23JUN

Houthis fire second barrage at Israel

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11:42UTC

The second Houthi missile and drone attack on Israel in a single day confirms staged escalation, with Bab al-Mandeb closure declared openly as the next step.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

A second Houthi barrage in 24 hours confirms Iran's proxy network is activating in sequence.

The Houthis (Ansar Allah) fired their second missile and drone barrage at Israel on 29 March, following their first attack the previous day . Israeli military claimed interceptions; targets included what the Houthis described as "sensitive military sites" in southern Israel ¹. Deputy information minister Mohammed Mansour has explicitly threatened Bab al-Mandeb closure as part of a staged escalation programme.

Tehran coordinated the timing. Houthi entry came the day after Pakistan confirmed US-Iran indirect talks had stalled and the day Iran published its five conditions . Two attacks in 24 hours is a demonstration of sustainable tempo, not a one-off provocation. The Long War Journal reports that Houthi leaders have conditioned further escalation on whether other nations join anti-Iran operations or use the Red Sea for strikes against Iran's allies.

The strategic problem is compounding. Hezbollah fired 600 projectiles at Israel on 28 March . The Houthis are now adding a second axis. Iran's proxy network is activating in sequence, each front requiring separate defensive resources from a coalition already stretched by the primary conflict.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Yemen's Houthi movement, which controls most of northern Yemen including the Red Sea coast, is an Iranian-aligned armed group. On 28 March it fired its first missiles at Israel. Within 24 hours it fired a second wave. This matters because the Houthis also control the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the other end of the Red Sea from Hormuz. They have now explicitly threatened to close it. The situation in brief: Iran controls one end of the Gulf-to-Red Sea shipping corridor through Hormuz. Its Houthi allies may be about to close the other end at Bab al-Mandeb.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Houthi activation followed Pakistan's confirmation that indirect US-Iran talks had stalled. Tehran appears to have calibrated proxy activation against the diplomacy clock: when talks collapsed, the proxy network activated. This suggests a deliberate coercive strategy rather than autonomous Houthi decision-making.

The Houthis have their own motivations that partially overlap with Tehran's. Bab al-Mandeb closure would be the single largest expression of Houthi strategic power and a recruiting and fundraising windfall domestically in Yemen.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Qatar

Qatar

Primary parallel: Hezbollah's 2006 rocket campaign against northern Israel opened a second front that stretched IDF resources during the Lebanon War. Like the current Houthi activation, it began with limited salvoes that escalated in frequency.

Counter-parallel: In 2006, Hezbollah operated from contiguous territory with a resupply corridor; IDF could conduct ground operations to degrade launch capability. Yemen's geographic distance from Israel significantly constrains Israeli retaliation options.

Consensus view: The Long War Journal and the Middle East Eye assess the Houthi tempo shift from sporadic attacks to two barrages in 24 hours as a demonstration of sustainable operational capability, not a one-off escalation designed to signal and de-escalate.

Counter-view: Iranian opposition media Iran International argues the Houthi activation is more controlled than it appears: Tehran is deploying the proxy network sequentially to maximise pressure without triggering a direct escalation that would force the US to respond against Yemen as a third theatre.

Key tension: Whether the Houthis can sustain two-barrage-per-day tempo against Israeli air defences, or whether the first failed interception attempts will produce Israeli retaliation against Houthi launch sites that draws the US in.

Sources:International Maritime Organisation / UKMTO·International Maritime Organisation / UKMTO·Al Jazeera

Mentions:Israel →Pakistan →Iran →Bab al-Mandeb →Houthis →Mohammed Mansour →

First Reported In

Update #51 · Iran hits aluminium plants; Hormuz emptying

International Maritime Organisation / UKMTO· 29 Mar 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Houthis strike Israel for the first time

The second Houthi barrage on 29 March directly follows the first attack on 28 March, confirming staged escalation declared by Mansour.

Occurred 28 Mar 2026

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This Event

Houthis fire second barrage at Israel

Houthi entry transforms the conflict from a bilateral US-Iran war into a multi-front regional contest, with the world's second most important oil chokepoint now explicitly threatened.

Led to

Houthis strike Israel for third day

The second Houthi barrage on 29 March (ID:1686) was followed by a third consecutive attack on 30 March, confirming sustainable operational tempo not a one-off provocation.

Occurred 30 Mar 2026

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Different Perspectives

Shipping and insurance industry

UKMTO counted about 20 US-facilitated Hormuz transits a day to 11 September against only 6 visible on AIS, with traffic still around 90% below the 138-a-day pre-war baseline. War-risk underwriters cannot price hulls they cannot see, or resolve whether the tanker El Gaia hit a mine, as Iran claims, or a missile and drone, as CENTCOM says.

European refiners

European refiners, including Poland's Orlen, absorbed a roughly $26 gap between Dated Brent at $130.80 on 15 September and ICE Brent futures settling at $103.87 on 18 September, a spread that widened from $13.45 on 9 September rather than newly opening. Their futures hedges no longer cover what they now pay for physical barrels.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Aramco zeroed European term customers' October allocations and rerouted roughly 60 million barrels to Asia through Ras Tanura and Sohar, using Red Sea and Gulf terminal capacity built years ago to cut Hormuz exposure. Riyadh reallocated existing supply rather than negotiating a shortfall with Europe.

Qatar

Qatar's energy minister Saad al-Kaabi told Bloomberg at the Qatar Economic Forum on 20 September that Bessent's two-year Hormuz-obsolescence forecast is wrong, and that Doha has deliberately built no bypass pipeline. Qatar's gas exports run through one waterway by choice, not oversight.

Iran (foreign ministry and Majlis)

Iran's foreign ministry and 130 Majlis deputies moved toward NPT withdrawal this week, with lawmaker Hossein-Ali Haji Deligani filing a triple-urgency bill on 20 September that Speaker Qalibaf has not yet scheduled. Tehran treats treaty membership as leverage still on the table, not yet spent.

Russia and China

Moscow and Beijing vetoed the Panel of Experts' renewal, maintaining Resolution 2231 lapsed in October 2025 and the 2025 snapback was never validly triggered, so the sanctions architecture the Panel enforces has no current legal standing. Both governments frame the veto as upholding law, not shielding Tehran.