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US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

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14:52UTC

OFAC's GL 134A expires 11 April; at $121 per barrel, any extension would hand Russia far more revenue than when the waiver was issued at $73, while simultaneous vessel desanctioning created contradictory signals.

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Key takeaway

GL 134A expiry on 11 April is the binary choice: extension at $121/barrel or lapse compounding Russia's crisis.

OFAC issued General License 134 on 12 March, covering the roughly 124 million barrels of Russian crude at sea , amended it to GL 134A on 19 March, and faces a binary decision on its 11 April expiry. At $73 per barrel when issued, the waiver was defensible as market stabilisation. At $121, the same licence authorises far greater per-barrel income than its design contemplated.

OFAC added Iran, North Korea, and Cuba exclusions to GL 134A one week after the original licence, a rapid amendment suggesting Treasury received evidence that cargoes were being redirected toward sanctioned parties. On 31 March, OFAC separately removed sanctions on three Russian cargo vessels: Fesco Magadan, Fesco Moneron, and SV Nikolay.

The contradictory pattern, tightening the licence's terms while reducing pressure on named Russian vessels, is consistent with an administration managing competing objectives across the Iran war and Ukraine simultaneously. The Atlantic Council warned that extension at current prices "risks sustaining Russia's war effort."

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US government gave Russia a special oil sales exemption that expires on 11 April. When it was issued, oil prices were around $73 per barrel. Now that the Iran war has pushed prices to $121, extending the same exemption would hand Russia much more money than originally intended. At the same time, the US removed sanctions on three Russian ships while tightening the exemption's rules — sending confusing signals about American policy toward Russia.

What could happen next?

Risk
GL 134A extension at $121/barrel would constitute the largest single US-authorised revenue transfer to Russia since sanctions began.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

At $73/barrel (waiver issuance price), each barrel of Russian crude under GL 134A generated approximately $29 above the $44.10 cap. At $121/barrel, the same barrel generates $76.90 above cap — a 2.6x increase in per-barrel sanction circumvention value.

Consensus view: Atlantic Council and external sanctions analysts assess extension at current Urals prices would directly fund Russian war prosecution at levels the waiver was never designed to permit.

Counter-view: Treasury may extend on Iran war market stabilisation grounds — the same justification that applied at $73/barrel, though far less defensible at $121.

Key tension: Whether Treasury's Iran war stabilisation objective outweighs the revenue-to-Russia impact of extension at current oil prices.

Sources:Mayer Brown

Mentions:Moscow →Ukraine →Iran →Urals →North Korea →Russia →OFAC →Atlantic Council →

First Reported In

Update #11 · Russia Sells Less Oil but Earns More

Mayer Brown· 5 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

This Event

US Oil Sanctions Waiver Expires 11 April Amid Confusion

The GL 134A expiry is a binary US policy signal: extension at $121 per barrel directly subsidises Moscow's war revenue; lapse combined with Baltic terminal damage would compound Russia's export crisis.

Led to

GL 134A lapses toward quiet extension

GL 134A event is the direct resolution of ID:2027's binary-choice framing: extension at $121/bbl or lapse on the 11 April expiry date.

Occurred 11 Apr 2026

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Treasury kills $150M-a-day Russian oil waiver

At $121 Urals the waiver was running 2.6x above the $73 barrel design price, making non-renewal a structural inevitability.

Occurred 16 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

EU Council / European Commission

With Orban's veto lifted and Magyar's Tisza government not placing a replacement block, the European Commission is signalling the first 90 billion euro Ukraine loan tranche for late May or early June 2026. Disbursement depends on Magyar's 5 May government formation proceeding to schedule.

Germany

Russia's Druzhba northern branch transit halt from 1 May removes one of Germany's residual non-Russian crude supply options. The timing compounds Berlin's exposure in the same week Ukrainian strikes drive Russian refinery throughput to its lowest since December 2009.

IAEA / Rafael Grossi

Grossi confirmed the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant lost external power for its 14th and 15th times within a single week in late April, with the Ferosplavna-1 backup feeder damaged 1.8 km from the switchyard. He was negotiating a further local ceasefire; the previous IAEA-brokered repair lasted less than a week.

Japan

Japan authorised direct PAC-3 exports to the United States on 30 April, breaking its post-1945 arms export restrictions to replenish Iran-war-depleted US stockpiles. The White House global Patriot export freeze remains in place; Japan's historic policy shift benefits US readiness without reaching Ukraine.

Kazakhstan

Russia's Druzhba northern branch transit halt from 1 May cuts Kazakhstan's access to the German crude market. Astana routes most of its export crude through Russian infrastructure, meaning Moscow's unilateral decision directly constrains Kazakh export diversification despite Kazakhstan's stated neutrality on the war.

Péter Magyar / Tisza Party / Hungary

Magyar targets 5 May for government formation ahead of the 12 May constitutional deadline. Orbán lifted the EU loan veto before leaving office; Magyar supports Hungary's opt-out but has not placed a new veto, leaving the first 90 billion euro tranche on track for late May disbursement.