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Iran Conflict 2026
9JUN

War-risk cover sets a hidden cost floor

2 min read
10:36UTC

Western war-risk insurance has returned to the Gulf at 3 to 4% of hull value against 0.25% before the war, adding roughly a dollar to a dollar fifty a barrel to every VLCC cargo and setting a cost floor flat Brent does not show.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Returning war-risk cover embeds a dollar-plus-per-barrel cost floor on Gulf cargoes that flat Brent does not show.

Western marine war-risk cover returned to The Gulf shipping corridor at 3 to 4% of hull value by 22 June, against 0.25% before the conflict, twelve to sixteen times the pre-war rate⁠1. War-risk insurance is the premium underwriters charge to cover a vessel crossing a conflict zone; at these levels the loading alone adds roughly $1 to $1.50 a barrel to the all-in delivered cost of a VLCC cargo. Mine clearance through Hormuz has not officially begun.

The transit counts and the mine-clearance timeline are the Iran desk's beat. A European freight desk carries the insurance loading directly, embedding a premium of a dollar or more a barrel into the delivered cost of every Gulf cargo. The flat Brent screen does not register that floor for eastern buyers, even as the screen treats the crisis as closed.

That embedded cost is part of why the forward freight curve has stayed anchored while the flat price fell: the tanker market is pricing the insurance and the physical risk, not the diplomacy. An insurance market still charging a war-risk multiple of this size is not one that believes the reopening is complete.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Before a commercial tanker can sail, it needs two types of insurance. A hull and machinery policy pays the shipowner for physical damage to or total loss of the vessel. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance pays for liability to third parties: crew injury, fuel spills, and damage to other vessels or port infrastructure. Banks that finance vessels and ports that accept them both require valid certificates for both types. Before the Hormuz conflict, war-risk insurance for Gulf transits cost roughly 0.25% of a vessel's hull value per voyage. On a large crude tanker worth $120 million, that was around $300,000 per crossing. This week, war-risk cover returned to The Gulf corridor at 3-4% of hull value, and P&I clubs have not yet reinstated standard terms for Hormuz transits at all. At 3-4%, the same $120 million tanker now carries $3.6 to $4.8 million in war-risk cost per voyage, translating to roughly $1-1.50 for each of the 2 million barrels on board. This extra cost does not show up in the $73 Brent crude price on the screen, but it is being paid by the buyers of Gulf crude on top of the headline price.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The 3-4% hull rate traces to three specific underwriting inputs that remain unresolved. First, the Lloyd's JWC "Additional Premiums" designation requires 30 consecutive days without a maritime incident in the listed area before a formal delisting review can begin; with 43 vessels still unaccounted for between CENTCOM and Kpler tracking as of 22 June, the JWC cannot start its 30-day incident-free clock because vessel status cannot be confirmed.

Standard P&I, North P&I, Gard, and Steamship Mutual have each issued Gulf withdrawal notices; without P&I cover a tanker cannot legally operate in any port requiring a valid club certificate.

Hull insurance pays for the vessel's physical structure; P&I pays for crew liability, pollution, and third-party damage, and no major bank financing a vessel will waive P&I as a loan covenant condition. A tanker operator who self-insures the hull still cannot satisfy port entry requirements or lender covenants without club membership.

Third, the 2023 Scandinavian Reinsurance Company (RNRC) precedent for Russian crude provides a structural parallel: after Western P&I clubs withdrew from Russian crude cargoes in 2022, Russia moved approximately 40 vessels to RNRC cover within three weeks; however, RNRC's capital reserves were insufficient to cover a catastrophic hull loss event, which is exactly the scenario P&I clubs are pricing at Hormuz.

The same capital-adequacy constraint applies to any non-Lloyd's substitute attempting to cover 270,000-tonne VLCC hull exposure in an active-conflict zone.

First Reported In

Update #11 · Thin Brent book, heavy WTI length into a loaded week

Marine Insight· 26 Jun 2026
Read original →
Different Perspectives
Wang Yi
Wang Yi
China's foreign minister and Djibouti's issued a joint communique on 21 October saying the war should not reach the Horn of Africa and stressing free navigation through Bab al-Mandeb. The text names neither Iran nor the Houthis, and Djibouti hosts China's only overseas military base, opposite the Yemeni coast.
Ministry of External Affairs
Ministry of External Affairs
India's foreign ministry called the attacks on Saudi civilian and energy sites "unacceptable" on 22 October and said they must stop at once. An Indian died at Dammam, Indians were injured there and at Shaybah, and about 4,000 Umrah pilgrims remain stranded by one MP's count.
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq closed the al-Sheeb crossing with Iran to travellers and trucks from 21 October and said other crossings would close gradually. Unlike September's closure, which ended on a staged timetable, this one has none, and Iran's interior ministry said it received no notice.
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Egypt's president said on 21 October that Cairo's support would "defend Saudi territory, and does not include an attack on Yemen". Araghchi warned that Egyptian involvement would further complicate the situation, and Cairo's limit matches the one Ankara set on 8 October against attacking another state's soil.
UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence
The MoD said on 20 October that RAF Typhoons over Saudi Arabia will not strike the Houthis, but extended tanker support to Saudi operations including against Houthi targets in Yemen. The tanker line sets no limit on strikes, so British aircraft may now refuel Saudi jets on bombing runs.
Turkey
Turkey
Ankara sent the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement to parliament around 20 October, and its published text treats an attack on one party as an attack on all. Article 16 brings it into force only on the last ratification, so the 5 October invocation in Riyadh could not yet bind Turkey.

Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.