6AUG

Naqadeh dual, two Iraqis, a Turk at risk

3 min read

15:43UTC

Hengaw documented two secret executions at Naqadeh on 21 May; two Iraqi nationals were executed on espionage charges the day before, and a Turkish citizen faces imminent execution on the same charge.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Two executions at one facility in one day; foreign-national executions convert repression into a foreign-relations crisis.

Hengaw, the Norway-based Kurdish Human Rights Organisation that has been the principal independent casualty monitor of the 2026 conflict, documented the secret execution of two Kurdish political prisoners, Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour, at Naqadeh Central Prison on Thursday 21 May ¹. Naqadeh sits in West Azerbaijan Province in Iran's Kurdish-majority northwest. Two executions at a single facility on the same day is the sharpest escalation in Hengaw's wartime register since the 13 May five-prison cluster across Birjand, Tabriz, Kerman and Gorgan.

The Naqadeh dual sits inside an escalating repression cluster Hengaw has documented across the week. Kurdish bodies have been denied to families on 18-19 May and writer Majid Karimi was detained in Tehran in the same window ; Shiraz lawyer Bahar Sahraeian was detained at 22:05 on 17 May while performing legal duties . The Naqadeh executions extend a pattern that has already touched Iran's defence bar and its literary milieu.

On Wednesday 20 May, Iranian authorities executed two Iraqi nationals on espionage charges, the first foreign nationals so executed during the 2026 conflict. Iraq holds the bilateral PGSA passage deal that has kept Iraqi crude moving through Hormuz on political engagement rather than yuan tolls . Baghdad protested privately over Israeli covert bases on Iraqi soil the week before, but its Hormuz dependence makes public confrontation with Tehran structurally difficult. The foreign ministry must now choose between protesting the executions and keeping the transit deal intact.

Gholamreza Khani Shakarab, a Turkish national in Iranian custody, faces imminent execution on the same espionage charge while Turkey is an active mediator. A Turkish execution would force Recep Tayyip Erdogan to suspend Ankara's mediating role and create a domestic crisis he cannot deflect. The execution of foreign nationals is procedurally distinct from political-prisoner executions: it converts what had been a domestic-repression track into a foreign-relations event by definition. The Iraqi case implicates a passage deal Baghdad cannot lose; the Turkish case implicates a mediation channel Ankara cannot abandon. Hengaw's register has now reached two of Tehran's three functioning Western-adjacent backchannels.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran's government carries out executions in secret, meaning families and lawyers are not told in advance. A Norwegian human rights group called Hengaw tracks these executions by collecting information from inside Iran. On 21 May 2026, Hengaw documented that two Kurdish men Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour were killed at a prison in northwest Iran without public announcement. The same day, Iran had also executed two Iraqi citizens on espionage charges. This is significant because Iraq has a deal with Iran that lets Iraqi ships use the Strait of Hormuz. Killing Iraqi nationals accused of spying sends a message to Baghdad about the limits of that relationship. A Turkish citizen named Gholamreza Khani Shakarab faces the same espionage charges and imminent execution. This creates a problem for Turkey, which is one of the few countries Iran is willing to talk to about ending the war. Executing a Turkish national while Turkey mediates would likely end Ankara's role as a go-between.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Secret executions during wartime serve two distinct institutional functions in Iran. The judiciary operates on pre-existing case timelines; Zaleh and Maroufpour were held on charges predating the 2026 conflict, and their execution reflects the judiciary's standard practice of accelerating capital cases during periods of state emergency when political cover is higher.

The espionage-charge executions of Iraqi nationals represent a different mechanism: IRGC counterintelligence treating the wartime information environment as a combat theatre where foreign nationals can be neutralised under espionage law without triggering the Geneva Convention protections that would apply to captured combatants.

Iran's use of espionage charges rather than explicitly military charges is calibrated to keep the executions inside domestic criminal law rather than international humanitarian law.

What could happen next?

Risk
If Iran executes Gholamreza Khani Shakarab while Turkey serves as active mediator, Ankara's domestic political constraints will likely force it to suspend or end its mediating role, removing one of only two Western-adjacent back-channels alongside Pakistan.
Immediate · Reported
Consequence
The execution of Iraqi nationals on espionage charges directly contradicts the 'friendly nation' framing of Iraq's bilateral Hormuz passage deal, creating a diplomatic contradiction Baghdad cannot publicly address without undermining its own passage rights.
Short term · Reported
Risk
European states funding or considering Hengaw's documentation as evidence for ICC or universal-jurisdiction proceedings now have a concrete wartime human rights record that may activate their domestic legal obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture.
Medium term · Suggested
Meaning
The clustering of Kurdish political executions alongside foreign-national espionage executions in a 24-hour window signals that Iran's security apparatus is running multiple parallel operation types simultaneously, suggesting command-and-control is distributed rather than centralised.
Immediate · Reported

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Iran

Iran

Primary parallel: Iran's 1988 prison massacres, in which an estimated 4,000-5,000 political prisoners were executed in weeks following a Mojahedin-e Khalq incursion, established the precedent of wartime security crackdowns treated as internal operational decisions immune from diplomatic protest. The Naqadeh executions follow the same institutional logic: the judiciary and IRGC counterintelligence operate on their own security timeline, not the foreign ministry's diplomatic timeline.

