13SEP

Israel rejects a deal it never signed

3 min read

13:27UTC

Netanyahu said Israel had been saved from annihilation, then admitted he had not read the memorandum's text. Ben-Gvir called it non-binding; Smotrich demanded Beirut demolitions; Gantz called the whole thing a strategic failure.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Israel's whole political spectrum rejected the memorandum, and none of the objectors carries a signature Geneva can bind.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a press conference Israel had "saved itself from annihilation", then admitted in the same appearance that he had not seen the memorandum's text. ¹ He confirmed Israeli forces would stay in southern Lebanon regardless of the deal. Israel signed nothing in Islamabad and is not a party to the instrument, yet its government spent the signing weekend rejecting terms it says it has not read.

The coalition went further than the prime minister. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir posted that "Trump's agreement does not bind us in any way". Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for ten buildings in Beirut destroyed for every drone Hezbollah fires, extending the threat to Tyre, Sidon and the Bekaa. The objections were not confined to the right: opposition leader Benny Gantz, a former defence minister, called the deal a "strategic failure". ²

Trump had publicly threatened Netanyahu only days earlier over Israel's strike on the Karun field , so an Israeli repudiation of his memorandum reads as defiance in Washington as much as in Jerusalem. A ceasefire announced over a government that depends on ministers who reject any Lebanon withdrawal rests on whoever can compel Israel, and the one actor with that leverage has not used it.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Washington and Tehran signed the Islamabad MOU; Israel was excluded from the Islamabad negotiations and received no advance text before 15 June. But its terms affect Israel directly because Iran has armed and backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the MOU is supposed to bring all that fighting to an end. Netanyahu said on 15 June that Israel had 'saved itself from annihilation' but admitted he had not read the text. National Security Minister Ben-Gvir said the deal does not bind Israel. Finance Minister Smotrich called for ten Beirut buildings destroyed per Hezbollah drone. Opposition leader Gantz called it a strategic failure. Right and centre in Israel each rejected the same agreement, for different reasons.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Netanyahu's coalition structure drives the MOU rejection pattern. Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power party) and Smotrich's Religious Zionism party together hold enough Knesset seats to collapse the government if Netanyahu implements a deal that withdraws IDF forces from Lebanon or Gaza. These parties ran on a platform of permanent IDF presence in occupied territory; accepting an MOU that even implies eventual withdrawal would trigger a coalition crisis.

Gantz's opposition rejection from the centre adds a different dimension: he left the emergency war cabinet in June 2025 and bases his objection on the deferred nuclear terms rather than coalition politics. Leaving 440.9 kg of HEU inside Iran under no inspection for 60 days is Gantz's stated grounds, a position that overlaps with Israeli security establishment concerns rather than settler ideology.

What could happen next?

Risk
Smotrich's demand for ten Beirut buildings destroyed per Hezbollah drone, if acted on, would trigger the Lebanon violation clause Araghchi has already invoked, giving Iran legal cover to exit the MOU.
Immediate · Assessed
Consequence
Netanyahu's admission that he had not read the MOU text confirms Israel received no advance consultation; Washington must now decide whether to pressure Israel publicly or accept a deal its closest ally openly repudiates.
Short term · Assessed
Risk
Ben-Gvir's and Smotrich's public repudiation creates a political record that Netanyahu can cite domestically to justify non-compliance without formally withdrawing from a deal he never signed.
Medium term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-left-leaning sources from United States

United States

Primary parallel: When Rabin signed Oslo II on 28 September 1995, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu led protests outside the Knesset and the opposition voted unanimously against it. A far-right incitement campaign that framed Rabin as a traitor culminated on 4 November 1995 when Yigal Amir assassinated him. Domestic hardliners publicly repudiating a US-brokered deal while the prime minister champions it carries a recorded trajectory toward operational sabotage in Israeli history.

Counter-parallel: After the 1978 Camp David Accords, Menachem Begin's government faced domestic criticism from settlement advocates. Begin proceeded to Knesset ratification and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979. Israeli domestic political rejection of a US-brokered framework has been overridden before when the Prime Minister chose ratification over coalition solidarity.

Consensus view: Researchers at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) note that Netanyahu's admission he had not read the MOU text is itself the structural finding: Israel was not consulted in the Islamabad negotiations, was not a party, and received no advance text.

Ben-Gvir's public repudiation follows directly. The across-the-board Israeli rejection, from far-right coalition members to centre-opposition Gantz, reflects the fact that no Israeli stakeholder was given a document to accept or reject before the signing.

Counter-view: Analysts at the Mitvim Institute in Jerusalem argue that the political Spectrum's rejection disguises a narrower divide: Netanyahu's phrase 'saved Israel from annihilation' signals he privately assesses the MOU as better than continued war, while Ben-Gvir and Smotrich's public repudiation targets the domestic settler constituency rather than Washington.

The operative question, they argue, is not whether Israel rejects the deal rhetorically but whether Netanyahu orders the IDF to stop operations in Lebanon.

Key tension: Whether the uniform Israeli rejection across right and centre constitutes a genuine policy position or a coalition-management exercise that Netanyahu can reverse once the domestic audience has been satisfied.

First Reported In

Update #129 · Iran deal signed, but no paper to show

The Hill· 16 Jun 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Hezbollah fired on Israel hours after signing

Israel's across-the-board rejection of the MOU coincided with Hezbollah combat that its own officials refused to halt.

Occurred 15 Jun 2026

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This Event

Israel rejects a deal it never signed

A ceasefire is being signed in Geneva over the head of the party still doing the fighting, with no Israeli signature anyone can hold.

Led to

Netanyahu sidelined by the deal on Iran

The 15 June cabinet rejections by Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and Gantz escalated into broader Israeli and international commentary framing the MOU as a referendum on Netanyahu's tenure.

Occurred 16 Jun 2026

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Different Perspectives

United States

OFAC gazetted two wind-down licences expiring four days apart and adopted a presumption of denial for new Iran sanctions requests, while the State Department separately sanctioned Kataib Hezbollah and Hezbollah financial networks. Washington is closing legal channels on a published calendar rather than all at once.

United Arab Emirates

Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan met Iran's president in New Delhi, the first known face-to-face since the war began, weeks after cutting all Emirati trade and financial dealings with Iran. Abu Dhabi is running economic pressure and diplomatic contact at the same time.

Houthis

Houthi forces completed the capture of Yemen's Red Sea coast and Mayun island this week, an offensive a Houthi official confirmed alongside Yemeni government officers. The gain locks in the Bab al-Mandeb closure to Saudi crude declared as an embargo on 23 July.

Iran

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei credited Iranian diplomacy backed by military strength for pushing neighbours to negotiate, citing the Oman safe-passage talks, while addressing none of the pipeline strike, the Iraqi dismissals or Saudi restraint directly.

Iraq

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi sacked two Maysan officials, closed and reopened three Iran border crossings inside three days, and approved a joint inquiry with Tehran into the launch site on his own territory. He is managing a militia network he does not fully control rather than confronting it.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh's Foreign Ministry confirmed the Petroline strike, named no attacker, and said it would hold off retaliating at Iraq's request while reserving the right to act on its own sovereignty. It expects Baghdad's inquiry, not a Saudi strike, to be the next move.