7AUG

Last P&I clubs quit Gulf; Hormuz sealed

4 min read

12:08UTC

Every major Protection & Indemnity club has cancelled war risk cover for the Gulf. After midnight Thursday, no internationally insured vessel can legally transit the Strait of Hormuz.

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Key takeaway

The P&I withdrawal constitutes a de facto international commercial embargo on Gulf energy exports — one imposed by private actuarial decisions rather than any government, and therefore not reversible by government decree alone.

Gard and NorthStandard, the two largest Protection & Indemnity clubs by insured tonnage, issued cancellation notices on Wednesday for The Persian Gulf, the strait of Hormuz, and Iranian waters. They join American Steamship Owners Mutual P&I, London P&I Club, and Skuld, which issued notices earlier in the week . Lloyd's of London separately classified Iran, The Gulf, and parts of The Gulf of Oman as high-risk zones. Every major P&I club in the global maritime insurance system has now withdrawn cover, effective midnight Thursday 5 March.

P&I insurance is the structural backbone of international shipping. It covers third-party liability — collision, pollution, crew injury, cargo loss. Without it, no port authority will grant entry, no bank will finance a voyage, no flag state will permit a vessel to sail. A tanker without P&I cover is not merely expensive to operate; it is legally inoperable under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.

During the Iran–Iraq tanker war between 1984 and 1988, when more than 400 commercial vessels were attacked in The Gulf, insurance markets adjusted premiums sharply but never fully withdrew. Lloyd's war risk premiums reached 7.5% of hull value at that conflict's peak. A complete withdrawal of all major P&I clubs from an entire maritime region has no precedent in the modern insurance market.

VLCC daily freight rates had already hit $423,736 — an all-time record exceeding the 1991 Gulf War peak . Hormuz traffic was down 80% from pre-conflict levels . After midnight Thursday, the remaining traffic faces a binary choice: sail uninsured — which no major shipping line or flag state will permit — or stop. President Trump's government-backed insurance through the Development Finance Corporation covers political risk but does not replace P&I liability cover; they are different products addressing different legal requirements. Reinstatement after hostilities cease requires a full syndicated risk reassessment by each club's underwriting committee — a process that historically takes weeks, not days.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ships need two kinds of insurance to operate commercially: one that covers the ship itself from war damage, and another (P&I) that covers liability if the ship damages something else — a port, another vessel, or the environment. The companies providing both have now all cancelled coverage for the Gulf. Without insurance, banks won't finance the cargo, and ship owners won't risk losing a vessel worth $100-200 million with no cover. The US government promised to back insurance and provide naval escorts — but the Navy itself has confirmed it doesn't currently have enough ships to run an escort programme. The result is that the promise cannot be fulfilled in time to prevent commercial shipping through the Gulf from stopping almost entirely after Thursday midnight.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

The P&I withdrawal achieves through private market mechanics what deliberate sanctions regimes rarely accomplish: a near-total commercial embargo without a single government imposing it. This mechanism — private actuarial decisions creating collective action that states cannot easily reverse — is novel in its effectiveness and in its immunity to diplomatic resolution. No ceasefire announcement, by itself, restores cover; underwriters will require a demonstrated period of stability before reinstatement, creating a commercial lag even after any political settlement.

Root Causes

The US Navy's convoy capacity gap reflects two structural constraints: (1) post-Cold War fleet reductions have left the US with approximately 290 battle-force ships versus the 600-ship Reagan-era fleet, with carrier strike groups already committed to the theatre leaving minimal surge capacity; (2) convoy escort requires not just surface combatants but organic ASW capability, minesweeping assets, and maritime patrol aircraft — a combined-arms commitment that cannot be rapidly assembled without drawing down other global commitments. The DFC insurance pledge was announced without coordination with the Navy on operational feasibility, creating the credibility gap the Navy's statement has now exposed.

What could happen next?

3 consequence1 meaning1 risk1 precedent

Consequence
Gulf energy exports face near-complete commercial cessation after midnight Thursday absent an operational naval escort programme the US Navy has confirmed does not currently exist.
Immediate · Assessed
Consequence
South Korean and Japanese strategic petroleum reserves — approximately 50 and 90 days respectively at normal consumption — will begin drawdown within days, creating a government-level response imperative within weeks.
Short term · Assessed
Consequence
Cape of Good Hope rerouting will absorb tanker capacity and raise freight rates globally, affecting non-Gulf shipping lanes.
Short term · Assessed
Meaning
The trade finance credit freeze — banks will not issue letters of credit without P&I cover — creates a dual-barrier embargo that government insurance pledges alone cannot resolve.
Immediate · Assessed
Risk
If the US cannot operationalise the escort programme within 72 hours, the credibility of the Trump pledge collapses, potentially affecting Gulf state confidence in US security guarantees more broadly.
Short term · Assessed
Precedent
A successfully operationalised government war risk insurance framework would establish a new template for state intervention in shipping markets during conflict — potentially reshaping how future maritime crises are managed.
Long term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from United States and United Kingdom

United States×2

United Kingdom

The closest operational precedent is the 1984–1988 'Tanker War' phase of the Iran-Iraq conflict, when Lloyd's War Risk rates for Gulf transits reached 0.5% per voyage and commercial shipping declined sharply until Operation Earnest Will (1987) deployed US Navy convoys.

