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Zelenskyy signs Gulf security deals

2 min read

14:52UTC

Ukraine is exchanging three years of battle-tested counter-drone expertise for Gulf security agreements, POW releases, and a diplomatic constituency beyond Europe.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Ukraine converted battlefield drone expertise into Gulf security partnerships and a new diplomatic constituency.

Zelenskyy completed a three-state Gulf tour between 27 and 28 March, signing 10-year security agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and securing cooperation terms with the UAE ¹. Over 200 Ukrainian counter-drone specialists are now deployed across four Gulf states, with 30 more assigned to Jordan and Kuwait. Six countries have submitted formal cooperation requests.

Iran manufactures the Shahed-136 drone. Russia buys it and launches it at Ukrainian cities nightly. Iran also fires the same design at Gulf targets. Ukraine's three years of defending against Shaheds produced the world's most battle-tested counter-drone expertise. Gulf states that spent $13.5 million per Patriot interception are now buying Ukrainian interceptor drones at under $2,000 each.

Ukraine is exchanging drone expertise for things it needs: Gulf states are facilitating POW releases and the return of Ukrainian children deported by Russia. Qatar is the primary intermediary. Zelenskyy's earlier offer to Trump of counter-drone assistance opened this track; the Gulf tour formalises it into binding agreements that create a diplomatic constituency beyond Europe.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ukraine's president toured Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in late March and signed security agreements with two of them. The logic: Iran makes the Shahed drones that Russia fires at Ukrainian cities every night. Iran also fires the same drones at Gulf state targets. Ukraine has three years of battle experience shooting down these drones cheaply. The Gulf states want that expertise. In exchange, Ukraine is getting help with POW releases, the return of children Russia deported, and something more strategic: six countries in the Middle East now have a material interest in Ukraine's survival. That is diplomatic leverage Ukraine did not have a year ago.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The Gulf tour's strategic foundation is Iran's dual role: Iran manufactures the Shahed drones used against both Ukraine and Gulf states, creating a shared threat perception. Ukraine's three-year operational experience against Iranian drones gives it knowledge that Gulf states, despite vastly greater defence budgets, cannot replicate without battlefield exposure.

The timing reflects Ukraine's recognition that European and American support has structural limits, including aid fatigue, election cycles, and the PURL diversion. Building a Gulf constituency diversifies Ukraine's political support base and its economic relationships simultaneously.

What could happen next?

Opportunity
Ukraine's Gulf defence export relationships provide a revenue stream and diplomatic constituency that partially offsets potential reductions in US and European support.
Consequence
Qatar's role as POW intermediary and Zelenskyy's public acknowledgement of it strengthens Qatar's diplomatic position relative to other Gulf mediators.

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from France

France

LeftRight

Primary parallel: Israel's post-1967 arms export strategy traded battlefield-tested military technology for diplomatic relationships in Africa and Latin America, creating economic and political dependencies that partially offset Arab League isolation. Ukraine is following a structurally similar playbook, converting wartime capability into diplomatic leverage.

Counter-parallel: Ukraine's 2022 weapons export ban, maintained for three years, prevented it from building the commercial relationships that could now be accelerated. Israel had a 20-year head start on weapons diplomacy. Ukraine is starting that process under wartime conditions.

Ukraine's counter-drone technology represents a nascent export industry. At under $2,000 per interceptor unit versus $13.5 million per Patriot round, the potential market among Gulf states with Iranian drone exposure is large. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait combined spend over $100 billion annually on defence. Even a 0.5% shift to Ukrainian counter-drone systems represents a $500 million annual market.

The strategic economic implication is longer-term: if Ukraine develops a sustainable defence export sector, its post-war reconstruction may be partly self-funded through arms revenues rather than relying entirely on EU and US grant financing.

Consensus view: Gulf Research Centre analysts assess that Gulf states' interest in Ukrainian counter-drone expertise is genuine and commercially motivated: the Iran war demonstrated that existing Patriot-based defences could not cost-effectively handle mass Shahed saturation attacks without burning through $13.5M missiles at unsustainable rates.

Counter-view: Al Jazeera's diplomatic correspondents note that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have simultaneously maintained economic and diplomatic relations with Russia throughout the war, suggesting the security agreements are hedging instruments rather than alignment shifts. Gulf states backing Ukraine while not sanctioning Russia is a carefully balanced position.

Key tension: Whether Gulf states' drone expertise purchases translate into political support for Ukraine's territorial position in peace negotiations, or remain purely transactional security arrangements.

Sources:Euronews

Mentions:Kuwait →Shahed-136 →Iran →Russia →Saudi Arabia →Volodymyr Zelenskyy →CIA →Ukraine →Prima →Ukrainian interceptor drone →CREA →Patriot →Jordan →POW →Qatar →United Arab Emirates (UAE) →

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Euronews· 1 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

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Germany

Russia's Druzhba northern branch transit halt from 1 May removes one of Germany's residual non-Russian crude supply options. The timing compounds Berlin's exposure in the same week Ukrainian strikes drive Russian refinery throughput to its lowest since December 2009.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

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Japan

Japan authorised direct PAC-3 exports to the United States on 30 April, breaking its post-1945 arms export restrictions to replenish Iran-war-depleted US stockpiles. The White House global Patriot export freeze remains in place; Japan's historic policy shift benefits US readiness without reaching Ukraine.

Kazakhstan

Russia's Druzhba northern branch transit halt from 1 May cuts Kazakhstan's access to the German crude market. Astana routes most of its export crude through Russian infrastructure, meaning Moscow's unilateral decision directly constrains Kazakh export diversification despite Kazakhstan's stated neutrality on the war.

Péter Magyar / Tisza Party / Hungary

Magyar targets 5 May for government formation ahead of the 12 May constitutional deadline. Orbán lifted the EU loan veto before leaving office; Magyar supports Hungary's opt-out but has not placed a new veto, leaving the first 90 billion euro tranche on track for late May disbursement.