SIPRI data released on 9 March confirmed that Russian arms exports fell 64% over the most recent five-year measurement period1. The decline ends three decades in which Russia held the world's second-largest arms export market, supplying India, Algeria, Egypt, Vietnam, and dozens of states that chose Soviet-legacy platforms for cost, strategic autonomy, or both.
Three forces drove the collapse. The war in Ukraine consumes domestic production — armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and precision munitions that would fill export contracts are absorbed by a front line that has destroyed thousands of platforms. Western sanctions on microelectronics and machine tools have constrained manufacturing; the strike on the Kremniy El semiconductor plant in Bryansk hit one of Russia's few remaining domestic sources of military-grade microelectronics. And battlefield performance has eroded buyer confidence — Russian air defence systems, armour, and electronic warfare equipment have failed against Ukrainian countermeasures in conditions prospective customers can observe through open-source intelligence.
India, historically Russia's largest arms customer, has accelerated diversification. New Delhi now flies French Rafale fighters, operates American Apache helicopters, and is expanding domestic Tejas production. The S-400 system — once Russia's flagship export programme — has faced repeated delivery delays. When a supplier's own military consumes output faster than factories can produce, commercial reliability erodes regardless of price.
EU member states' arms exports grew 36%, outpacing the US at 27% and China at 11%2. Gulf states that historically purchased American or Russian systems are now buying Ukrainian interceptor drones at $1,000–$2,000 per unit, and Saudi Arabia has signed a separate deal for Ukrainian interceptor missiles. The global arms market is reorganising around the two active wars consuming its inventory — and Russia is losing customers to competitors whose equipment those wars are simultaneously validating.
