Iranian Ministry of Intelligence operatives reached out to the CIA via a third country's intelligence service to discuss terms for ending the conflict, The New York Times reported on 5 March. The approach is the first documented Iranian initiative to contact Washington directly since US and Israeli strikes began on 28 February.
The channel's architecture tells the story. Acting President Mokhber told ILNA that Iran has "no intention" of negotiating with the United States . Ali Larijani, described as Iran's national security chief, publicly stated "We will not negotiate with the United States" . Iranian officials told NBC News and Al Jazeera that Tehran formally rejected Trump's Ceasefire outreach, arguing the June 2025 Ceasefire had been a strategic error that gave Washington eight months to rearm . Three separate public doors were bolted shut. The intelligence channel was an attempt to open a fourth — one invisible to domestic audiences, to hardliners within the IRGC, and to the Iranian public enduring a sixth day of internet blackout.
Iran has used this technique before. The backchannel that eventually produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action began with secret contacts facilitated by Oman's Sultan Qaboos in 2012, conducted through intelligence and national security channels rather than foreign ministries. Those talks ran for over a year before becoming public. The method allows both sides to explore positions without the political cost of formal negotiation — particularly useful for Iran, where The Supreme Leader's office has historically maintained final authority over whether to engage with Washington while permitting deniable exploratory contacts.
The critical difference this time is that the channel was exposed within hours. Whether the leak came from the third country's service, from within the US intelligence Community, or was deliberately placed by officials who wanted the approach killed is unknown. But the effect is the same: an approach designed to operate in shadow was dragged into daylight, where it became subject to the political dynamics of both capitals. For Tehran, the exposure confirms to hardliners that Washington cannot be trusted with sensitive communications. For any future intermediary — Oman, which facilitated the JCPOA backchannel, or whichever service carried this message — the lesson is that discretion cannot be guaranteed. The infrastructure for quiet diplomacy has been damaged along with the specific channel.
