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Iran Conflict 2026
11JUN

Iran and Oman draft Hormuz bilateral

2 min read
09:17UTC

Esmaeil Baghaei told his weekly Tehran press conference on 18 May that Iran and Oman were 'in continuous consultations' to design a new bilateral Hormuz transit mechanism, following an expert-level meeting in Muscat the previous week.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Muscat drafting a Hormuz mechanism with Tehran would convert a unilateral toll into a treaty Western planners must negotiate around.

At his weekly Tehran press conference on 18 May 2026, Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, said Iran and Oman were 'in continuous consultations' on a bilateral Hormuz transit mechanism, after an expert-level technical meeting in Muscat the previous week, Euronews reported 1. Baghaei's weekly briefing is the primary on-the-record channel for Iran's diplomatic positions; this one extended a bilateral channel Tehran had only previously disclosed in the context of guiding Indian vessels through Hormuz minefields .

Oman shares administration of the strait of Hormuz with Iran under a 1968 bilateral agreement signed before UNCLOS was drafted. That historical priority matters for the legal architecture: a co-signed Iran-Oman transit system cannot be dismissed as a unilateral Iranian imposition the way the PGSA-only mechanism can, and it directly confronts the UNCLOS Article 38 freedom-of-navigation foundation the 26-nation coalition has been resting on .

The Muscat track also reframes Oman's diplomatic posture. Muscat has historically been the back-channel host for US-Iran talks rather than a co-administrator of pressure. Drafting a transit mechanism with Tehran rather than mediating between Tehran and Washington places Oman closer to Iran's institutional architecture than to the coalition's. If a written agreement emerges, the freedom-of-navigation argument coalition planners have been making becomes a treaty dispute between two sovereigns who share the strait, not a corridor-opening operation against an isolated obstructor. The shift is the kind of legal repositioning that, once signed, is hard to reverse with hardware.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Iran and Oman are working on a deal to manage who gets through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is a small Gulf state that borders the southern half of the strait. It has a long history of acting as a go-between it hosted the secret talks that produced the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. What makes Oman useful here is geography: its waters cover part of the strait's main shipping lane, so any arrangement that runs through Muscat has a legal foundation that Iran's own permit body lacks. A deal here would be harder for the US-led coalition to dismiss than Iran's unilateral toll.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

Oman's value in this negotiation stems from a geographic fact that no political decision can alter: its territorial waters extend to the southern half of the strait's navigable channel. Any transit mechanism that runs through Omani coordination therefore operates partly inside Omani sovereign space, giving it a jurisdictional basis the PGSA's Chinese-yuan portal lacks.

A second structural driver is Iran's need for a face-saving exit from the PGSA mechanism. The PGSA generates compliance dilemmas but cannot be physically enforced against a coalition with Wedgetail AEW&C and Charles de Gaulle overhead. A bilateral Oman arrangement lets Tehran claim the PGSA succeeded diplomatically rather than retreating under pressure.

Third, Oman has an independent economic interest in Hormuz stabilisation: its LNG export revenue from Qalhat runs through the strait, and prolonged disruption costs Muscat directly.

Escalation

The Iran-Oman bilateral process is de-escalatory at the procedural level it provides a forum for managing the strait short of kinetic confrontation. Its risk is that it could harden Iran's claim to joint-administrative authority over the strait if a deal is signed before the coalition has agreed its own rules of engagement.

What could happen next?
  • Opportunity

    A signed Iran-Oman transit protocol would give the 26-nation coalition a legal text to engage with rather than a unilateral Iranian claim to refuse.

    Short term · 0.68
  • Risk

    If Oman signs a bilateral mechanism that implicitly validates the PGSA's jurisdictional claims, Gulf Cooperation Council cohesion faces a significant test.

    Medium term · 0.61
  • Precedent

    A functioning Oman-Iran co-administration of Hormuz would restructure the strait's legal governance for decades, regardless of how the 2026 conflict ends.

    Long term · 0.55
First Reported In

Update #102 · Iran signs Hormuz toll; Trump posts a cancelled strike

Euronews· 19 May 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Oil markets / Lloyd's underwriters
Futures markets priced CENTCOM's strikes-complete statement as a de-escalation signal and pushed Brent down 1.7 per cent to $94.71, even as the IRGC declared Hormuz closed. Lloyd's war-risk premiums held elevated because institutional de-listing requires a UN Security Council resolution that Russia and China have just shown they will block.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Interior minister Mohsin Naqvi carried dual civilian and military letters to Mojtaba Khamenei in Tehran on 6-7 June with no public response. The IRGC's Hormuz closure on 11 June shows the corps is acting independently of the channel Pakistan is using, making the mediation structurally unable to produce a binding commitment without direct IRGC access.
Russia and China
Russia and China
Russia and China voted against GOV/2026/40 at the IAEA Board, following through on the blocking position coordinated with Grossi in Geneva on 5 June; both states continue to oppose Western institutional pressure on Iran at every multilateral venue.
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
E3 and IAEA (UK, France, Germany)
The E3 co-sponsored IAEA resolution GOV/2026/40, adopted 21-3-10 on 10 June, demanding Iran disclose 440.9 kg of unaccounted HEU and admit inspectors to four denied facilities. The 10 abstentions and Russia-China noes leave any Security Council referral without a viable enforcement path.
IRGC / Iran military command
IRGC / Iran military command
The corps declared Hormuz closed to all traffic on 11 June and claimed two vessels struck, overriding the MoU its own civilian negotiators were pursuing through Pakistan. The closure order used the Persian Gulf Strait Authority apparatus to convert a toll mechanism into a military prohibition.
Trump administration / CENTCOM
Trump administration / CENTCOM
CENTCOM completed a second day of strikes on Tehran, Sirik and Minab, rejected the IRGC Hormuz closure as inconsistent with observed transit, and said strikes were complete. Hegseth framed the bombing explicitly as the negotiation: the method is coercive deal-making with no stated pause threshold.