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Iran Conflict 2026
14JUN

Iran defers nuclear talks to phase two

3 min read
11:42UTC

Baghaei confirmed the nuclear file has been split off into a separate 60-day second phase that starts only once a war-ending memorandum is signed. The hardest question is being deferred, not solved.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iran has deferred the nuclear file to a 60-day second phase that starts only after a signed ceasefire.

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei confirmed on 24-25 May that nuclear questions have been moved into a separate 60-day second phase, one that begins only after any war-ending memorandum is signed 1. Tehran insists the nuclear track cannot open until the first phase, covering the Strait of Hormuz and frozen assets, is resolved.

This is a development in a known dispute, not a fresh one. Accounts of the deal's nuclear terms had been contradictory across the parties , and Baghaei's confirmation resolves part of that confusion by naming the structure: the nuclear file is sequenced behind the ceasefire, not bundled into it. What is newly on the record is the architecture, a time-boxed second stage, rather than the existence of a nuclear disagreement.

The phasing makes diplomatic sense and reflects a constraint inside Tehran. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has directed that Iran's enriched uranium stay in the country , which is incompatible with the verification regime Washington would seek. Deferring that fight to a separate 60-day window lets a war-ending agreement close without first cracking the question that has defied negotiators for a decade.

Deferral shrinks the negotiation, not the problem. US positions on enrichment caps and verification have not been made public, and the 60-day clock would start only after the harder sequencing fight over the strait and the frozen assets is already settled. A second phase that opens with no agreed verifier, no IAEA re-access date, and no destination for Iran's enriched stock could stall exactly where the 2015 deal's successors did.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran confirmed on 24-25 May that discussions about its nuclear programme have been pushed into a separate, later stage of any peace agreement. The plan has two parts. Part one is ending the war: reopening the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the US naval blockade, and releasing frozen Iranian money. Part two, starting only after part one is signed, would be 60 days of nuclear talks. But Iran's supreme leader has already said Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium must stay in the country, which is the main thing the US wants removed. The nuclear inspection agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was expelled from Iran in April, so there is no one in place to verify whether Iran makes any nuclear changes. The 60-day window exists on paper, but the tools needed to make it work are not yet in place.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The 60-day nuclear deferral is structurally forced by the IAEA access gap created by the Majlis vote of 11 April 2026. Iran cannot credibly offer nuclear concessions for Phase 1 because there is no inspection regime through which any concession could be verified. The deferral to Phase 2 is not primarily a diplomatic choice; it is a verification impossibility that both sides are papering over by agreeing to solve it later.

Khamenei's 21 May uranium-stay directive compounds the problem: even if Phase 2 begins, the Supreme Leader has publicly instructed that the enriched uranium stockpile must remain in Iran, removing the one confidence-building measure the Axios MOU draft described as a Phase 2 deliverable.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If Phase 1 is signed and the blockade lifts, Iran retains full enrichment capacity for at least 60 days with no IAEA inspection access, creating a window during which any covert enrichment acceleration would be undetectable.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Khamenei's 21 May uranium-stay directive, combined with the 60-day deferral, means the IAEA will need to be restored to full access before Phase 2 can begin, a political precondition neither the Axios MOU draft nor Baghaei's statement has addressed.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    A signed war-ending MOU that explicitly defers nuclear questions would mark the first time the US has agreed in writing that a non-nuclear war with Iran can be terminated without simultaneous nuclear concessions, a structural precedent for any future Iranian nuclear negotiation.

    Long term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #107 · Two markets, two prices on one Iran deal

Al Jazeera· 25 May 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
Qatar (mediator)
Qatar (mediator)
Qatari negotiators flew to Tehran on Sunday morning to close remaining gaps between the parties, operating as the primary shuttle channel. Qatar's role is to bridge the civilian-track gap the IRGC veto has left.
IAEA / Rafael Grossi
IAEA / Rafael Grossi
Grossi replied to Araghchi's 13 June protection-of-materials letter the same day, citing Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement obligation to declare any nuclear material transfer. With 97 days of lost inspector access and approximately 240 kg unaccounted, Grossi has treaty text and no inspectors on the ground to enforce it.
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Emirates
The UAE state oil company assessed full Hormuz flows will not resume until 2027 even with a fast deal, citing demining, inspection, and insurance timelines. The UAE ambassador to Washington said a simple ceasefire is not enough.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The IRGC ran naval exercises in Hormuz during Geneva talks and its political deputy declared Iran was negotiating from a position of strength. The corps has not endorsed the MoU; by amplifying Mashhad protests through Fars, it is framing any deal as conditions it imposed rather than a concession it accepted.
Iran Foreign Ministry / Araghchi
Iran Foreign Ministry / Araghchi
Araghchi's dilute-in-Iran red line was met by the US concession, but his foreign ministry spokesman said Tehran had not taken a final decision and a signing might come in days, not Sunday. Araghchi separately wrote to the IAEA pledging to protect nuclear materials as dilution negotiations advanced.
White House / US negotiating team
White House / US negotiating team
Washington accepted dilution inside Iran rather than ship-out, its first substantive material concession in 106 days, the New York Times reported. With the White House register blank and the ceremony slipped a third weekend, the administration has moved its negotiating position without yet producing a document.