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Iran Conflict 2026
10MAY

Iran and Oman draft Hormuz bilateral

2 min read
14:22UTC

Esmaeil Baghaei told his weekly Tehran press conference on 18 May that Iran and Oman were 'in continuous consultations' to design a new bilateral Hormuz transit mechanism, following an expert-level meeting in Muscat the previous week.

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Key takeaway

Muscat drafting a Hormuz mechanism with Tehran would convert a unilateral toll into a treaty Western planners must negotiate around.

At his weekly Tehran press conference on 18 May 2026, Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, said Iran and Oman were 'in continuous consultations' on a bilateral Hormuz transit mechanism, after an expert-level technical meeting in Muscat the previous week, Euronews reported 1. Baghaei's weekly briefing is the primary on-the-record channel for Iran's diplomatic positions; this one extended a bilateral channel Tehran had only previously disclosed in the context of guiding Indian vessels through Hormuz minefields .

Oman shares administration of the strait of Hormuz with Iran under a 1968 bilateral agreement signed before UNCLOS was drafted. That historical priority matters for the legal architecture: a co-signed Iran-Oman transit system cannot be dismissed as a unilateral Iranian imposition the way the PGSA-only mechanism can, and it directly confronts the UNCLOS Article 38 freedom-of-navigation foundation the 26-nation coalition has been resting on .

The Muscat track also reframes Oman's diplomatic posture. Muscat has historically been the back-channel host for US-Iran talks rather than a co-administrator of pressure. Drafting a transit mechanism with Tehran rather than mediating between Tehran and Washington places Oman closer to Iran's institutional architecture than to the coalition's. If a written agreement emerges, the freedom-of-navigation argument coalition planners have been making becomes a treaty dispute between two sovereigns who share the strait, not a corridor-opening operation against an isolated obstructor. The shift is the kind of legal repositioning that, once signed, is hard to reverse with hardware.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran and Oman are working on a deal to manage who gets through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is a small Gulf state that borders the southern half of the strait. It has a long history of acting as a go-between it hosted the secret talks that produced the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. What makes Oman useful here is geography: its waters cover part of the strait's main shipping lane, so any arrangement that runs through Muscat has a legal foundation that Iran's own permit body lacks. A deal here would be harder for the US-led coalition to dismiss than Iran's unilateral toll.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Oman's value in this negotiation stems from a geographic fact that no political decision can alter: its territorial waters extend to the southern half of the strait's navigable channel. Any transit mechanism that runs through Omani coordination therefore operates partly inside Omani sovereign space, giving it a jurisdictional basis the PGSA's Chinese-yuan portal lacks.

A second structural driver is Iran's need for a face-saving exit from the PGSA mechanism. The PGSA generates compliance dilemmas but cannot be physically enforced against a coalition with Wedgetail AEW&C and Charles de Gaulle overhead. A bilateral Oman arrangement lets Tehran claim the PGSA succeeded diplomatically rather than retreating under pressure.

Third, Oman has an independent economic interest in Hormuz stabilisation: its LNG export revenue from Qalhat runs through the strait, and prolonged disruption costs Muscat directly.

Escalation

The Iran-Oman bilateral process is de-escalatory at the procedural level it provides a forum for managing the strait short of kinetic confrontation. Its risk is that it could harden Iran's claim to joint-administrative authority over the strait if a deal is signed before the coalition has agreed its own rules of engagement.

What could happen next?
  • Opportunity

    A signed Iran-Oman transit protocol would give the 26-nation coalition a legal text to engage with rather than a unilateral Iranian claim to refuse.

    Short term · 0.68
  • Risk

    If Oman signs a bilateral mechanism that implicitly validates the PGSA's jurisdictional claims, Gulf Cooperation Council cohesion faces a significant test.

    Medium term · 0.61
  • Precedent

    A functioning Oman-Iran co-administration of Hormuz would restructure the strait's legal governance for decades, regardless of how the 2026 conflict ends.

    Long term · 0.55
Sources:Euronews
Mentions:Esmaeil Baqaei →Iran →Oman →Strait of Hormuz →Euronews →Muscat →Algeria →Riyadh →RUSI →Abu Dhabi →Tehran →Doha →Washington →Persian Gulf Strait Authority →CENTCOM (US Central Command) →UN Convention on the Law of the Sea →
First Reported In

Update #102 · Iran signs Hormuz toll; Trump posts a cancelled strike

Euronews· 19 May 2026
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Causes and effects
Caused by
PGSA goes live on Hormuz transit
The PGSA's X account launch operationalised Iran's unilateral Hormuz toll system on the same day Baghaei announced the Iran-Oman bilateral track, suggesting a deliberate parallel architecture.
Occurred 18 May 2026
Read story →
This Event
Iran and Oman draft Hormuz bilateral
Oman's 1968 bilateral with Iran predates UNCLOS, so a co-signed transit system would give Iran international-law cover the unilateral PGSA portal lacks and pull the coalition's freedom-of-navigation argument into a treaty dispute.
Led to
PGSA opens vessel portal, withholds tariff schedule
Baghaei's confirmation of Iran-Oman bilateral Hormuz consultations on 18 May deepened the bilateral guided-passage architecture documented in event 3.
Occurred 20 May 2026
Read story →
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Oil markets / Lloyd's of London
Brent fell to near $87.33 on 80 per cent deal-probability pricing, but Lloyd's has not de-listed Hormuz from its war-risk register and shipping diversions continue at 139 vessels. Insurance markets are lagging futures: physical risk remains while financial markets have spent the good news before the paper exists.
India
India
Modi is expected to raise the deaths of three Indian sailors in the 11 June CENTCOM strike on the MT Settebello with Trump at G7 sidelines, the first non-party leader to put the blockade's human cost into a formal bilateral. New Delhi is also a major Iranian oil buyer whose import volumes the sanctions-relief terms will govern.
Israel (Netanyahu)
Israel (Netanyahu)
Netanyahu stated Israel is not party to the deal on 12 June; Defence Minister Katz ruled out the Lebanon withdrawal Iran's draft demands, inserting a third blocker the US-Iran negotiating channel cannot resolve. Israel's position tethers Hormuz reopening to a Lebanon settlement Washington has not brokered.
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Pakistan (mediator, Sharif/Naqvi)
Sharif declared a final agreed text on 12 June before either principal confirmed it, running two Tehran visits in under a week without securing a written IRGC or Khamenei response. Islamabad's incentive to claim a diplomatic win outpaces its standing to deliver either capital's signature.
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Iran foreign ministry (Araghchi)
Araghchi declared digital signing within days while setting dilute-in-Iran as a non-negotiable red line on the 440.9 kg HEU stockpile, a standing Tehran position he cannot override without authorisation from Khamenei, reachable only by courier. The FM track is sprinting to close before the IRGC reasserts control.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Vance called the deal still TBD on 12 June while CENTCOM downed Iranian drones over Hormuz for a second consecutive night and the White House register stayed blank. Washington holds the ship-out position on HEU and has not signed an Iran instrument in over 100 days of conflict.