Counter-parallel: Turkey's treatment of Kurdish PKK-linked prisoners during the 2015-2016 Cizre siege showed that wartime security operations against Kurdish populations can generate sustained diplomatic costs with European partners, even when the legal framing of the executions is criminal rather than explicitly political.

Iran's Kurdish political prisoners carry the same European diplomatic exposure, but Tehran calculates the cost as lower than the domestic political cost of appearing to moderate wartime repression.

Consensus view: Amnesty International's death-penalty researchers and Hengaw analysts assess that the dual Kurdish execution at a single facility in one day represents a deliberate escalation in the wartime repression cadence: prior executions were distributed across provinces and prisons to limit the visibility of any single cluster, a pattern that a two-person execution at one facility breaks.

Counter-view: Iran Human Rights, the Oslo-based monitoring organisation, has argued in prior reporting cycles that execution clustering near diplomatic meetings is a signal to domestic hardliners that the government has not softened its security posture, even as civilian officials engage with foreign mediators; the 20-21 May cluster coincides with the Naqvi Tehran visit, consistent with that pattern.

Key tension: Whether the Iraqi-national executions on espionage charges represent a deliberate message to Baghdad whose bilateral Hormuz passage deal gives Iran leverage over Iraqi state behaviour or an operational security action by the IRGC's counterintelligence arm that overrode diplomatic considerations.

First Reported In

Update #104 · Three days to Hengli

Hengaw Human Rights Organisation· 21 May 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

Hengaw: Kurdish bodies denied, writer detained

17-19 May Hengaw body-denial and writer detention in Tehran established the escalating wartime repression pattern that the dual Naqadeh execution advances

Occurred 18 May 2026

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Hengaw documents Shiraz lawyer detention mid-duty

17 May Bahar Sahraeian detention is in the same escalating wartime repression cluster that now includes the dual Naqadeh execution

Occurred 17 May 2026

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Iran runs Hormuz as a favours system

Iraq's bilateral PGSA passage deal creates structural pressure preventing Baghdad from protesting the Iraqi-national executions publicly

Occurred 15 May 2026

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This Event

Naqadeh dual, two Iraqis, a Turk at risk

Two executions at one facility in one day breaks the wartime cadence, and the first foreign-national espionage executions implicate Iraq's bilateral PGSA passage deal and Turkey's active mediating role.

Led to

Naqadeh executes two Kurdish PDKI prisoners

The 20 May execution of two Iraqi nationals on espionage charges (ID:3497) established the foreign-national execution track; the Naqadeh executions of Zaleh and Maroufpour extend it to PDKI-linked Kurdish prisoners.

Occurred 21 May 2026

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Iran hangs Turkish national, toll rises

Shakarab's imminent-execution flag (ID:3497) was carried since 21 May; the 26 May execution resolves this prior-flagged status and extends the foreign-national execution cluster.

Occurred 26 May 2026

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Different Perspectives

Hengaw

The Norway-based monitoring group reported the Urmia executions of Omid Behzad and Pouria Safvat, the only source to do so, consistent with its documented pattern of recording far more executions than the Iranian state acknowledges. Iran's government has not confirmed either execution.

Shipping and insurance underwriters

War-risk premiums price the Houthi campaign because the group announces its targets in advance, but a reopening Trump has promised without a published text gives underwriters no benchmark to reprice Hormuz cover against. Insurers want a text before they move rates, not a promise.

Houthi movement

Spokesman Yahya Saree claimed strikes on two tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on 5 August, only one of which UKMTO could confirm. The group's campaign against shipping continues on its own schedule, independent of any Hormuz arrangement further north.

Oman

Muscat has brokered the coordinates both Tehran and Washington's wire sources now describe differently, but has published no account of its own. Oman's position depends on treating Hormuz as a shared route, which is not what Iran is currently describing.

United States Central Command

CENTCOM raised its interdiction tally from 35 to 44 redirected vessels and disclosed its first boardings on 3 August, the day before Trump promised a reopening. The command's own enforcement record does not yet reflect the release the President has described.

Iran's Foreign Ministry

Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei described the agreed Hormuz coordinates as a wholly new corridor under Iranian management, not a split of the existing route, days after his own deputy rejected Oman's lane proposal. Tehran wants the arrangement read as a change of ownership, not a compromise on access.