26MAR

EU rejects Trump's Hormuz toll venture

2 min read

09:36UTC

Brussels cited UNCLOS transit rights to dismiss a US-Iran joint venture on strait fees.

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Key takeaway

Europe sees Hormuz tolls as a threat to the entire maritime order, not a single waterway dispute.

The European Union rejected Donald Trump's suggestion of a US-Iran "joint venture" on Hormuz toll collection. Under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), which applies as customary international law to non-signatories including both Iran and the United States, ships enjoy transit passage that "shall not be impeded" and fees may only be charged for specific services rendered, not by reason of passage alone.

No post-1945 precedent exists for a coastal state imposing mandatory tolls on a natural international strait. Just Security assessed Iran's blanket selective toll as a "clear violation" of international norms. Iran's Islamabad proposal included a fee structure tied to vessel passage, as detailed in the Hormuz traffic event above.

Trump had previously called the toll concept "a beautiful thing." That language sits uncomfortably alongside the US's historical role as guarantor of freedom of navigation. The EU's rejection is a legal rebuke, but it has no operational teeth: Russia and China co-vetoed the UNSC Hormuz reopening resolution 11-2 , blocking the only multilateral enforcement route for free navigation.

If tolls are formalised, the precedent extends far beyond Hormuz. Turkey could apply the same logic to the Bosphorus, Egypt could renegotiate Suez terms, Indonesia and Malaysia could toll the strait of Malacca. The EU's objection is not about Iran alone; it is about preventing the rewrite of a maritime order that underpins European trade.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Trump suggested that the US and Iran could run a 'joint venture' together to collect fees from ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. He called the idea 'a beautiful thing'. The EU immediately rejected it. Under international law, countries cannot charge ships simply for passing through international straits. Ships have a right to pass freely. Fees are only allowed for specific services, like a pilot to navigate a difficult channel. Iran charging a blanket toll for permission to pass is, in the view of almost every international law scholar, illegal. The EU's rejection matters because European ships are among those currently stranded or blocked. But the EU has no military means to enforce its legal position in the strait, so the rejection is a principled statement rather than an operational one.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The EU's UNCLOS position reflects a genuine institutional commitment to rules-based maritime order that European states depend on for trade flows through multiple global chokepoints.

Trump's willingness to entertain a toll joint venture reflects a transactional approach to international law: rules are useful when they serve US interests and renegotiable when they do not. The US's own freedom-of-navigation programme, which has operated since the 1970s, was built on exactly the principle the Hormuz toll would undermine.

What could happen next?

Precedent
Trump's positive framing of a US-Iran Hormuz toll joint venture, if pursued, would be the first US endorsement of a coastal state transit fee on a natural international strait, directly undermining the freedom-of-navigation doctrine the US has defended militarily for 70 years.
Consequence
The transatlantic split on the Hormuz toll question, US treating it as potentially 'beautiful', EU rejecting it as UNCLOS-incompatible, reduces the coherence of any Western negotiating position and gives Iran leverage to play the two sides against each other.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from United States

United States

LeftRight

Primary parallel: The 1956 Suez Crisis produced a similar transatlantic fracture: the US refused to support UK and French military action to retake the canal, forcing a humiliating withdrawal. The current EU-US split on Hormuz tolls is a mirror image, with Europe holding the legal principle and the US entertaining practical arrangements with the adversary.

Counter-parallel: The 1979 Iranian nationalisation of the oil industry (preceded by the 1973 Arab oil embargo) showed that US energy interests can override legal principles when the economic pressure is severe enough. Trump's 'beautiful thing' comment suggests a similar calculus: if a US share of Hormuz toll revenue secures energy flow, legal concerns become negotiable.

The UNCLOS violation is not merely a point of principle. If a Hormuz toll regime were accepted as legitimate, even in a US-Iran 'joint venture' format, it would create a precedent that coastal states can monetise transit passage through any international strait.

The Malacca Strait (handles 30% of global trade), the Bab el-Mandeb (approximately 6m barrels of oil per day), and the Taiwan Strait would all face analogous claims from coastal states. The global shipping industry's War Risks Committee estimates that if every major chokepoint adopted similar toll structures, annual insurance and transit costs for global trade would rise by $200-400 billion.

Trump's 'joint venture' framing also has a US fiscal angle: a shared toll regime with Iran would generate hard-currency revenue for Tehran while simultaneously giving Washington a political claim to managing global shipping infrastructure.

Sources:Just Security

Mentions:Turkey →Bosphorus →Malaysia →Iran →Suez Crisis →Islamabad →Indonesia →Prima →Egypt →Russia →Strait of Hormuz →United Nations →China →United States →Strait of Hormuz Toll System →European Union →UN Convention on the Law of the Sea →Donald Trump →

First Reported In

Update #66 · Islamabad collapses: 10 days to expiry

Just Security· 12 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

EU rejects Trump's Hormuz toll venture

The EU rejection exposes a transatlantic split: Trump entertained a toll concept that violates the maritime law framework Europe considers binding.

Led to

Paris drafts the Hormuz passage mission

The EU UNCLOS rejection of Trump's toll joint-venture (ID:2243) established the European legal ground the Paris conference is operationalising.

Occurred 17 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

IAEA

Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.

Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)

Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.

India

Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.

Pakistan

Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.

UK and France (Northwood coalition)

Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.