Russian guided bombs blocked the Dnipro Hydroelectric Dam and Preobrazhensky bridges on 20 to 21 June, and the Henichesk bridge in occupied Kherson was separately reduced to a single lane1. The combined effect tightens supply lines for Russian forces dug in on the river's east bank, where every crossing carries fuel, ammunition and rotation traffic.
Forces on the far bank of a major river depend on a handful of fixed crossings, and each one lost narrows the throughput the whole grouping runs on. Cut the Dnipro spans and reduce Henichesk to one lane, and the east-bank garrison is supplied through a pipe that keeps shrinking. The bombs that did it were Russia's own, the consequence of a contested crossing rather than a deliberate Ukrainian interdiction.
The damage compounds a wider strike wave. The 20 June operation that reached Tyumen, and the earlier rationing of Crimean petrol, belong to the same campaign of pressure on Russian rear-area logistics. ISW's reading of a stalling front and these tightening crossings describe one condition from two angles: Russia cannot advance, and the ground it holds is getting harder to sustain.
