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Iran Conflict 2026
26MAR

Trump says taking Iran's oil is his goal

3 min read
09:36UTC

The US president told the Financial Times he wants to seize Iran's oil, claimed a peace deal was imminent, and sent thousands of troops to the Gulf. All on the same day.

ConflictAssessed
Key takeaway

Three incompatible US objectives persist until one is abandoned.

Trump told the Financial Times on 30 March that his 'favourite thing is to take the oil in Iran,' directly naming Kharg Island, the terminal handling 90% of Iran's crude exports. 1 In the same interview he claimed Tehran had accepted 'most of' a US 15-point framework and that a deal 'could be soon.' He also acknowledged that killing Iran's leaders constitutes "regime change," contradicting weeks of administration denials. 2

Vice President Vance told a podcast five days ago that Iran's military is 'effectively destroyed,' then rebuked Prime Minister Netanyahu for "overselling the likelihood of Iran regime change" . Secretary of State Rubio told G7 ministers on 27 March that the war needs two to four more weeks . CENTCOM declared victory while the 82nd Airborne deployed . Iran's senior security officials responded through CNN: Tehran will determine when the war ends. Trump's own words have sharpened a contradiction that was already visible into something no diplomatic interlocutor can ignore.

No state enters peace negotiations while its adversary publicly declares intent to seize its primary revenue source. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar was offering to host direct US-Iran talks 'in coming days' at the exact moment Trump's interview circulated. The Islamabad diplomatic track, the strongest multilateral initiative of the conflict , concluded without a communique. A counter-perspective exists: some analysts argue Trump's statements are negotiating pressure, not operational intent. But the Pentagon's simultaneous confirmation of 'weeks of ground operations' planning and the arrival of 3,500 Marines in CENTCOM make that reading harder to sustain.

The 1968 Vietnam parallel is uncomfortable but relevant. Washington simultaneously escalated forces and pursued peace talks in Paris. The war continued seven more years. Negotiations succeeded only when military options were exhausted. The structural conditions here are similar: no mechanism exists to force a choice between the three tracks until one fails on its own terms.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

On the same day that American warships with thousands of troops arrived near Iran, President Trump gave an interview saying he most wanted to 'take the oil' from Iran, naming a specific island where most of Iran's oil exports leave from. At the same time, he said a peace deal was close. These two things directly contradict each other. No country will negotiate peace while the other side is publicly planning to seize its main source of income. Pakistan was at that very moment hosting a meeting of four countries trying to arrange peace talks. Trump's interview landed in the middle of it.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The US entered the conflict without a unified political objective. The military mission (degrade Iranian nuclear and missile capability) diverges structurally from the economic goal (reopen Hormuz) and the political goal (not government overthrow, per administration denials).

Trump's instinct to seize tangible assets reflects a transactional approach to conflict that treats oil as collateral, not as part of a coherent strategic objective. The administration inherited no policy consensus, and Trump's personal interventions have repeatedly overridden diplomatic channels before they consolidate.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    The Islamabad diplomatic track is structurally compromised. Pakistan cannot host talks where one party has publicly declared intent to seize the other's primary revenue source.

    Immediate · 0.9
  • Risk

    Three simultaneous and incompatible US objectives, with no internal mechanism to choose between them, increase the probability of unintended escalation as each track operates independently.

    Short term · 0.85
  • Precedent

    A presidential declaration of intent to seize a foreign state's primary resource terminal during active hostilities has no precedent in post-1945 international law outside colonial-era seizures.

    Long term · 0.95
First Reported In

Update #52 · Trump wants Iran's oil; 3,500 Marines land

CNBC / Financial Times· 30 Mar 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
IAEA
IAEA
Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.
India
India
Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.