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Iran Conflict 2026
15JUN

Rubio sets the US sequence on oath

3 min read
11:40UTC

In his first war testimony, Marco Rubio told the Senate the strait reopens before any centrifuge talks, with no sanctions relief for reopening alone.

ConflictDeveloping

Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave the SFRC (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) his first testimony since the war began, on 2 June. He laid out the US order of operations under oath: the Strait of Hormuz reopens first, then 30, 60 or 90-day technical talks on cutting or cancelling enrichment 1. Reopening alone buys Tehran nothing. "We have not offered Iran any sanctions relief" for that first step, Rubio told the committee 2.

The sequence answers a question the war has dodged for three months, which side moves first. Washington wants the strait open before the centrifuges are discussed, and the same week it cut the IRGC's stablecoin toll rail through OFAC , the demand to reopen Hormuz is the diplomatic face of that financial squeeze. Iran must give up the chokepoint leverage before it gains anything at the table.

Rubio also gave the first US read on the Supreme Leader's channel. Mojtaba Khamenei "appears increasingly engaged, although all of his communications have been in writing and through intermediaries" 3. On the 440.9 kg enriched uranium stockpile, Rubio offered no new custody plan: it is, he said, "still buried deep in a mountain somewhere" 4. Washington has a sequence and a read on Tehran's top channel, but no answer yet on where the uranium goes.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

US Secretary of State Rubio told Congress on 2 June that Iran must reopen the Strait of Hormuz first, before any nuclear talks begin and before any sanctions are lifted. He laid out a timeline of 30, 60 or 90 days of technical negotiations that would only start after Iran acts. Iran's leverage in these negotiations is the Hormuz closure itself. Rubio is asking Tehran to relinquish that leverage before Washington offers anything in return. He also confirmed for the first time that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is sending written messages through intermediaries, a slow channel that sits awkwardly against the 30/60/90-day timetables Rubio proposed.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The sequencing deadlock has one structural driver: Iran's only strategic leverage is the Strait of Hormuz. Reopening it for free removes Tehran's ability to compel a sanctions-relief deal.

The Hormuz toll mechanism and the PGSA architecture (built at significant political cost inside Iran between March and May 2026) were designed specifically to create a concession Iran could offer in exchange for something. Asking Iran to dismantle that mechanism before talks produce a verified commitment violates the basic exchange logic that any negotiated settlement requires.

Rubio's characterisation of Mojtaba Khamenei as writing-only-through-intermediaries is the public US record that the Supreme Leader is engaging. It simultaneously constrains Tehran's ability to deny talks are happening and confirms that the channel is indirect and slow, meaning that the 30/60/90-day timelines Rubio proposed require Khamenei to sanction moves faster than his communication channel permits.

Escalation

Rubio's testimony does not escalate the military situation but hardens the US diplomatic position. The explicit statement that no sanctions relief accompanies a Hormuz reopening reduces the probability of a rapid deal and increases the risk that Iran will interpret the framework as structurally bad-faith.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    Iran's SNSC will likely read the no-sanctions-relief condition as confirming that Hormuz reopening is a unilateral concession, reinforcing the hardliners' argument that Araghchi's diplomacy delivers nothing.

  • Consequence

    The 440.9 kg enriched uranium stockpile remains in Iranian territory with no agreed custody plan; every week without an agreement extends the proliferation-risk window Rubio acknowledged but did not resolve.

First Reported In

Update #116 · Washington signs a sanction, not a strike

Al Jazeera· 3 Jun 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
G7 Leaders (ex-US)
G7 Leaders (ex-US)
Kananaskis ended without a joint communique for the first time in the body's history; Macron credited G7 pressure with speeding the ceasefire while Trump publicly denied the summit played any role. The split between US and European G7 partners over what the memorandum means for sanctions relief was the direct cause of the text failure.
Protection-and-Indemnity insurers
Protection-and-Indemnity insurers
London-based P&I mutual clubs declined to underwrite Hormuz crossings while the IRGC Strait Authority remained operational, making the passage commercially impassable regardless of the memorandum's terms. Shipping operators said they would wait weeks for on-water conditions to change before routing tankers through.
IRGC Persian Gulf Strait Authority
IRGC Persian Gulf Strait Authority
P&I mutual insurers declined to underwrite Hormuz crossings on 15-16 June while the IRGC's Strait Authority remained in operation, reducing actual transits to two vessels against a pre-war daily rate of 94. The corps' revenue-generating toll mechanism, created 5 May and collecting $1.5-2 million per VLCC in crypto, has not been stood down and cannot be dissolved by Ghalibaf's signature.
Israeli Cabinet
Israeli Cabinet
Netanyahu admitted he had not seen the memorandum's text but confirmed IDF forces would stay in southern Lebanon; Finance Minister Smotrich called for ten Beirut buildings destroyed per Hezbollah drone and National Security Minister Ben-Gvir said the agreement 'does not bind us in any way'. Israel signed nothing in Islamabad and is the central unresolved variable in the Lebanon clause.
Iranian Majlis hardliners
Iranian Majlis hardliners
Around 60 MPs signed a letter demanding Ghalibaf explain the memorandum; Paydari faction MP Sabeti said the deal violates the Supreme Leader's red lines, and MP Aboutorabi argued the document carries binding obligations 'that cannot be resolved by simply changing the name'. President Pezeshkian defended the negotiators against accusations of betrayal, confirming the fracture inside Iran's political class.
US Vice President JD Vance
US Vice President JD Vance
Vance signed on 15 June and said the memorandum was 'not conditioned on Israel withdrawing from Lebanon' while also saying it 'envisioned a ceasefire that covers both Iran and Lebanon'. The two formulations are incompatible and hand Iran's foreign minister a ready-made violation claim before Geneva.