12OCT

CEPA scale check: 0.46% of Russian oil

3 min read

10:59UTC

David Axe at CEPA, citing RUSI research, assessed Ukraine's 130 oil strikes in 2025 produced $863 million of damage against roughly $189 billion in annual Russian oil revenue.

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Key takeaway

Ukraine's oil strike campaign delivers footage; the revenue figures sit on the wrong side of the scale.

David Axe at CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis), citing RUSI research published this month, assessed that Ukraine's 130 refinery and port strikes in 2025 delivered only a 6% export reduction against 2024⁠¹. Cumulative damage came to $863 million against roughly $189 billion in annual Russian oil revenue, or 0.46% of the base.

That is roughly the cost of three weeks of Patriot operations in the Middle East, set against a rounding error in Moscow's books. At that tempo, Ukraine would need over two centuries of strike operations to match a single year of Russian oil revenue. Ukrainian targeteers pick lightly-defended terminals for visible damage, leaving hardened core infrastructure intact. Footage does most of the work the revenue figures do not.

Two separate considerations compound the scale problem. Fire Point, the Ukrainian consortium manufacturing the Flamingo cruise missile, is reportedly under investigation by NABU (Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau). Only nine Flamingos have been fired in six months, against the hundreds that any serious strike campaign against hardened infrastructure would require. And the Iran war separated price from volume in a way the infrastructure campaign cannot control: Urals rode the Hormuz premium while Baltic throughput was recovering. When Kyiv asks for Patriots for ballistic defence while launching its own drones at pipelines Chevron part-owns, the two trade-offs sit on the same ledger.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ukraine has been hitting Russian oil refineries and export terminals in a campaign aimed at cutting the revenue that funds Russia's military. A new report from the Center for European Policy Analysis and RUSI found that 130 such strikes across 2025 reduced Russia's oil exports by only 6% and caused $863 million in total damage. Russia earns roughly $189 billion per year from oil. So the entire year of strikes damaged the equivalent of 0.46% of annual revenue. To put that in context, Russia earns back that amount in about 42 hours. The Iran war's oil price spike likely generated more revenue for Russia in a single week than Ukraine's entire 2025 strike campaign cost Russia in a year.

What could happen next?

Meaning
The CEPA finding reframes the Baltic and Black Sea oil campaigns as primarily having operational-denial value, not economic attrition value; Ukraine's justification for the campaign must shift accordingly.
Immediate · 0.78
Risk
If the Fire Point/NABU investigation reveals systematic corruption in Ukraine's precision strike procurement, it will complicate Western partner willingness to fund further anti-infrastructure weapons deliveries.
Short term · 0.62
Opportunity
The 6% export-volume reduction, while small in revenue terms, represents real capacity constraints on specific refinery outputs (aviation fuel, diesel) that have strategic value beyond headline revenue figures.
Medium term · 0.55

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

Primary parallel: Allied strategic bombing of German oil infrastructure in 1944-45 required approximately 18 months of sustained precision strikes, consuming over 6,000 sorties, before achieving a 70% reduction in aviation fuel production.

Ukraine has conducted 130 strikes with cruise missiles and drones, not heavy bomber fleets with precision-guided munitions. The CEPA finding is consistent with the historical lesson that infrastructure attrition requires an order of magnitude more capacity than Ukraine currently deploys.

Counter-parallel: NATO's 1999 Kosovo campaign struck Serbian oil refineries over 78 days and produced an economic shock that contributed to Milosevic's negotiated withdrawal, but Serbian oil revenues were tiny compared to Russia's $189 billion annual figure. Scale matters: Kosovo-level infrastructure strikes are insufficient at Russian scale.

The Flamingo cruise missile programme is a notable data point: only 9 firings in six months, with the manufacturer Fire Point under NABU investigation. If Ukraine's most sophisticated anti-infrastructure missile is both scarce and under a corruption probe, the 0.46% figure is not a floor that can be pushed higher through scaling.

The structural implication: Ukraine needs either a qualitatively different class of weapon (longer range, higher accuracy, greater payload) or a fundamentally different targeting theory to shift the revenue damage ratio. Current drone and cruise missile capabilities at current sortie rates cannot close the gap between $863 million and the $18-19 billion that would represent a genuinely debilitating revenue reduction at 10% of annual revenue.

Consensus view: RAND's Dara Massicot assesses that the 0.46% damage-to-revenue ratio reveals a fundamental asymmetry in Ukraine's strike campaign: physical infrastructure destruction is expensive, precise, and reversible, while Russia's revenue is driven by global oil price movements that Ukraine cannot control. The Iran war's price effect on Urals crude offset every infrastructure strike Ukraine conducted in 2025 within a matter of days.

Counter-view: Michael Nacht at the University of California Berkeley's Goldman School of Public Policy argues the 0.46% figure understates the campaign's indirect effects: insurance premiums on Black Sea and Baltic crude shipments rose sharply, Russian re-routing costs increased, and some refinery capacity that was struck has not been fully restored, creating sustained throughput constraints not captured in annual revenue aggregates.

Key tension: Whether Ukraine's oil campaign is primarily an economic strategy, where the 0.46% finding is damning, or a denial-of-capacity strategy, where long-term refinery and terminal degradation is the intended metric.

First Reported In

Update #12 · Three narrowings of US support for Kyiv

Center for European Policy Analysis· 11 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

CEPA scale check: 0.46% of Russian oil

Load-bearing counter-evidence against the narrative that Ukraine's strike campaign is constraining Russian oil revenue.

Led to

Syzran Hit, Quarter of Refining Halted

The 20-21 May Syzran and Reuters refinery synthesis represents a campaign evolution from the 2025 revenue-targeting strikes CEPA/RUSI assessed

Occurred 20 May 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Government of Latvia

Latvia abstained on 22 September when the EU renewed its individual sanctions for 36 months at the price of delisting Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, and promised national sanctions of its own. Riga's abstention marks how far a frontline member state will go to keep listed names listed.

India's Ministry of External Affairs

After the House passed the Graham bill on 16 September, India's foreign ministry said it would keep buying energy on market terms and protect its trade. Russia supplied 30.3% of India's crude imports in fiscal 2026, so the tariff decision due around 18 October falls directly on New Delhi.

Kaja Kallas, EU foreign policy chief

Kallas answered the US licence on 10 October by saying Europe would not ease pressure, and EU ministers adopted a 22nd package of nearly 1,600 listings two days later. Brussels is tightening as Washington loosens, though TASS reported the package adds no significant new trade restrictions.

Donald Trump and the US Treasury

The Treasury licensed Russian diesel imports until 7 April 2027 on the day of Trump's call with Putin, and Trump then told reporters Ukraine should find a new leader. Washington is trading sanctions relief for fuel supply while pressing Kyiv to halt the refinery strikes behind the shortage.

Kremlin and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak

After the 9 October call the Kremlin said Russia was ready to supply oil and petroleum products to American and global markets, and Novak brought forward the end of diesel export curbs. Moscow is selling the shortage back as goodwill, with volumes that Decree No. 686 now hides from outside checks.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine

Zelenskyy called GL 135 an investment in prolonging the war and offered to stop striking Russian refineries if Russia stops destroying Ukraine's energy system. Answering Trump's call for a new leader, he set a total 60-day ceasefire as the condition for elections, which puts the next move on Moscow.