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Iran Conflict 2026
29APR

Hengaw: two more 'Israel spy' hangings

3 min read
09:17UTC

Hengaw reported the executions of Naser Bakrzadeh and Yaqoub Karimpour in Iran on Saturday 2 May, both charged with spying for Israel; April's monthly total was revised upward to 26.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

April's revised total of 26 executions runs ahead of any diplomatic motion to slow it.

Hengaw, the Norway-based Kurdish human rights organisation, reported two executions in Iran on Saturday 2 May: Naser Bakrzadeh and Yaqoub Karimpour, both charged with spying for Israel⁠1. Hengaw simultaneously revised April's monthly execution total upward to at least 26, including 14 political prisoners⁠2. The previous topic figure was 22 political executions in the six weeks since 19 March; the April aggregate revises that count upward and tightens the window.

The 'spying for Israel' charge category links the executions directly to the war narrative. Iran's judiciary has been processing politically sensitive cases under that classification at speed since February 28. Bakrzadeh and Karimpour are the latest names attached to a category Hengaw has stopped publishing as a single rolling figure, because the monthly aggregate is now the only way the trajectory remains legible. The diplomatic track that might end the war-spy charge category is still stuck on sequencing.

The three Pakdasht mosque-fire defendants whose Supreme Court appeals were upheld on 27 April remain at imminent risk. Ehsan Hosseinipour Hesarloo, Matin Mohammadi and Erfan Amiri were aged 17 to 18 when arrested; their case files have moved to the implementation office, the administrative step before execution. Masoumeh Azhini, detained in early April, is still missing per Hengaw's 2 May report, with no information from authorities for a month.

Iran's judicial-execution rate during the 2026 conflict is outpacing diplomatic motion in either direction across both the war-spy and Pakdasht categories. The figures Hengaw publishes monthly arrive faster than the briefing cadence, and the next scheduled briefing (#87) will already be running behind a register that is still moving.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran has been executing political prisoners at an accelerating rate since the war began in February. Two more people, Naser Bakrzadeh and Yaqoub Karimpour, were hanged on 2 May, charged with spying for Israel. A human rights group called Hengaw, based in Norway, counted at least 26 executions in April alone, including 14 people classified as political prisoners. Three more men, who were teenagers when they were arrested for allegedly setting fire to a mosque, remain at a pre-execution holding facility and have not yet been killed. Human rights organisations say their convictions were based on confessions extracted under torture.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Iran's wartime execution rate has a structural driver the body does not fully surface: the IRGC's political-security apparatus, which controls the Evin Prison intelligence ward and the Ministry of Intelligence's detention facilities, has a documented interest in eliminating opposition figures before a ceasefire creates an accountability window.

The 1988 massacres followed a ceasefire negotiation, not a victory; internal opposition was liquidated while the leadership had emergency authority that a peace settlement would curtail.

The three Pakdasht mosque-fire defendants remain at the implementation office (the documented precursor location to execution) more than two weeks after the Supreme Court upheld their sentences. Their non-execution on 2 May may reflect tactical sequencing of execution batches rather than any change in their status.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    At the current rate of 14 political executions per month, a two-month ceasefire negotiation period would see roughly 28 more political prisoners executed before any peace agreement could create accountability pressure, deaths that cannot be reversed by any post-war process.

  • Consequence

    The three Pakdasht mosque-fire defendants remain at imminent execution risk despite international attention; their cases have become a visible test of whether external pressure influences Iran's execution pace during wartime.

First Reported In

Update #86 · Trump signs paper. The paper ends the war.

Hengaw Human Rights Organisation· 2 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
Wang Yi
Wang Yi
China's foreign minister and Djibouti's issued a joint communique on 21 October saying the war should not reach the Horn of Africa and stressing free navigation through Bab al-Mandeb. The text names neither Iran nor the Houthis, and Djibouti hosts China's only overseas military base, opposite the Yemeni coast.
Ministry of External Affairs
Ministry of External Affairs
India's foreign ministry called the attacks on Saudi civilian and energy sites "unacceptable" on 22 October and said they must stop at once. An Indian died at Dammam, Indians were injured there and at Shaybah, and about 4,000 Umrah pilgrims remain stranded by one MP's count.
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq closed the al-Sheeb crossing with Iran to travellers and trucks from 21 October and said other crossings would close gradually. Unlike September's closure, which ended on a staged timetable, this one has none, and Iran's interior ministry said it received no notice.
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Egypt's president said on 21 October that Cairo's support would "defend Saudi territory, and does not include an attack on Yemen". Araghchi warned that Egyptian involvement would further complicate the situation, and Cairo's limit matches the one Ankara set on 8 October against attacking another state's soil.
UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence
The MoD said on 20 October that RAF Typhoons over Saudi Arabia will not strike the Houthis, but extended tanker support to Saudi operations including against Houthi targets in Yemen. The tanker line sets no limit on strikes, so British aircraft may now refuel Saudi jets on bombing runs.
Turkey
Turkey
Ankara sent the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement to parliament around 20 October, and its published text treats an attack on one party as an attack on all. Article 16 brings it into force only on the last ratification, so the 5 October invocation in Riyadh could not yet bind Turkey.

Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.