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Iran Conflict 2026
13MAY

Hormuz down 80%; four ships in five gone

3 min read
12:29UTC

Vessel traffic through the world's most important oil chokepoint fell 80%, worsening from 70% in 24 hours. OPEC+'s emergency output increase replaces 1.3% of the lost throughput.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Pipeline bypass capacity — Saudi Arabia's East-West Petroline and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah pipeline combined — can offset at most 30–40% of normal Hormuz flow, meaning 60–70% of the current reduction is structurally unrecoverable until the strait reopens regardless of what alternative routes are activated.

Vessel traffic through the strait of Hormuz has fallen 80% below normal levels, a further deterioration from the 70% decline recorded on 1 March . The acceleration — ten percentage points in 24 hours — reflects the cumulative effect of shipping line withdrawals, P&I insurance cancellations, and Iran's demonstrated willingness to strike commercial vessels.

Roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day transited Hormuz before the conflict — approximately one-fifth of global consumption. At 80% reduction, roughly 16 million barrels per day of transit capacity has been removed from the market. OPEC+'s emergency 220,000-barrel-per-day production increase replaces 1.3% of the lost throughput. CMA CGM's emergency surcharges of $2,000–$4,000 per container and the all-time record VLCC freight rates are consequences of this contraction, not its cause — the chokepoint itself is closing.

Three tankers were attacked near the strait on 28 February — the MV Skylight, MKD Vyom, and Sea La Donna , , . An Indian mariner was killed on 1 March when a surface drone detonated against the MKD Vyom's hull 52 nautical miles northwest of Muscat — the first Indian national to die in the conflict. The remaining 20% of traffic likely consists of vessels already in transit when conditions deteriorated, ships flagged to non-belligerent states, or tankers operating under government rather than commercial insurance. Iran has now degraded all three pillars of The Gulf's energy export architecture — production at Ras Laffan, refining at Ras Tanura, transit through Hormuz . The trajectory is toward near-total closure.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Normally about 20% of the world's traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel between Iran and Oman with no practical alternative route at comparable volume. Four-fifths of that traffic has now stopped. Unlike a road with a detour, pipelines that could reroute exist but can carry at most a quarter of normal flow. The world's oil supply has effectively lost access to one of its most critical arteries, and the gap cannot be filled by alternative routes even if they operate at maximum capacity.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

The pipeline bypass capacity figures are the critical missing element in assessing how much of the supply reduction can be mitigated independently of Hormuz reopening. Saudi Arabia's East-West Petroline (~5 million b/d to Yanbu) and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah pipeline (~1.5 million b/d) together provide approximately 6.5 million b/d of bypass capacity against normal Hormuz flow of 17–21 million b/d. Even at full utilisation, these bypass at most 30–40% of normal volume. The IEA's emergency stockholding mechanism provides approximately 90 days of buffer at current disruption rates — a hard deadline after which physical supply tightness becomes unavoidable without Hormuz reopening.

Root Causes

Charter party contracts contain force majeure and war risk clauses that give operators legal cover — and sometimes obligation — to suspend voyages when an area is formally designated a war zone. Once a critical mass of operators invokes these clauses, remaining operators face asymmetric exposure: full risk with no commercial advantage from being among the few still transiting. This game-theoretic dynamic produces rapid, cascading market exits rather than gradual linear responses.

Escalation

The 10-percentage-point single-day deterioration from 70% to 80% follows an accelerating, not linear, pattern consistent with a market cascade: each operator that exits reduces the information available to remaining operators about safe transit, making further exits more likely. Absent a military escort programme or insurance market intervention, continued deterioration toward 90%+ within 48–72 hours is more probable than stabilisation.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Pipeline bypass capacity covers at most 30–40% of normal Hormuz flow; the remaining reduction is structurally irreplaceable until the strait reopens, regardless of bypass utilisation rates.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Risk

    The market cascade trajectory makes a near-total cessation of commercial Hormuz traffic probable within 48–72 hours absent a military escort programme or insurance market intervention.

    Immediate · Suggested
  • Risk

    IEA strategic reserves provide approximately 90 days of buffer at current disruption rates, after which physical supply tightness becomes unavoidable without Hormuz reopening.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    An 80% disruption of Hormuz traffic likely exceeds any previous recorded figure for this strait, establishing a new benchmark for what a confined maritime conflict can achieve against global energy infrastructure.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #14 · Natanz unverified; Hormuz sealed

Al Jazeera· 3 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Hormuz down 80%; four ships in five gone
The 80% traffic decline removes roughly 16 million barrels per day of oil transit capacity from the market — a loss that OPEC+'s 220,000-barrel-per-day production increase cannot meaningfully offset, with the trajectory pointing toward near-total closure.
Different Perspectives
Oil markets
Oil markets
Brent fell $1.05 to $106.0 on summit Day 1 but remains $5-7 above the post-ceasefire equilibrium analysts modelled in March; the market is pricing a holding pattern, not a breakthrough. OilPrice.com and Aramco CEO Nasser converge on buffer-exhaustion before Hormuz reopens if the blockade extends past mid-June.
Iranian dissidents and human rights monitors
Iranian dissidents and human rights monitors
Hengaw documented a five-prison simultaneous execution cluster on 13 May, with Gorgan appearing for the first time in the wartime register. Espionage charges framed as Israel-linked moharebeh now extend across Mashhad, Karaj, and Gorgan, using the war as judicial cover for protest-era detainees.
BRICS / Global South
BRICS / Global South
Araghchi's Delhi appearance positioned Iran as a victim of US aggression before non-Western foreign ministers, with Deputy FM Bagheri Kani calling on BRICS to act against US aggression. India, as the largest non-Chinese user of Iranian-routed crude, faces pressure to balance bloc solidarity against its own shipping and sanctions exposure.
China
China
Beijing accepted the Nvidia chip clearance on summit Day 1 and gave Rubio verbal acknowledgement of Iran as an Asian stability concern, having already put Pakistan on paper as the mediatory channel on 13 May (ID:3253), deflecting the US ask for direct Chinese action without refusing it.
Iran (government and civilian diplomatic track)
Iran (government and civilian diplomatic track)
Araghchi denied any Hormuz obstruction at BRICS Delhi on 14 May while Iran's SNSC had finalised a Hormuz security plan the day before. Israel Hayom's single-sourced 15-year freeze offer gives Tehran a deployable figure in non-Western forums regardless of corroboration; the state attributed 3,468 wartime deaths with no independent verification.
United States (Trump administration and Senate moderates)
United States (Trump administration and Senate moderates)
Trump signed a chip clearance for 10 Chinese firms on summit Day 1 and zero Iran instruments across 76 days; Rubio and Vance made verbal Iran asks without paper. Murkowski voted yes on the 49-50 war-powers resolution after Hegseth told the Senate that Article 2 makes an AUMF unnecessary.