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Iran Conflict 2026
22MAY

Naqadeh dual, two Iraqis, a Turk at risk

3 min read
11:08UTC

Hengaw documented two secret executions at Naqadeh on 21 May; two Iraqi nationals were executed on espionage charges the day before, and a Turkish citizen faces imminent execution on the same charge.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Two executions at one facility in one day; foreign-national executions convert repression into a foreign-relations crisis.

Hengaw, the Norway-based Kurdish Human Rights Organisation that has been the principal independent casualty monitor of the 2026 conflict, documented the secret execution of two Kurdish political prisoners, Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour, at Naqadeh Central Prison on Thursday 21 May 1. Naqadeh sits in West Azerbaijan Province in Iran's Kurdish-majority northwest. Two executions at a single facility on the same day is the sharpest escalation in Hengaw's wartime register since the 13 May five-prison cluster across Birjand, Tabriz, Kerman and Gorgan.

The Naqadeh dual sits inside an escalating repression cluster Hengaw has documented across the week. Kurdish bodies have been denied to families on 18-19 May and writer Majid Karimi was detained in Tehran in the same window ; Shiraz lawyer Bahar Sahraeian was detained at 22:05 on 17 May while performing legal duties . The Naqadeh executions extend a pattern that has already touched Iran's defence bar and its literary milieu.

On Wednesday 20 May, Iranian authorities executed two Iraqi nationals on espionage charges, the first foreign nationals so executed during the 2026 conflict. Iraq holds the bilateral PGSA passage deal that has kept Iraqi crude moving through Hormuz on political engagement rather than yuan tolls . Baghdad protested privately over Israeli covert bases on Iraqi soil the week before, but its Hormuz dependence makes public confrontation with Tehran structurally difficult. The foreign ministry must now choose between protesting the executions and keeping the transit deal intact.

Gholamreza Khani Shakarab, a Turkish national in Iranian custody, faces imminent execution on the same espionage charge while Turkey is an active mediator. A Turkish execution would force Recep Tayyip Erdogan to suspend Ankara's mediating role and create a domestic crisis he cannot deflect. The execution of foreign nationals is procedurally distinct from political-prisoner executions: it converts what had been a domestic-repression track into a foreign-relations event by definition. The Iraqi case implicates a passage deal Baghdad cannot lose; the Turkish case implicates a mediation channel Ankara cannot abandon. Hengaw's register has now reached two of Tehran's three functioning Western-adjacent backchannels.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's government carries out executions in secret, meaning families and lawyers are not told in advance. A Norwegian human rights group called Hengaw tracks these executions by collecting information from inside Iran. On 21 May 2026, Hengaw documented that two Kurdish men Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour were killed at a prison in northwest Iran without public announcement. The same day, Iran had also executed two Iraqi citizens on espionage charges. This is significant because Iraq has a deal with Iran that lets Iraqi ships use the Strait of Hormuz. Killing Iraqi nationals accused of spying sends a message to Baghdad about the limits of that relationship. A Turkish citizen named Gholamreza Khani Shakarab faces the same espionage charges and imminent execution. This creates a problem for Turkey, which is one of the few countries Iran is willing to talk to about ending the war. Executing a Turkish national while Turkey mediates would likely end Ankara's role as a go-between.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Secret executions during wartime serve two distinct institutional functions in Iran. The judiciary operates on pre-existing case timelines; Zaleh and Maroufpour were held on charges predating the 2026 conflict, and their execution reflects the judiciary's standard practice of accelerating capital cases during periods of state emergency when political cover is higher.

The espionage-charge executions of Iraqi nationals represent a different mechanism: IRGC counterintelligence treating the wartime information environment as a combat theatre where foreign nationals can be neutralised under espionage law without triggering the Geneva Convention protections that would apply to captured combatants.

Iran's use of espionage charges rather than explicitly military charges is calibrated to keep the executions inside domestic criminal law rather than international humanitarian law.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If Iran executes Gholamreza Khani Shakarab while Turkey serves as active mediator, Ankara's domestic political constraints will likely force it to suspend or end its mediating role, removing one of only two Western-adjacent back-channels alongside Pakistan.

    Immediate · Reported
  • Consequence

    The execution of Iraqi nationals on espionage charges directly contradicts the 'friendly nation' framing of Iraq's bilateral Hormuz passage deal, creating a diplomatic contradiction Baghdad cannot publicly address without undermining its own passage rights.

    Short term · Reported
  • Risk

    European states funding or considering Hengaw's documentation as evidence for ICC or universal-jurisdiction proceedings now have a concrete wartime human rights record that may activate their domestic legal obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Meaning

    The clustering of Kurdish political executions alongside foreign-national espionage executions in a 24-hour window signals that Iran's security apparatus is running multiple parallel operation types simultaneously, suggesting command-and-control is distributed rather than centralised.

    Immediate · Reported
First Reported In

Update #104 · Three days to Hengli

Hengaw Human Rights Organisation· 21 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
Islamabad (Pakistan Armed Forces and Foreign Ministry)
Islamabad (Pakistan Armed Forces and Foreign Ministry)
Munir's cancellation reflects Islamabad's assessment that no bridging formula survives the collision of Khamenei's uranium directive, Rubio's Hormuz red line, and the sequencing gap simultaneously; Naqvi's relay role signals continued Pakistani engagement without a mandate to close any of the three gaps.
Lloyd's of London war-risk market
Lloyd's of London war-risk market
Published PGSA coordinates give underwriters the cartographic input to model tanker route exposure inside the claimed zone; OFAC's Sunday GL V ruling determines whether Hengli-Singapore dollar-clearing routes carry secondary-sanctions risk from Monday, adding a compliance layer to the existing kinetic war-risk premium.
Hengaw Human Rights Organisation
Hengaw Human Rights Organisation
Zaleh's trial lasted 'only a few minutes' before a conviction on PDKI membership charges at Naqadeh; the pattern of solitary detention, coerced confession, and minutes-long hearing is consistent with wartime political-charge architecture the organisation has documented across the Kurdish northwest.
Gulf Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait)
Gulf Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait)
The UAE has not published counter-coordinates to the PGSA's Hormuz zone map, leaving Emirati silence as the maritime-law response to Iran's charted boundary claim. Abu Dhabi's published position now defaults by omission toward implied acceptance of the zone's cartographic fact.
Beijing's Ministry of Commerce
Beijing's Ministry of Commerce
MOFCOM's blocking order covers Hengli and four other designated refineries on the mainland but does not extend to the dollar-clearing layer in Singapore, making Sunday's GL V expiry the first live test of whether Beijing's sanctions-defiance architecture reaches the place where dollars settle.
The White House
The White House
Trump's verbal track on Iran has produced no signed Iran-specific presidential instrument across 84 days; both financial-sector EOs signed on 19 May are unrelated to Hormuz or the IRGC. Rubio's public naming of the Hormuz toll architecture as a deal-killer is the administration's most concrete new position this week.