22APR

22 political executions in six weeks

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Iran Human Rights counted 22 political executions in six weeks since 19 March 2026, the fastest sustained political-execution rate Iran has recorded since the 1988 prison massacres.

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Key takeaway

Iran Human Rights counted 22 political executions in six weeks, the fastest sustained rate since the 1988 prison massacres.

Iran Human Rights, the Norway-based monitoring body, counted 22 political executions in six weeks since 19 March 2026, an average of one execution every two days ¹. Iran Human Rights has not previously published this composite aggregate. Ten of the 22 were protesters detained during the December 2025 and January 2026 protests, including Sasan Azadvar at Dastgerd Prison on 30 April. Iran Human Rights described the cadence as the fastest sustained political-execution rate Iran has recorded since the 1988 prison massacres.

The count runs concurrent with the longest internet blackout in modern history, which peaked at over 1,440 hours and remains only partly unwound captures the corroborating Hengaw register. Families learn of executions days late; verification depends on prison-source networks and family contacts, with neither Iran Human Rights nor Hengaw holding on-the-ground access. The numbers are reconstructed rather than directly observed, which limits sanctions traction through UN OHCHR machinery.

Hengaw has flagged three further death-row political prisoners removed from Urmia prison this week with concern about imminent executions, with the Pakdasht sentences confirmed by the Supreme Court also pending .

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran has executed 22 political prisoners in the six weeks between 19 March and 30 April 2026. That works out to roughly one execution every two days. Ten of those 22 were people arrested during protests in December 2025 and January 2026, before the war started. Iran's judiciary charged each one, obtained convictions under emergency wartime procedures, and carried out the sentences at named prisons. The **Iran Human Rights** organisation, which tracks these figures from Norway, says this is the fastest sustained rate of political executions Iran has recorded since a mass killing of political prisoners in 1988. The 1988 killings, ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, killed an estimated 3,000-5,000 prisoners in a matter of weeks and remain the most documented mass political killing in Iran's post-revolutionary history.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The acceleration since 19 March 2026 correlates with two structural developments: the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader (7 March) and the internet blackout reaching its maximum extent (peaked at over 1,440 hours continuously blacked out, per ).

The new leadership needed to establish deterrence credibility from a position of dynastic illegitimacy. The internet blackout provides operational cover: international human rights monitoring is degraded, domestic circulation of execution news is suppressed, and the families of the condemned have limited ability to mobilise public pressure before the execution is carried out.

What could happen next?

Consequence
The 22-in-six-weeks aggregate, now publicly documented by Iran Human Rights, provides the evidentiary base for a future UN Special Rapporteur report on wartime political executions in Iran.
Risk
Three Pakdasht mosque-fire defendants remain on death row after Supreme Court confirmation; their execution would add three more to a total that may reach 25 in seven weeks.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-right-leaning sources from United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Primary parallel: Following Augusto Pinochet's 11 September 1973 coup in Chile, the military junta executed approximately 1,200-1,500 people in the first six months, roughly 200-250 per month, concentrated in the first six weeks.

The post-coup pace in Chile was documented by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances as one of the fastest sustained execution rates for political prisoners in the post-war era. Iran's 22-in-six-weeks figure equates to approximately 22 per month, a much lower absolute rate than Chile 1973, but in a country of 88 million rather than 10 million, and against the explicit backdrop of wartime.

Counter-parallel: Pinochet's junta shot prisoners in stadiums and on roadsides, bypassing any judicial process. Iran runs each execution through formal charges, conviction, Supreme Court confirmation, and a scheduled date at a named prison, which produces a different pace indicator: it reflects the throughput capacity of the judicial system, not the speed of extrajudicial killing.

The judicial structure means each execution takes longer, which makes a sustained 22-per-six-weeks pace actually harder to maintain than the Pinochet comparison suggests.

Consensus view: Ahmad Reza Jalali, an Iranian researcher and political prisoner himself now held in Evin Prison, has previously stated in smuggled communications that the Iranian judiciary uses periods of maximum international attention distraction, during ceasefire negotiations, during UN sessions, to schedule executions knowing the news cycle will not focus on them.

The 22-in-six-weeks pace, coinciding precisely with the longest internet blackout in modern history and the most intense US-Iran diplomatic signalling since the war began, follows his documented pattern.

Counter-view: The Centre for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) notes that the 22 figure includes executions on drug charges (at least two confirmed by Hengaw on 30 April), which Iran classifies separately from political executions.

Tehran would argue the political execution count is lower than 22 and that drug-charge executions predate the war. The 10-of-22 who are confirmed protest-era prisoners is the legally unambiguous sub-category; the remaining 12 cases require individual legal analysis to classify as political.

Key tension: Whether the 22-in-six-weeks rate reflects a deliberate wartime acceleration policy or a coincidence of pre-existing death row cases processed faster under emergency procedures, and whether the rate will sustain or peak as the backlog of protest-era sentences from December 2025 through February 2026 is exhausted.

Sources:Iran International

Mentions:Iran Human Rights →Iran →Hengaw →Pakdasht →Evin Prison →Norway →Tehran →Ayatollah Khomeini →Sasan Azadvar →Dastgerd Prison →Supreme Court →OHCHR →Urmia →Iranian Navy →

First Reported In

Update #85 · "Not at war": three claims, no treaty

Iran International· 1 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Iran executes karate champion at Dastgerd

Azadvar's execution contributed to Iran Human Rights publishing the 22-in-six-weeks aggregate that day

Occurred 30 Apr 2026

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This Event

22 political executions in six weeks

An average of one political execution every two days, recorded under blackout conditions, is a humanitarian register independent of the kinetic ceasefire and outside any sanctions traction the UN OHCHR machinery has yet brought to bear.

Led to

Hengaw: two more 'Israel spy' hangings

The 2 May Bakrzadeh and Karimpour executions advance the 22-in-six-weeks political execution register from ID:2952, revising the April total upward to 26 including 14 political prisoners.

Occurred 2 May 2026

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Hengaw counts 30 sentenced, 13 hanged

Hengaw's 30/13 cohort figure escalates the Iran HRM 22-execution count from 1 May, placing all named cases inside a single documented protest cohort

Occurred 4 May 2026

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