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European Tech Sovereignty
10JUN

OFAC GL 134B expires 16 May, no successor

4 min read
10:31UTC

OFAC General License 134B, authorising Russian crude transactions, expires at 12:01 EDT on 16 May 2026. No GL 134C has appeared in the OFAC actions feed as of 13 May, making this the second consecutive non-extension.

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Key takeaway

GL 134B expires 16 May with no successor visible: second consecutive non-extension, threatening stranded cargoes.

OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) General License 134B expires at 12:01 EDT on 16 May 2026 1. No GL 134C has appeared in OFAC's recent actions feed as of 13 May. GL 134B authorises transactions in Russia-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto vessels on or before 17 April; expiry without a successor would strand cargoes currently at sea and remove the legal certainty that shadow-fleet operators and Asian refiners have relied on since the licence series began in March 2026.

This would be the second consecutive non-extension in the sequence. GL 134A expired on 16 April without renewal, triggering the redesignation of Rosneft and Lukoil as Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) . Treasury then issued GL 134B one day later , keeping the channel open through 16 May. That single-day reflexive extension on 17 April is not a reliable precedent: it was a patch on an unexpected cliff, not a standing commitment to rolling authorisation. If GL 134B expires hard, the 17 April response is the model for how Treasury acts, but only if the same internal calculus that produced the one-day patch still holds.

The fiscal timing makes the cliff consequential regardless of which way it lands. Russia's National Wealth Fund (NWF) held $49.1 billion in liquid assets on 1 May, with the Finance Ministry now purchasing 110 billion roubles in NWF assets in May to recapitalise . Oil and gas revenues fell 38.3% year-on-year in January-April 2026, as covered separately in this briefing. With Brent at $107/barrel, each Russian barrel that cannot leave legally costs Moscow at Urals rates near $80-85. Every blocked cargo at a high oil price is the most expensive version of the sanctions mechanism. If GL 134C does not appear before 16 May, Asian refinery contract adjustments and potential Treasury SDN follow-ons are the downstream signals to watch.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

When the US sanctions Russia, it does not always switch everything off at once. Instead, it issues 'general licences': temporary permissions that let companies finish existing contracts without breaking the law, so they can wind down their business with Russia gradually. GL 134B covers shipments of Russian crude oil that were already loaded onto tankers before a certain date. Without it, those ships are technically carrying cargo the US says nobody can legally help with, which means Western insurers would have to withdraw their cover. The licence expires on 16 May. If no new one appears, the companies still in this wind-down process face a legal problem. Russia can work around it, as it has built its own shadow insurance system, but the process costs more and takes time.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Western P&I clubs may withdraw cover from Russian-cargo wind-down voyages, raising Russian oil export transaction costs by an estimated 15-25% and accelerating Russia's shift to RNRC coverage.

  • Risk

    A permanent move of Russian oil logistics outside Western insurance and legal architecture reduces the leverage that future US administrations would have to apply financial pressure on Russia's energy sector.

First Reported In

Update #16 · 800 drones, three ceasefires, one cliff

Baker McKenzie Sanctions News· 13 May 2026
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