Basij militia members marched on Iran's foreign ministry in the early hours of 15 June 2026 to oppose the deal, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated channels broadcast crowds in Mashhad, Iran's second city and a major religious centre, chanting against foreign minister Abbas Araghchi.1 The Basij is the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary wing, used for domestic enforcement. The hardline daily Kayhan, whose editor the Supreme Leader appoints, called the ceasefire "a gift to the enemy", arguing it lets adversaries restock.2
Iranian sources told The Jerusalem Post that hardliners were "angry with Khamenei" and had tried to sabotage the talks; one said simply, "We are all shocked by deal, worry that regime feels it won."3 The protest carries structural weight because the IRGC runs revenue streams independent of the elected government, controls the Hormuz traffic machinery, and has reversed Araghchi's announcements before. Its deputy framed the agreement as strength rather than concession only the day before, and IRGC-aligned Tasnim said on 13 June the deal still needed review.
This matters most because of who has to sign off. Analysts assessed on 11 June that the IRGC holds day-to-day war authority while the man who must approve any deal is reachable only by courier. Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, has not appeared in public since 8 March and communicates through sealed envelopes with a three-to-five-day lag. A deal announced as finished still awaits endorsement from a figure no one can reach at the speed the announcement claims.
