Professor Julian Cooper's analysis, published by SIPRI, puts Russia's 2026 defence and security allocation at 16.8 trillion rubles — 38 to 40 per cent of all federal spending1. Army and weapons procurement alone accounts for 12.93 trillion rubles, the largest single budget category since the USSR. Total military expenditure reaches $165.6 billion, or 5.8 per cent of GDP, with 84 per cent classified — meaning independent verification of the actual spending breakdown is impossible2.
The share-of-budget figure requires a specific comparison. The late Soviet Union devoted an estimated 15 to 25 per cent of GDP to defence (CIA and DIA estimates diverged throughout the Cold War), but it ran a command economy where the state controlled all output. Russia must sustain a wartime budget inside a market economy, and the seams are visible. The National Wealth Fund has been drained to historic lows. The budget deficit stands at 3.78 trillion rubles (1.6 per cent of GDP) — manageable by international standards, but running in one direction. Oil and gas revenues fell roughly 32 per cent year-on-year in January, with Urals crude below $38 per barrel against Brent at $62.50. Russian arms exports have simultaneously collapsed by 64 per cent over the most recent five-year measurement period, confirming that domestic military-industrial output is being consumed internally rather than generating export revenue.
Cooper's assessment is direct: economic pressure "is unlikely to stop the war in Ukraine"3. One variable supports that judgement. SIPRI notes the Iran conflict may improve Russia's fiscal outlook through higher energy prices — consistent with the €510 million in daily fossil fuel revenue recorded during the conflict's first fortnight, a 14 per cent jump above February's average. The Treasury's 12 March waivers on 124 million barrels of Russian oil provide additional relief on the revenue side.
The budget tells a clear story about priorities: Moscow has chosen guns over everything else. What it cannot reveal is the breaking point. Russia's Central Bank has used aggressive interest rate policy to contain the inflationary pressure that wartime spending generates, but 38–40 per cent of federal spending directed to a single purpose leaves minimal flexibility for civilian infrastructure, social spending, or responding to economic shocks. The National Wealth Fund was built from two decades of oil revenue precisely to absorb those shocks. It is now nearly gone. Russia is running a wartime economy without a safety net — sustainable as long as the war goes well and energy prices hold, catastrophically exposed if either variable turns.
