execute unlawful orders.

Trump separately cast Pezeshkian's televised apology as a form of surrender. Pezeshkian explicitly rejected the unconditional surrender demand, calling it "a dream that they should take to their grave." The forces Trump now threatens to target more expansively are the same forces Iran's own civilian president cannot control — the IRGC's 31 autonomous provincial commands continued striking Dubai, Saudi oil facilities, and Bahrain within hours of Pezeshkian's halt order. Widening the target set does not resolve the command fragmentation that makes negotiated de-escalation difficult. It compounds the problem by eliminating whatever remains of the institutional structure a future interlocutor would need to enforce a ceasefire.

First Reported In

Update #26 · President orders halt; IRGC ignores him

Bloomberg· 7 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Trump threatens new target groups
The statement extends a documented rhetorical escalation from military strikes through unconditional surrender demands to undefined targeting categories potentially encompassing civilian populations, creating legal obligations for US military commanders to evaluate resulting orders against the DoD Law of War Manual and the principle of distinction.
Different Perspectives
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Monitors documented a second death sentence for Zahra Tabari, 68, reported cemetery record deletions at Behesht-e Zahra, and a poll showing 81.5% of medical residents want to emigrate, against a background of 200+ confirmed executions since February. Iran's security courts operate at uninterrupted wartime tempo regardless of the diplomatic track.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Islamabad carried Trump's revised MOU demanding HEU destruction to Iranian negotiators, formally inheriting the role of sole active mediator after Oman's forced withdrawal. Pakistan lacks Oman's banking infrastructure for frozen-asset routing and carries its own regional stakes, making it a less structurally neutral broker.
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait intercepted Iranian missiles and drones for a second time in days on 1 June, with air-raid sirens sounding nationwide, after invoking Article 51 self-defence on 28 May following the Ali Al Salem ballistic-missile strike. The repeated interceptions test whether Kuwait's domestic politics can sustain hosting US forces as a de facto co-belligerent.
China (PRC)
China (PRC)
Beijing sent scholars to Shangri-La rather than its defence minister and addressed Taiwan without mentioning Iran, maintaining bilateral energy corridor protection with Tehran while refusing diplomatic exposure at multilateral forums. Trump barred China as an HEU custodian on 27 May, removing Beijing from the deal architecture while China continues supplying DPI hardware that caps Iran's internet.
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's held its Hormuz war-risk designation at $10-14 million per voyage while Brent recovered to $93.91, maintaining the structural divergence from futures pricing that has persisted since late May. Underwriters require a UN Security Council resolution or government certification letter, not diplomatic optimism.
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Five Gulf states wrote to the IMO on 21 May rejecting Iran's PGSA transit authority over international waters; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not confirmed participation in the European Hormuz mission. The GCC is navigating between US security guarantees and exposure to Iranian fire, with no Gulf state formally co-belligerent except Kuwait.