Ukrainian drones struck Ust-Luga and Primorsk, Russia's two largest Baltic oil export terminals, at least four times between 22 and 31 March. Together these ports handle roughly 60% of Russia's seaborne oil flow. Weekly crude exports fell from 4.07 million barrels per day to 2.32 million bpd, a 43% collapse1. Bloomberg data shows this is the steepest single-week drop in modern Russian export history. Revenue fell from $2.45 billion to $1.44 billion.
On 26 and 27 March, no ships recorded loading oil at any of Russia's three Baltic ports. Two consecutive zero-loading days had not occurred since 2022. President Zelenskyy framed the campaign as deliberate policy: "Unlike most countries, Ukraine has its own sanctions: its long-range capabilities." The logic is strategic. On 12 March, the US Treasury waived sanctions on approximately 124 million barrels of Russian oil at sea, valued by Zelenskyy at roughly $10 billion. That waiver expires on 11 April. When international enforcement weakens, Ukraine destroys the pipes.
The contrast with the revenue picture two weeks earlier is sharp. CREA data showed Russia earning €510 million per day in fossil fuel revenues during the Iran war's first fortnight. The Urals benchmark has since risen $11.30 to $73.24 per barrel, well above the $59 budget assumption. High prices mean nothing if tankers cannot load. Ukrainian strikes on the Labinsk oil depot targeted inland storage; the Baltic campaign targets the revenue stream itself.
