106 combat engagements along the front line on 4 March, down from 145 on 2 March1. The drop coincides with rasputitsa — the seasonal thaw that turns Ukraine's black earth into vehicle-swallowing mud. The pattern is consistent with reduced mechanised mobility, not reduced intent: infantry-led assaults continued across all active sectors.
The heaviest pressure fell on three axes. At Pokrovsk, which fell to Russian forces in December 2025, attacks targeted Ukrainian positions west of Krasnoarmeysk — the next step in exploiting the city as a forward logistics platform. At Kostiantynivka, nine separate Russian assault actions hit Pleshchiivka, Sofiivka, and the approaches to Illinivka. These settlements sit on the routes to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the twin cities anchoring Ukraine's eastern defence; their encirclement has been Russia's stated operational objective for over a year. At Huliaipole, Russian forces pressed the Zaporizhzhia axis — the same sector where Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi reported Ukrainian forces recaptured 300–400 square kilometres during February.
Rasputitsa has constrained operations in this theatre for centuries; what changes is how armies compensate. The 8,828 Russian kamikaze drones launched in a single 24-hour period days earlier — roughly triple the 2025 daily average — suggest Moscow is substituting aerial volume for ground mobility. Drones are unaffected by mud, cheaper per sortie than artillery, and impose constant attrition on Ukrainian positions regardless of whether Russian armour can move. The operational tempo on 4 March was lower. The war of attrition was not.
