Iran tabled a 10-point plan at Islamabad listing "acceptance of enrichment" as non-negotiable. The United States tabled a 15-point plan demanding a zero nuclear weapons commitment, removal of Iran's HEU stockpile from the country, limits on defence capabilities, and unconditional Hormuz reopening. Donald Trump posted that "there will be no enrichment of Uranium"; Iran's plan explicitly claims the right to it.
Sanam Vakil, Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa director, assessed that Iran is "unlikely" to surrender its HEU stockpile and that downblending to lower enrichment levels is the realistic floor for any deal. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had publicly offered downblending on CBS in March, but Islamabad's US demands went further: full removal of the material from Iranian territory.
The last verified stockpile figure is 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, recorded by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in September 2025, before the strikes. At 60% purity, that quantity requires relatively modest further enrichment to reach weapons-grade; the IAEA defines a "significant quantity" for a single device at 25 kg of 90%-enriched uranium. Since the Majlis voted 221-0 to suspend all IAEA cooperation on 3 April, no independent verification has been possible.
The Arms Control Association assessed in March that US negotiators were "ill-prepared for serious nuclear negotiations." The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) took 20 months of structured talks with continuous IAEA access to bridge a comparable enrichment gap. Islamabad attempted the same in two days, without inspectors.
