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Iran Conflict 2026
25MAY

20,000 seafarers trapped in Hormuz

4 min read
13:55UTC

Filipino, Indian, and Bangladeshi crews are stranded aboard vessels in the Persian Gulf while the countries that employ them negotiate a blockade that selectively lets Iranian oil through.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Only a naval convoy mission could protect 20,000 stranded seafarers — and none currently exists.

The International Maritime Organisation's cumulative tally for the strait of Hormuz since 28 February: 10 vessels attacked, 7 seafarers killed, and 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf. Tanker traffic through Hormuz has fallen 90% from pre-war levels. GPS jamming has been reported across the strait.

The stranded crews are mostly from the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh — countries whose nationals make up the backbone of global merchant shipping but whose governments have no seat at the table where the war's conduct is determined. Manila, New Delhi, and Dhaka face the same structural position: their citizens crew the ships, their economies depend on Gulf energy imports, and they possess no mechanism to compel safe passage. The IMO has issued condemnations. It has no enforcement power and no naval assets.

The blockade's selectivity sharpens the injustice. 11.7 million barrels of Iranian crude have transited the strait since 28 February, all bound for China, according to TankerTrackers.com co-founder Samir Madani. The IRGC's earlier publicly claimed strikes on the Marshall Islands-flagged Louise P and the Prima , established the operating principle: Iran decides who passes. Chinese-operated vessels systematically broadcast AIS messages emphasising Chinese ownership and crew nationality. The two-tier passage system Fortune documented days ago is now the strait's governing reality — open for Chinese-linked commerce, functionally closed for everyone else.

GPS jamming compounds the danger. A vessel unable to navigate accurately in Hormuz21 nautical miles at its narrowest, with traffic separation lanes barely two miles wide — faces grounding, collision, or drift into Iranian territorial waters. Any of these could trigger a new incident. The 90% traffic decline reflects insurance withdrawal as much as physical threat; every major protection and indemnity club cancelled War risk coverage effective 5 March. For the 20,000 stranded seafarers, the arithmetic is personal: they cannot transit out, their employers cannot insure the voyage, and the governments that might negotiate their passage are consumed by the oil price crisis their stranding helped create.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that roughly a fifth of the world's oil passes through. Iran has been attacking ships there and declared it closed. Twenty thousand sailors — most from the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh — are now stuck on vessels in the Persian Gulf, unable to leave safely. The IMO is the international body responsible for seafarer welfare, but it has no ships or enforcement powers of its own. It can write letters; it cannot escort vessels through a war zone. Unlike the Suez Canal, there is no alternative route around the Persian Gulf — it is geographically a dead end, which means every option for restoring traffic requires either defeating the blockade militarily or negotiating Iran's consent.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The demographic concentration of stranded seafarers — Philippines, India, Bangladesh — is not random. These three countries together supply approximately 40% of the global professional seafarer workforce. The human cost of the blockade falls disproportionately on labour-exporting Global South nations whose governments face domestic political pressure but possess no naval capacity to protect their citizens. The states with naval capacity to act are parties to the conflict. This asymmetry ensures the humanitarian crisis has no available advocate with both the motive and the means to resolve it.

Root Causes

The IMO's flag-state architecture grants Iran, as a coastal state, de facto authority over transit that UNCLOS Part III designates as subject to non-suspendable transit passage rights. Iran's suspension of those obligations carries no enforcement consequence because no member state has invoked ITLOS dispute mechanisms, and the treaty's design contains no self-executing enforcement provision. The legal gap predates this conflict.

Escalation

The addition of GPS jamming extends Iranian interdiction capability without requiring additional IRGC naval assets. It degrades safe navigation for vessels attempting transit on their own commercial risk, effectively expanding the blockade's reach beyond physical attack. The cumulative effect — kinetic threat plus electronic warfare plus insurance pricing — makes residual transit non-viable for commercially rational operators.

What could happen next?
2 consequence2 risk1 precedent
  • Consequence

    Twenty thousand stranded seafarers cannot be evacuated without a naval escort mechanism that does not currently exist and that no state has proposed.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    GPS jamming expands Iranian interdiction capability without additional naval assets, making residual voluntary transit commercially and navigationally non-viable simultaneously.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    If no state invokes UNCLOS dispute mechanisms against Iran's blockade, it establishes that a coastal state can suspend non-suspendable transit passage rights without legal consequence.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Labour-exporting countries supplying 40% of global seafarers face structural economic damage as Gulf route recruitment collapses and remittance flows decline.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Risk

    The IMO's demonstrated enforcement impotence in this crisis may accelerate pressure to reform the flag-state system, but any institutional reform would take years to negotiate and ratify.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #32 · UN condemns Iran 13-0; ceasefire blocked

IMO· 12 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
20,000 seafarers trapped in Hormuz
The 20,000 stranded seafarers represent a humanitarian crisis invisible behind the oil price headlines. Their governments have no leverage over the blockade's terms, the IMO has no enforcement power, and GPS jamming in one of the world's most congested waterways adds navigational danger to the physical threat of interdiction.
Different Perspectives
Lloyd's of London
Lloyd's of London
The Joint War Committee left Hormuz war-risk premiums at $10-14 million per voyage on 25 May, declining to move on Brent's 5% fall. The JWC's protocol requires a UN Security Council resolution or bilateral government certification letter before de-listing, and neither has arrived: a verbal understanding does not satisfy the formal condition the reinsurance market's treaty terms require.
Gulf Arab producers
Gulf Arab producers
Saudi Arabia and UAE depend on Hormuz for their own crude exports; Aramco CEO Nasser has warned no oil market recovery arrives until 2027 if the blockade continues past mid-June. Monday's $98.96 Brent settlement shortens nothing for Gulf producers without a signed instrument and a Pentagon mine-clearance timeline that runs up to six months post-ceasefire.
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar holds $12bn of frozen Iranian assets at the centre of the sequencing dispute but cannot release them without explicit US Treasury authorisation, given the original freeze was a US instrument. As the asset-holding state, Qatar's leverage is real but passive: it is the escrow holder, not the decision-maker, and any resolution requires US Treasury sign-off that Trump has withheld.
Pakistan
Pakistan
With both Prime Minister Sharif and army chief Munir simultaneously in Beijing on 25 May, Pakistan has for the first time consolidated its civilian and military mediation tracks under China's roof. Munir's direct Tehran-to-Beijing flight signals that the security and financial threads of the sequencing problem are now being worked in parallel rather than sequentially.
China
China
Beijing hosted Pakistan's principal mediators and Iran's China envoy Ghalibaf simultaneously on 25 May while its banking regulator capped new state-bank lending to five sanctioned refiners. China is simultaneously the most credible third-party underwriter of the $12bn sequencing and the state whose institutions face live OFAC secondary-sanctions exposure if the deadlock persists through GL V's expiry.
United States
United States
Trump posted on 24 May that the blockade holds until a deal is certified and signed, ruling out the informal MOU structure both sides had been building. The 'certified, and signed' condition is the first operational bar Trump has attached in 87 days, but it arrived without an executive instrument, maintaining the gap between posted ultimatum and signed US policy.