3APR

US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

2 min read

11:45UTC

OFAC's GL 134A expires 11 April; at $121 per barrel, any extension would hand Russia far more revenue than when the waiver was issued at $73, while simultaneous vessel desanctioning created contradictory signals.

← Back to Bridge strike kills eight; Army chief fired Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

GL 134A expiry on 11 April is the binary choice: extension at $121/barrel or lapse compounding Russia's crisis.

OFAC issued General License 134 on 12 March, covering the roughly 124 million barrels of Russian crude at sea , amended it to GL 134A on 19 March, and faces a binary decision on its 11 April expiry. At $73 per barrel when issued, the waiver was defensible as market stabilisation. At $121, the same licence authorises far greater per-barrel income than its design contemplated.

OFAC added Iran, North Korea, and Cuba exclusions to GL 134A one week after the original licence, a rapid amendment suggesting Treasury received evidence that cargoes were being redirected toward sanctioned parties. On 31 March, OFAC separately removed sanctions on three Russian cargo vessels: Fesco Magadan, Fesco Moneron, and SV Nikolay.

The contradictory pattern, tightening the licence's terms while reducing pressure on named Russian vessels, is consistent with an administration managing competing objectives across the Iran war and Ukraine simultaneously. The Atlantic Council warned that extension at current prices "risks sustaining Russia's war effort."

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government gave Russia a special oil sales exemption that expires on 11 April. When it was issued, oil prices were around $73 per barrel. Now that the Iran war has pushed prices to $121, extending the same exemption would hand Russia much more money than originally intended. At the same time, the US removed sanctions on three Russian ships while tightening the exemption's rules — sending confusing signals about American policy toward Russia.

What could happen next?

Risk
GL 134A extension at $121/barrel would constitute the largest single US-authorised revenue transfer to Russia since sanctions began.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

At $73/barrel (waiver issuance price), each barrel of Russian crude under GL 134A generated approximately $29 above the $44.10 cap. At $121/barrel, the same barrel generates $76.90 above cap — a 2.6x increase in per-barrel sanction circumvention value.

Consensus view: Atlantic Council and external sanctions analysts assess extension at current Urals prices would directly fund Russian war prosecution at levels the waiver was never designed to permit.

Counter-view: Treasury may extend on Iran war market stabilisation grounds — the same justification that applied at $73/barrel, though far less defensible at $121.

Key tension: Whether Treasury's Iran war stabilisation objective outweighs the revenue-to-Russia impact of extension at current oil prices.

Sources:Mayer Brown

Mentions:Moscow →Ukraine →Iran →Urals →North Korea →Russia →OFAC →Atlantic Council →

First Reported In

Update #11 · Russia Sells Less Oil but Earns More

Mayer Brown· 5 Apr 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

This Event

US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

The GL 134A expiry is a binary US policy signal: extension at $121 per barrel directly subsidises Moscow's war revenue; lapse combined with Baltic terminal damage would compound Russia's export crisis.

Led to

GL 134A lapses toward quiet extension

GL 134A event is the direct resolution of ID:2027's binary-choice framing: extension at $121/bbl or lapse on the 11 April expiry date.

Occurred 11 Apr 2026

Read story →

Treasury kills $150M-a-day Russian oil waiver

At $121 Urals the waiver was running 2.6x above the $73 barrel design price, making non-renewal a structural inevitability.

Occurred 16 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

IAEA

Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.

Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)

Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.

India

Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.

Pakistan

Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.

UK and France (Northwood coalition)

Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.