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Iran Conflict 2026
18APR

Larijani: Iran will not talk to the US

3 min read
14:57UTC

Ali Larijani — the man who once negotiated Iran's nuclear programme with Europe — says there will be no talks with the government that killed the Supreme Leader.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iran's public refusal to negotiate with the US almost certainly reflects domestic political necessity rather than a final strategic position, given Iran's consistent historical pattern of backchannel engagement while maintaining public defiance.

Ali Larijani, senior adviser to Iran's Interim Leadership Council, stated publicly that Iran will not negotiate with the United States. The declaration came as the US-Israeli air campaign continued across Iranian territory and the three-person interim council formed under Article 111 (ID:77) attempted to consolidate authority without a Supreme Leader for the first time in the Islamic Republic's 47-year history.

Larijani is not an IRGC hawk issuing a reflexive refusal. He served as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council from 2005 to 2007, where he led nuclear negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, France, Germany). He was parliament speaker for twelve years. He participated in the diplomatic architecture that eventually produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. When Larijani says Iran will not negotiate, he speaks as someone who has negotiated with Western governments before — and who has calculated that the political cost of direct engagement with Washington now exceeds any benefit.

The logic is domestic. The interim council governs a country whose Supreme Leader, defence minister, IRGC commander, military chief of staff, and National Security Council secretary were all killed in strikes authorised by Washington . Up to 40 senior officials are dead. Any Iranian official who enters direct talks with the United States faces the charge of negotiating with the government responsible for those deaths — a charge that would be politically fatal during a succession contest where the IRGC retains independent military capacity and legitimacy is actively contested.

The refusal also exposes a gap in Washington's campaign design. President Trump explicitly rejected ground troops and nation-building , which means the air campaign's end state depends on Iranian compliance with terms Tehran has not agreed to. If Iran will not negotiate those terms directly, Washington must either find an intermediary willing to carry them, escalate further, or accept an outcome shaped by forces it has shattered but cannot replace.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

A senior Iranian official publicly stated that Iran will not, under any circumstances, talk to the United States. This was said on the same day that America's president claimed Iranian officials want to have talks. One of them must be wrong — or both are technically accurate because the public statements and the private diplomatic conversations are operating on completely separate tracks. Iran has a well-documented history of saying it will not deal with America in public while quietly sending messages through go-betweens, most recently through the Gulf state of Oman. The statement therefore tells us what Iran needs to be seen saying to its domestic audience and to hardline military factions, but it may reveal very little about what is actually happening in private diplomatic channels.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Larijani's declaration of non-negotiation is best understood as a political text directed at domestic audiences and IRGC hardliners rather than an operational communication to Washington. It establishes the public frame within which any eventual Iranian diplomatic engagement must be managed — through intermediaries, with deniability, structured so that Iran can claim it never negotiated directly with the Americans. The foreign minister's simultaneous message to Oman demonstrating openness to de-escalation efforts shows that Iran is actively distinguishing between public posture and practical diplomacy. This is a well-established Iranian diplomatic pattern: the JCPOA was preceded by precisely this kind of bifurcated communication. The analytical question is therefore not whether Iran will eventually engage, but whether the current military tempo allows sufficient time for that engagement to prevent further strategic deterioration.

Root Causes

Larijani's statement is driven by the political dynamics of an Iranian leadership under existential pressure. Any figure associated with the interim council who publicly expressed willingness to negotiate with the government that authorised the killing of the Supreme Leader would face immediate delegitimisation from IRGC hardliners, whose political influence remains significant even as their operational capacity is degraded. The statement is therefore structurally required of any Iranian official who wishes to retain political standing — it is less a strategic decision than a domestic political imperative. The framing of the refusal around the specific government that authorised the Supreme Leader's killing also preserves flexibility: a change of US administration, or a sufficiently indirect backchannel formulation, could theoretically be squared with Larijani's stated position.

Escalation

Larijani's statement does not in itself drive military escalation — it is a public posture, not an operational order. The escalation risk it creates is indirect: by removing the prospect of near-term direct negotiations from public view, it reduces international diplomatic pressure on the US and Israel to pause military operations pending talks, thereby giving those operations more running room. The more significant escalation indicator from Iran's side remains the foreign minister's separate admission that military units are acting outside central government direction (ID:547) — which suggests that regardless of what any Iranian diplomat says, the operational military response may not be fully controllable through negotiated commitments even if they were made.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    Larijani's refusal is primarily a domestic political signal insulating the interim council from hardline criticism rather than a definitive operational position closing off all diplomatic options.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    If taken at face value internationally, the refusal removes diplomatic pressure on the US and Israel to pause military operations pending negotiations, extending the military campaign's running room.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Iran's public refusal to negotiate concentrates all diplomatic weight on the Oman intermediary channel, making Muscat's role pivotal and potentially giving Oman significant leverage over outcome.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Iran's bifurcated public/private diplomatic posture — established during JCPOA negotiations — is being reproduced in the current crisis, suggesting the same backchannel architecture may be the only viable route to any eventual agreement.

    Medium term · Suggested
First Reported In

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Al Jazeera· 2 Mar 2026
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Different Perspectives
Global South governments (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa)
Global South governments (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa)
Neutrality was possible when the targets were military. 148 dead schoolgirls made it impossible — no government can explain that away to its own citizens.
Trump administration
Trump administration
Oscillating between claiming diplomatic progress and threatening escalation, while deploying additional ground forces to the Gulf.
Israeli security establishment
Israeli security establishment
Fears a rapid, vague US-Iran agreement that freezes military operations before the IDF achieves what it considers full strategic objectives. A senior military official assessed the campaign is 'halfway there' and needs several more weeks.
Iraqi government
Iraqi government
Iraq's force majeure is the position of a non-belligerent whose entire petroleum economy has been paralysed by a war between others — storage full, exports blocked, production being cut with no timeline for resumption.
Russia — Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia
Russia — Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia
Moscow calibrated its position between Gulf states and Iran: abstaining on Resolution 2817 rather than vetoing it, signalling it would not block protection for Gulf states, while refusing to endorse a text that ignores the US-Israeli campaign it regards as the conflict's proximate cause. Russia proposed its own ceasefire text — which failed 4-2-9 — allowing Moscow to claim the peacemaker role while providing Iran with satellite targeting intelligence, a duality consistent with its approach in Syria.
France — President Macron
France — President Macron
France absorbed its first combat death in a conflict it has publicly declined to join. The killing of Chief Warrant Officer Frion in Erbil forces Macron to choose between escalating involvement and accepting casualties from the margins.