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Pandemics and Biosecurity
2JUN

Pandemic Agreement still unsigned after one year

3 min read
09:17UTC

WHO member states concluded the resumed 6th IGWG session on 1 May by agreeing to extend negotiations on the PABS annex, leaving the Pandemic Agreement inoperative one year after its adoption at WHA78 and scheduling the next substantive session for 6-17 July 2026.

ScienceDeveloping
Key takeaway

One year after adoption, the Pandemic Agreement's PABS annex remains unresolved, with no vaccine-sharing mechanism in force.

WHO member states concluded the resumed 6th session of the IGWG (Intergovernmental Working Group on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response) on 1 May by agreeing to extend negotiations on the PABS (Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing) annex to the Pandemic Agreement. 1 The Agreement was adopted at WHA78 in May 2025. One year on, it cannot be signed or ratified because the PABS annex, described by WHO as 'the last piece of the puzzle', remains unresolved. The 7th IGWG session is scheduled for 6-17 July 2026. WHA79, convening in Geneva 18-23 May, is expected to formally authorise continued negotiations through mid-2027, meaning the Agreement could remain inoperative for at least two full years post-adoption.

The structural tension behind PABS has resisted resolution since the treaty's initial draft: high-income countries want rapid, frictionless access to pathogen samples for vaccine development; low- and middle-income countries want guaranteed access to the resulting vaccines. The same tension disabled the Nagoya Protocol's application to pathogens under the Convention on Biological Diversity. No countries or blocs have publicly named themselves as the obstacle to consensus; WHO's characterisation that 'differences will be overcome' gives no indication of whether the gap is technical (sample-sharing definitions) or political (vaccine-access guarantees). NTI Bio and Resolve to Save Lives (founded by former CDC director Tom Frieden) have consistently argued PABS is the treaty's load-bearing arch.

The governance stasis lands in a week when the US dairy H5N1 picture is deteriorating and Andes hantavirus is tracking across six countries. The WHO R&D Blueprint Q1 2026 roadmaps represent the parallel preparedness track that is moving: published pathogen roadmaps for filoviruses, arenaviruses, and paramyxoviruses in the first quarter. The 7th IGWG session opens only in July 2026, with no interim deliverables agreed. The R&D Blueprint covers pathogen research prioritisation; it cannot substitute for the vaccine-sharing mechanism that PABS was designed to provide in a declared emergency.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

In May 2025, most of the world's countries agreed in principle to a new **Pandemic Agreement** at the **World Health Organisation**. The idea is to set legal rules for how countries share dangerous pathogen samples and how they get fair access to vaccines when a pandemic happens. But there is one unresolved part: the **PABS annex** (Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing). It is the section that says: if country A discovers a new virus and shares the sample with vaccine manufacturers in country B, what is country A guaranteed to get back in return? Rich and poor countries disagree on the terms. A year after the agreement was adopted, that section is still being negotiated. Without it, the whole agreement cannot be signed or come into legal force. The next round of talks is in July 2026. In the meantime, if a new pandemic started today, the rules for sample sharing would still be the old voluntary bilateral deals that left many poor countries waiting months for COVID vaccines.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The structural conflict underlying PABS negotiations has two components. First, origin countries (predominantly low-income, which historically contributed samples) and destination countries (predominantly high-income, which host vaccine manufacturers) have economically opposite interests: origin countries want guaranteed rapid access to finished vaccines; destination countries want rapid sample access without binding financial obligations.

Second, **NTI Bio** and **Resolve to Save Lives** have documented that the existing Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, the only prior benefit-sharing arrangement for pathogens, generated approximately $350 million for WHO's preparedness programmes between 2011 and 2020 but delivered zero guaranteed vaccine doses to contributing countries during the 2009 H1N1 emergency.

Negotiators from the Global South use PIP's failure as evidence that voluntary frameworks do not deliver; high-income country negotiators use PIP's operational complexity as evidence that mandatory frameworks create more friction than they solve.

What could happen next?
  • Risk

    If H5N1 B3.13 acquires sustained human-to-human transmission before PABS is resolved, the sample-sharing and vaccine-access framework for a pandemic response would default to the bilateral deal-making model that disadvantaged low-income countries in 2020-2021.

    Medium term · 0.72
  • Consequence

    WHA79 (18-23 May 2026) is expected to authorise continued negotiations through mid-2027, effectively extending the Pandemic Agreement's ratification gap by at least another year.

    Immediate · 0.85
  • Precedent

    The PABS stall follows the Nagoya Protocol timeline; a 2027 resolution and 2028-2029 ratification window would mean the Pandemic Agreement does not enter force until roughly a decade after COVID-19 demonstrated its necessity.

    Long term · 0.6
First Reported In

Update #2 · B3.13 gets better at humans as testing ends

WHO· 12 May 2026
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