Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Cuba Dispatch
28MAY

Diaz-Canel admits Russian oil running out

3 min read
08:42UTC

On 4 May Miguel Diaz-Canel told reporters the Kolodkin's 730,000-barrel cargo was depleting and Cuba had no certainty about the next shipment.

PoliticsDeveloping
Key takeaway

The president put on his own record what UNE bulletins had implied: the Kolodkin cushion is gone.

President Miguel Díaz-Canel said publicly on Monday 4 May 2026 that the Russian crude delivered by the Anatoly Kolodkin on 31 March is "already running out these days" and that Cuba has "no certainty about the arrival of another shipment" 1. The statement is the first presidential acknowledgement of the fuel gap, made one day before the Antonio Guiteras plant tripped on 5 May.

The Kolodkin's 730,000-barrel delivery had powered the late-April window of restored grid stability in Havana . At Cuba's roughly 60,000-barrel-per-day baseline crude consumption, that cargo bought ten to twelve days of margin. The cushion has now been burnt, and the next Russian vessel positioned for Cuba is the Sovcomflot Universal, which Bloomberg locates 1,000 nautical miles offshore on 5 May at a pace that cannot reach port before its GL 134B licence expires.

The admission breaks an information pattern. Earlier crude tightness had been signalled through UNE bulletin language and indirect minister statements; the 4 May admission came from the president on the record. The 10 April back-channel between State Department officials and Havana , and the GL 134B extension issued on 18 April have not produced a confirmed second tanker. The combination of those two facts means Havana is signalling, in public, that the Russian-Cuban supply chain is at the edge of what Sovcomflot can move under sanctions cover.

The diplomatic reading runs alongside the operational one. A presidential admission of fuel shortage is unusual in Cuban political grammar; it is normally absorbed into ministry-level language about "complex moments." Díaz-Canel's choice to put the words on his own record raises domestic expectation pressure on Moscow at exactly the moment Washington's 1 May sanctions order tightens the personal architecture around officials and their families.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Cuba has to import almost all its oil, it does not produce enough to run its power stations, vehicles, and industry. The most recent delivery came from a Russian ship called the Anatoly Kolodkin in March. That fuel lasted about five to six weeks before running out. On 4 May, Cuba's president said publicly that the Russian oil was almost gone and that Cuba had no confirmed next delivery. This is unusual: Cuban leaders do not normally admit supply problems so directly. It signals that the situation on the ground, widespread blackouts visible to millions of people, has made managing the news impossible.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Cuba imports approximately 60,000-70,000 barrels per day of fuel, almost entirely from Venezuela and Russia. Venezuelan supply was curtailed after EO 14380 excluded GAESA from the PDVSA licence framework on 25 March 2026. Russia became the sole remaining state-level supplier.

A single tanker delivery of 730,000 barrels covers approximately 10-12 days of national consumption, which aligns precisely with the four blackout-free days achieved in Havana during the Kolodkin burn and the subsequent relapse.

Cuba holds no strategic fuel reserve beyond the Matanzas terminal storage, which covers a few weeks of consumption at most. With no second tanker confirmed and the Universal deterred from declaring its Cuban destination, Cuba's grid is operating on a consumption curve rather than a storage buffer.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    With the Kolodkin fuel exhausted and no confirmed replacement, Cuba's grid deficit will worsen unless Russia dispatches a second vessel before the Universal's GL 134B licence expires on 16 May.

  • Consequence

    A presidential fuel-gap admission creates a domestic credibility problem for Díaz-Canel: any further deterioration in conditions will now be measured against his own public acknowledgement of the supply failure.

First Reported In

Update #3 · Family sanctions land as the grid relapses

Periódico Cubano· 7 May 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
Holy See and WOLA engagement-track analysts
Holy See and WOLA engagement-track analysts
Caritas Cuba distributed 82 per cent of a $3M tranche to 8,800 families via the Church channel Rubio proposed at his 9 May Vatican audience. WOLA analysts note that personal sanctions on peso-denominated officeholders carry limited coercive effect; the Church track is the one instrument that reaches ordinary Cubans directly.
Sovcomflot and Russia
Sovcomflot and Russia
Moscow has announced no replacement for the Universal after it diverted on 26 May, and Sovcomflot's failure to activate Russia's National Reinsurance Company cover as a substitute for the expired P&I insurance signals that Russian fuel deliveries to Cuba now depend on OFAC-compatible licensing rather than on an unconditional bilateral commitment.
Prisoners Defenders and OCDH human rights monitors
Prisoners Defenders and OCDH human rights monitors
Prisoners Defenders' April 2026 census of 1,260 political prisoners, its highest on record, documents the caseload rising by ten in a month despite repeated Cuban pardon announcements. Maykel Osorbo's refusal of the State Security exile-or-2030 ultimatum in May kept a high-profile name inside the registry Havana would need cleared before any prisoner-release negotiation proceeds.
MINREX and Cuban government
MINREX and Cuban government
Cuba's foreign ministry condemned the indictment as 'political coercion' and filed a formal protest met by the US Deputy Secretary of State on 24 May. Diaz-Canel offered dialogue 'on equal terms' but ruled political prisoners off the table, while Cuba's pardon decrees structurally exclude crimes-against-authority charges from every amnesty wave, leaving the 1,260-prisoner count unchanged.
Trump administration and Florida delegation
Trump administration and Florida delegation
The administration framed the 18 May designation wave and 20 May indictment as accountability for Cuba's security apparatus; Florida Republicans Gimenez, Diaz-Balart, and Salazar credited constituent pressure for the EO 14404 architecture. Senate Democrats Kaine, Schiff, and Gallego, having lost S.J.Res.124 51-47 on 29 April, called the Nimitz deployment under Operation Southern Spear a constitutional overreach.
OCDH and dissident coalition (Otero Alcántara, Osorbo proxies)
OCDH and dissident coalition (Otero Alcántara, Osorbo proxies)
The Madrid-based OCDH coordinated the 13 May Brussels handover after the Cuban Supreme Popular Court rejected Otero Alcántara's early-release appeal in late April. The coalition's pivot to the EU restrictive-measures track follows procedural closure of the early-release vector before the 24 April US deadline lapsed.