Rosatom chief Alexey Likhachev issued a statement on 17 May accusing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog) Secretariat of 'effectively ignoring daily Ukrainian attacks' on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP, the largest nuclear plant in Europe and under Russian occupation since March 2022)1. On Saturday 23 May the plant passes day 60 running on its single remaining backup external power line, Ferosplavna-1, since the main feeder Dniprovska went down on 24 March.
IAEA Update 349, published 7 May, recorded a drone strike on the External Radiation Control Laboratory on 3 May that destroyed the meteorological equipment used for real-time nuclear emergency monitoring2. Director General Rafael Grossi said the agency 'cannot afford for the next damage to occur on essential nuclear safety equipment' and is still negotiating a sixth local ceasefire for repairs.
Likhachev's intervention attacks the asset Grossi cannot replace. IAEA's leverage at ZNPP runs through Grossi's personal credibility as a neutral broker; once the host state's nuclear corporation publicly accuses the watchdog of bias, that broker role narrows fast. The Rosatom posture also runs in parallel to Rostekhnadzor's 10-year ZNPP operating certificates issued earlier in the year, which together signal Moscow will not return administrative control of the plant under any negotiated outcome.
Three total power-loss events have been recorded at the site since March. The plant has been in cold shutdown since September 2022; the consequence of any further line loss is bounded by emergency diesel runs, none of which has yet exceeded 90 minutes. A fourth total power loss with diesel failure would push the plant into uncharted territory in under two hours. Day 60 lands on Saturday 23 May with no sixth repair ceasefire agreed and the diplomatic track on the wrong end of a Rosatom broadside.
