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Iran Conflict 2026
7AUG

Trump threatens new target groups

2 min read
12:08UTC

A Truth Social post expands stated US war aims to unnamed categories of targets — language without precedent in modern presidential rhetoric and with direct implications under the laws of war.

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President Trump posted on Truth Social on Saturday morning: "Today Iran will be hit very hard! Under serious consideration for complete destruction and certain death, because of Iran's bad behavior, are areas and groups of people that were not considered for targeting up until this moment in time." Bloomberg ran the headline: "Trump Says US May Target New Parts of Iran." The phrase has no precedent in modern US presidential targeting rhetoric. Prior targets in this campaign have been military: IRGC bases, missile sites, naval vessels, air defences, command infrastructure.

The statement extends a trajectory documented across eight days. Trump demanded unconditional surrender on 5 March , then issued immunity-or-death ultimatums directly to IRGC commanders via social media . CENTCOM was subsequently directed to "dismantle the Iranian regime's security apparatus" — a war aim encompassing the IRGC, Basij, MOIS, and internal security forces , materially different from the campaign's opening framing of nuclear facilities and missile infrastructure. Each step broadened the stated objective. None was accompanied by a diplomatic mechanism to give it operational meaning. Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly closed the door on negotiations . The Egypt-Turkey-Oman mediation has produced no confirmed participants. Congress has rejected war authorisation in both chambers — 212–219 in the House and 47–53 in the Senate .

"Areas" not previously considered could mean cultural heritage sites, civilian government buildings, or infrastructure sustaining the civilian population — power grids, water treatment, telecommunications. "Groups of people" could refer to remaining IRGC leadership, civilian government officials, or religious figures. The United States is not party to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions but is bound by customary International humanitarian law, including the principle of distinction — the requirement to differentiate between military objectives and civilian objects. The DoD Law of War Manual, which governs US forces, prohibits attacks directed at the civilian population as such. Commanders who receive orders derived from this statement must evaluate them against these requirements. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, personal criminal liability attaches to service members who knowingly execute unlawful orders.

Trump separately cast Pezeshkian's televised apology as a form of surrender. Pezeshkian explicitly rejected the unconditional surrender demand, calling it "a dream that they should take to their grave." The forces Trump now threatens to target more expansively are the same forces Iran's own civilian president cannot control — the IRGC's 31 autonomous provincial commands continued striking Dubai, Saudi oil facilities, and Bahrain within hours of Pezeshkian's halt order. Widening the target set does not resolve the command fragmentation that makes negotiated de-escalation difficult. It compounds the problem by eliminating whatever remains of the institutional structure a future interlocutor would need to enforce a ceasefire.

First Reported In

Update #26 · President orders halt; IRGC ignores him

Bloomberg· 7 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Trump threatens new target groups
The statement extends a documented rhetorical escalation from military strikes through unconditional surrender demands to undefined targeting categories potentially encompassing civilian populations, creating legal obligations for US military commanders to evaluate resulting orders against the DoD Law of War Manual and the principle of distinction.
Different Perspectives
Turkiye
Turkiye
Erdogan followed the Pakistani delegation to Jeddah for an instrument that has not been signed. Ankara's entry widens Saudi Arabia's defence architecture beyond the existing Pakistan pact, adding a second non-Gulf military partner mid-conflict.
Oman
Oman
Muscat is the corridor's broker but has published nothing about the arrangement Fars describes on its behalf. The account leaves Oman administering outbound traffic only, a narrower role than the shared route its mediation has rested on since 1979.
Pakistan
Pakistan
Islamabad sent Sharif, Munir and Dar to Jeddah to widen a defence commitment it has honoured in cheaper registers since March, when Dar invoked the Saudi mutual defence pact. Jeddah tests whether that hedge becomes a binding trilateral instrument with Turkiye.
United States
United States
Washington rejected the Majlis Hormuz bill outright while CENTCOM's own tally kept climbing to 49 vessels redirected since 14 July. Both instruments tightened in the same week Trump promised the strait would reopen soon.
Iran
Iran
Iran's foreign ministry is selling a phased Hormuz corridor through Oman and denying any percentage cargo tariff, while its own Majlis is legislating fines to 20% and a bar on Israeli-linked cargo. The two accounts, from the same government, do not agree with each other.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh published a target forecast, not an attribution, for the campaign it says the Najran strike previewed. That keeps an Article 51 case available while it formalises a trilateral defence architecture with Pakistan and Turkiye.