Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Japan's Kyodo News: "the strait is closed only to ships belonging to our enemies, countries that attack us. For other countries, ships can pass through the strait." The audience was deliberate. Japan depends on Hormuz for more than 90% of its Middle Eastern crude imports and was granted passage the same week. Araghchi's statement codifies what the IRGC toll system had already established in practice — a selective blockade distinguishing between hostile and non-hostile nations.
Under international maritime law, all vessels hold transit passage rights through straits used for international navigation. A blanket Hormuz closure would unite maritime powers against Tehran and provide clear legal grounds for military enforcement. A selective closure divides them. Nations that joined the 22-country demand for reopening but pledged no warships now have a route to continued energy access — provided they keep their commitments rhetorical. Iran's doctrine rewards the gap between words and action that has characterised the international response. The seven-nation statement from 19 March produced no vessels; the expanded 22-nation version tripled the signatories and still produced none.
Araghchi's framing is consistent with Iran's broader negotiating posture. Days earlier, he told The National that Iran does not "believe in a ceasefire" and set conditions including removal of all US bases from the region and reparations. The selective blockade is not a de-escalation offer. Tehran maintains the military closure against US-aligned shipping while building bilateral dependencies with non-aligned states — dependencies that give each country an individual reason to resist joining any enforcement Coalition. For Washington, the structural problem is plain: every nation that secures bilateral passage from Iran has less incentive to challenge Iran's control of the strait.