The critical structural difference: in 1987, the escort programme was operationally established before commercial paralysis became complete. The current situation is inverted — insurance withdrawal is materialising before any escort architecture exists.

Why it’s relevant now

Operation Earnest Will succeeded precisely because the commitment preceded the collapse of commercial viability. With the US Navy confirming it lacks current assets for a convoy programme, the sequencing failure makes the 1987 model unavailable as a template without a significant force-positioning interval that markets will not wait for.

Two dimensions not in the body: (1) Trade finance freeze — without P&I cover, letters of credit from major commodity trade finance banks will not be issued, creating a dual-barrier embargo that compounds the insurance withdrawal. Cargo cannot move even if a vessel is willing to sail uninsured.

(2) Rerouting economics — Cape of Good Hope routing adds 10–14 days to Europe-bound voyages and 6–8 days to Asia-bound voyages, absorbing significant tanker tonnage into longer routes and structurally tightening global available capacity independent of lost Gulf volumes. Japan holds approximately 90 days of strategic petroleum reserves at normal consumption; South Korea approximately 50 days — timelines that frame when Asian government intervention becomes politically compelled.

Maritime law specialists distinguish P&I (third-party liability) cover from war risk hull cover, but commercial operations require both: a vessel without either cannot obtain letters of credit from major trade finance banks (HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citi) needed to finance cargo. State-backed schemes — including the UK government war risk scheme and the US DFC pledge — typically cover hull loss but not third-party liability, leaving a residual gap that makes commercial operation untenable even with government backing.

Admiralty law firms (Hill Dickinson, Ince Gordon Dadds) have noted that the International Group of P&I Clubs covers approximately 90% of global ocean-going tonnage; unanimous withdrawal is structurally equivalent to a commercial blockade of the insured zone.

Sources:CNBC·Lloyd's List·Maritime Executive

Mentions:VLCC →Persian Gulf →US Development Finance Corporation →Oman →Gard →NorthStandard →American Steamship Owners Mutual P&I →London P&I Club →National Security Council (Iran) →Time →Skuld →Iran →Strait of Hormuz →Gulf of Oman →Donald Trump →

First Reported In

Update #18 · First Iranian warship sunk since 1988

CNBC· 4 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Three P&I clubs pull Gulf war risk cover

Gard and NorthStandard withdrawals complete the insurance exodus begun by the three P&I clubs that cancelled earlier in the week, achieving total industry withdrawal.

Occurred 3 Mar 2026

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Hormuz down 80%; four ships in five gone

The 80% collapse in Hormuz traffic drove the remaining P&I clubs to issue cancellation notices, as continued coverage became commercially untenable.

Occurred 3 Mar 2026

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This Event

Last P&I clubs quit Gulf; Hormuz sealed

P&I insurance is the legal and financial precondition for commercial shipping — without it, vessels cannot enter ports, secure financing, or operate under any major flag state. The complete withdrawal converts a military conflict into a de facto commercial blockade of the world's most important oil chokepoint, with no precedent in the modern maritime insurance market.

Led to

KOSPI down 12%; record single-day fall

P&I insurance cancellations compounded market shock for energy-import-dependent Asian economies

Occurred 4 Mar 2026

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P&I deadline passes; Strait sealed

P&I club cancellation notices triggered the midnight Thursday deadline; its passage commercially sealed the Strait of Hormuz

Occurred 5 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Shipping and insurance industry

UKMTO counted about 20 US-facilitated Hormuz transits a day to 11 September against only 6 visible on AIS, with traffic still around 90% below the 138-a-day pre-war baseline. War-risk underwriters cannot price hulls they cannot see, or resolve whether the tanker El Gaia hit a mine, as Iran claims, or a missile and drone, as CENTCOM says.

European refiners

European refiners, including Poland's Orlen, absorbed a roughly $26 gap between Dated Brent at $130.80 on 15 September and ICE Brent futures settling at $103.87 on 18 September, a spread that widened from $13.45 on 9 September rather than newly opening. Their futures hedges no longer cover what they now pay for physical barrels.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Aramco zeroed European term customers' October allocations and rerouted roughly 60 million barrels to Asia through Ras Tanura and Sohar, using Red Sea and Gulf terminal capacity built years ago to cut Hormuz exposure. Riyadh reallocated existing supply rather than negotiating a shortfall with Europe.

Qatar

Qatar's energy minister Saad al-Kaabi told Bloomberg at the Qatar Economic Forum on 20 September that Bessent's two-year Hormuz-obsolescence forecast is wrong, and that Doha has deliberately built no bypass pipeline. Qatar's gas exports run through one waterway by choice, not oversight.

Iran (foreign ministry and Majlis)

Iran's foreign ministry and 130 Majlis deputies moved toward NPT withdrawal this week, with lawmaker Hossein-Ali Haji Deligani filing a triple-urgency bill on 20 September that Speaker Qalibaf has not yet scheduled. Tehran treats treaty membership as leverage still on the table, not yet spent.

Russia and China

Moscow and Beijing vetoed the Panel of Experts' renewal, maintaining Resolution 2231 lapsed in October 2025 and the 2025 snapback was never validly triggered, so the sanctions architecture the Panel enforces has no current legal standing. Both governments frame the veto as upholding law, not shielding Tehran.