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Cuba Dispatch
12JUN

Minister: Venezuelan oil cut since November 2025

4 min read
09:35UTC

Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy stated on 13 May that Venezuelan crude supply to Cuba has been interrupted since November 2025, four months earlier than the 18 March PDVSA carve-out previously framed as the proximate cause.

PoliticsDeveloping
Key takeaway

De la O Levy dated the Venezuelan supply cut to November 2025, predating US sanctions by two months.

Cuban Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy told a Havana press conference on Wednesday 13 May 2026 that Venezuelan crude supply to Cuba has been interrupted since November 2025. The date sits four months upstream of the 18 March 2026 PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., Venezuela's state oil company) carve-out previously framed as the proximate cause of Cuba's exclusion . De la O Levy described the situation as "so acute, critical, extremely tense" and stated that Cuba produces 40,000 barrels per day domestically against demand of 90,000 to 110,000 barrels per day.

Mexican supply, he said, ended in late January 2026. The dual cut leaves Cuba dependent on Russian-origin cargo that the US sanctions architecture has progressively walled off. De la O Levy's framing hardened the language Miguel Díaz-Canel used on 4 May when the President described the Anatoly Kolodkin's 730,000-barrel cargo as running out . "Out of fuel" is now the operative public framing from the Cuban government itself.

If the November 2025 date holds up, the chronology of the crisis is structurally upstream of the US sanctions instruments that followed. EO 14380, the secondary-tariff fuel-pressure order, was signed on 29 January 2026, two months after the supply collapse the minister now identifies. Plausible upstream causes include PDVSA operational degradation, Cuban inability to pay in dollars, or the December 2025 Hormuz disruption pulling Chinese-owned tankers previously lifting for PDVSA-to-Cuba routes onto Asian Brent buyers at the spike price. None of these are confirmed; each implies a different durable shape for the crisis.

De la O Levy's admission corrects both Lowdown's prior chronology and the dominant English-language framing. For any sanctions-relief negotiation that assumes restoring Venezuelan supply would close the loop, the re-weighting is material: a flow that stopped before the sanctions order was issued is not restored by lifting the order.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Cuba does not produce enough oil to power itself. It pumps about 40,000 barrels a day out of its own ground but burns somewhere between 90,000 and 110,000 barrels. The gap has been filled for nearly twenty years by Venezuela, which sent crude in exchange for Cuban doctors working in Venezuelan hospitals. On 13 May, Cuba's Energy Minister **Vicente de la O Levy** went on television and said the Venezuelan shipments actually stopped in November 2025. Earlier **Havana** statements had implied a March or April 2026 cut, not November 2025. The earlier date matters because it means the country has been running on emergency procurement and reserve fuel for half a year. **De la O Levy** did not name a replacement source. The deeper news beneath the shortage: no foreign government has committed to selling Cuba more crude.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

**CUPET** domestic production at 40,000 barrels per day covers crude and natural-gas-liquids combined, of which only roughly 28,000 barrels are usable as refinery feed at **Cienfuegos** or **Ñico López**. The structural gap is therefore closer to 60,000 to 80,000 barrels of refinery-grade input per day, above the headline 50,000 to 70,000 figure **De la O Levy** cited on 13 May.

No committed replacement supplier exists. **Rosneft** Cuba liftings ran at approximately one ship per month through 2024, dropped to one shipment between December 2025 and April 2026. **Mexico**'s **Pemex** ended the Olmeca-grade supply line in late January 2026 after the new **Sheinbaum** administration's Energy Ministry under **Luz Elena González Escobar** declined renewal. Cuba is now dependent on a tanker-by-tanker spot procurement model with no contract.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Informal USD/CUP rate likely to break 600 within 30 days as forward-remittance lending pricing collapses on the De la O Levy disclosure.

    Short term · 0.65
  • Risk

    Without a committed replacement supplier, Cuba's reserve burn exhausts foreign-currency liquidity for crude procurement within six to eight weeks at current import pace.

    Short term · 0.6
  • Precedent

    Public ministerial admission of structural supply gap, rather than political framing of US sanctions causation, marks a shift in Cuba's communicative posture and may signal preparation for a wider rationing announcement.

    Medium term · 0.55
First Reported In

Update #4 · Diesel adrift, grid splits, Rubio at Vatican

CiberCuba· 18 May 2026
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Different Perspectives
WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America)
WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America)
WOLA argues that sanctioning peso-paid Cuban officials has limited coercive bite because their personal holdings are not US-proximate, citing the Maduro Venezuela precedent: the head-of-state listing functions as a signal rather than a seizure, and the real operational weight of the 4 June package sits entirely in FAQ 1258's ownership-tree multiplier.
OCDH / Prisoners Defenders
OCDH / Prisoners Defenders
OCDH (Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos, Madrid-based) documented 332 repressive actions in May and formally demanded an EU reparations fund for Cuban political prisoners. Prisoners Defenders' May census placed the count at a record 1,281 with one death in custody; both organisations argue the EU restrictive-measures track is the remaining lever after the US programme has exhausted institutional designations.
EU / Netherlands Foreign Affairs (Ollongren track)
EU / Netherlands Foreign Affairs (Ollongren track)
EU Special Representative Kajsa Ollongren received the OCDH Acuerdo de Liberacion in Brussels on 13 May demanding asset freezes and a victims' compensation fund for political prisoners. Madrid's hotel-sector stake and the Spanish chains' own exit decisions create a structural tension within EU policy between restrictive-measures pressure and commercial-engagement continuity.
China
China
China joined Russia in birthday solidarity to Raul Castro but has not moved a tanker to Cuba since the CUPET designation. Beijing's calculus resembles the post-PDVSA Venezuela calculation: barter or renminbi-denominated crude outside the US legal perimeter is technically available but requires absorbing secondary-sanctions risk Washington is deliberately signalling.
Russia
Russia
Moscow sent birthday solidarity to the indicted Raul Castro on 3 June but despatched no replacement cargo after the Sovcomflot Universal turned back on 26 May. Russia's practical support for Cuba is constrained by its own war economy and secondary-sanctions exposure under the same OFAC architecture it benefits from in the Ukraine context.
Cuban government / MINREX
Cuban government / MINREX
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla condemned the CUPET designation as 'further tightening the economic and energy blockade'; Diaz-Canel's standing public line is willingness for dialogue 'on equal terms' but political prisoners are explicitly off the table. Havana offers no new concessions after the personal listing.