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Iran Conflict 2026
17APR

Trump waives Russia sanctions; G7 balks

4 min read
09:52UTC

A 30-day reprieve on Russian oil sanctions aims to cool crude prices past $100 — but six G7 members called it the wrong signal, and Zelenskyy warned the waiver hands Moscow $10 billion.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

The US is subsidising Russian war revenues to offset oil prices its own war created.

President Trump issued a 30-day waiver on Russian oil sanctions, seeking to ease crude prices that have risen more than 40% since the war began on 28 February 1. Six of seven G7 membersGermany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, and Canada — told The Administration the waiver sends "not the right signal" 2. Zelenskyy estimated the reprieve could deliver $10 billion to Moscow 3.

The waiver is a response to market conditions The Administration's own campaign created. Brent Crude breached $100 on a closing basis on 11 March after the International Energy Agency declared the Iran war "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" — Gulf production down at least 10 million barrels per day, Hormuz transits reduced to single digits against a pre-war average of 138 . The IEA's record 400-million-barrel strategic reserve release failed to hold prices below $100. Brent closed Friday at $103.14 , with Monday futures pointing to $104.89–106.44 — the war's highest sustained range. The Administration needs crude on the market. Russia has crude to sell.

The policy contradiction is direct. On the same day the waiver was announced, Zelenskyy told CNN that Russia is manufacturing Shahed drones at the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan and shipping them to Iran for use against American forces 4. If that intelligence is accurate, the waiver eases financial pressure on a state arming Washington's current battlefield adversary. Russian oil revenue flows to the same defence industrial base producing drones that US forces intercept over The Gulf. The United States is, in practical effect, financing both sides of its own war — prosecuting a campaign against Iran while relaxing sanctions on Iran's arms supplier to manage the economic consequences of that campaign.

G7 opposition is broad but without enforcement leverage. The objecting six do not control the sanctions architecture — the United States does. European leaders face their own bind: the continent is still restructuring energy supply away from Russian gas dependency, and a simultaneous Gulf disruption and Russian supply contraction would push import-dependent economies toward the recession that Deutsche Bank and Oxford Economics have already warned of . Their objection is genuine. Their capacity to offer an alternative mechanism that puts barrels on the market within 30 days is not. The waiver will hold because no ally can propose a substitute — and because The Administration has decided that $103 oil is a greater immediate political liability than the contradiction of easing sanctions on one adversary to fight another.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies imposed sanctions to reduce Russia's oil revenues and limit its war capacity. Trump is now temporarily lifting some of those restrictions — not because Russia took any constructive action, but because US military operations against Iran are pushing up global oil prices. Six of the seven major Western economies publicly objected. The circularity identified by Zelenskyy and G7 members is the core problem: US actions raise oil prices, the waiver allows Russia to earn more from oil, and that revenue may fund the arms transfers supplying Iran against US forces — making the policy self-defeating at the strategic level.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

Six-of-seven G7 public dissent is structurally extraordinary. G7 communiqués and public statements almost universally paper over bilateral disputes with consensus language; a six-to-one break — on the record, on a US unilateral economic action toward Russia — signals that European capitals judge this waiver as categorically different from previous US-Russia economic adjustments. The dissent is itself a deterrence signal to Washington: further unilateral carve-outs risk formal G7 fragmentation on Russia policy, weakening the sanctions architecture that European capitals have invested three years constructing.

Root Causes

The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve was drawn down substantially during 2022–2023, materially reducing the administration's non-market tool for oil price management. The IEA coordinated emergency release mechanism requires consensus among member states, which the US has not sought. The waiver is therefore a supply-side fix for a price shock the US itself generated, reflecting a structural absence of short-term alternatives rather than a considered strategic choice.

Escalation

The waiver signals to Iran that US economic coercion has a domestic price ceiling: once oil rises high enough, sanctions relief follows regardless of adversary behaviour. This reduces Iranian incentive to seek terms and provides a replicable template — sustain the conflict at a cost level that keeps prices elevated without triggering decisive US escalation, and wait for Washington's domestic economics to force concessions.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

    US sanctions credibility is now explicitly conditional on domestic petrol prices, giving adversaries a replicable template: sustain conflict at a price-elevating tempo until sanctions relief follows.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    If incremental Russian revenues within the waiver window accelerate Shahed deliveries to Iran, the waiver directly shortens the US-Israel military advantage at a critical phase of the air campaign.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Consequence

    Six-of-seven G7 public dissent normalises allied defection from US-led sanctions coalitions, weakening economic coercion as a collective instrument precisely when it is most needed against Iran.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Granting sanctions relief to offset inflation caused by a US military campaign creates a template adversaries can exploit in future conflicts by operating at a price-escalating rather than militarily decisive tempo.

    Long term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #37 · Six more weeks of strikes; Hormuz deal dead

ABC News· 16 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Trump waives Russia sanctions; G7 balks
The waiver exposes a structural policy contradiction: the US is easing financial pressure on Russia to manage oil prices driven up by the US war on Iran, while Russia — per Ukrainian intelligence — is arming Iran against US forces with Shahed drones manufactured at Alabuga.
Different Perspectives
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Monitors documented a second death sentence for Zahra Tabari, 68, reported cemetery record deletions at Behesht-e Zahra, and a poll showing 81.5% of medical residents want to emigrate, against a background of 200+ confirmed executions since February. Iran's security courts operate at uninterrupted wartime tempo regardless of the diplomatic track.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Islamabad carried Trump's revised MOU demanding HEU destruction to Iranian negotiators, formally inheriting the role of sole active mediator after Oman's forced withdrawal. Pakistan lacks Oman's banking infrastructure for frozen-asset routing and carries its own regional stakes, making it a less structurally neutral broker.
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait intercepted Iranian missiles and drones for a second time in days on 1 June, with air-raid sirens sounding nationwide, after invoking Article 51 self-defence on 28 May following the Ali Al Salem ballistic-missile strike. The repeated interceptions test whether Kuwait's domestic politics can sustain hosting US forces as a de facto co-belligerent.
China (PRC)
China (PRC)
Beijing sent scholars to Shangri-La rather than its defence minister and addressed Taiwan without mentioning Iran, maintaining bilateral energy corridor protection with Tehran while refusing diplomatic exposure at multilateral forums. Trump barred China as an HEU custodian on 27 May, removing Beijing from the deal architecture while China continues supplying DPI hardware that caps Iran's internet.
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's held its Hormuz war-risk designation at $10-14 million per voyage while Brent recovered to $93.91, maintaining the structural divergence from futures pricing that has persisted since late May. Underwriters require a UN Security Council resolution or government certification letter, not diplomatic optimism.
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Five Gulf states wrote to the IMO on 21 May rejecting Iran's PGSA transit authority over international waters; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not confirmed participation in the European Hormuz mission. The GCC is navigating between US security guarantees and exposure to Iranian fire, with no Gulf state formally co-belligerent except Kuwait.