10MAR

China, Russia, Iran drill at Hormuz

3 min read

04:55UTC

Chinese, Russian, and Iranian warships conducted joint Maritime Security Belt 2026 exercises in the Strait of Hormuz while US and Israeli forces struck Iranian targets — the first time trilateral naval drills have overlapped with active combat operations in the same waterway.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Running scheduled exercises during an active conflict converts routine training into deliberate strategic signalling without triggering alliance commitments.

Chinese, Russian, and Iranian naval forces are conducting Maritime Security Belt 2026 exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, operating alongside the newly arrived 48th PLA Navy fleet. The exercises place warships from two permanent UN Security Council members in the same waterway where CENTCOM is prosecuting a naval campaign that has destroyed two-thirds of Iran's surface fleet .

Maritime Security Belt has a short but deliberate history. Iran, China, and Russia held the first iteration in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman in December 2019 — four months after the IRGC's seizure of the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero and the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Subsequent exercises in 2022, 2023, and 2024 expanded in scope and moved closer to the strait itself. Each iteration was a diplomatic signal: the three powers were building interoperability in the waterway that carries roughly 20% of the world's traded oil. But the signal was always prospective — a demonstration of what they could do together, not what they were doing.

The 2026 iteration breaks that pattern. The exercises are running during active hostilities. Iranian ports are under bombardment. The IRGC is striking civilian tankers by name , . Coalition aircraft are flying daily sorties. In this environment, joint exercises are not symbolic; they are operational cover. Russian and Chinese warships conducting manoeuvres in the strait create zones of ambiguity — areas where CENTCOM must verify the identity and intent of every contact before engaging, slowing response times and complicating targeting decisions.

Russia's participation adds a specific intelligence dimension. US intelligence officials confirmed Moscow is already providing satellite imagery and targeting data on American military positions to Iran . Russian naval vessels in Hormuz can supplement that with real-time observation of Coalition ship movements and communications — a capability that pairs with the Liaowang-1's SIGINT collection to give Tehran's remaining command structure a composite picture of the maritime battlespace that Iran's own degraded sensors cannot provide.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

China, Russia, and Iran have been running joint military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz since 2019 as a way to signal political coordination. These exercises were planned before this war started. The fact that they continue now — while fighting is happening nearby — sends a deliberate message: these three countries are present and coordinated. It also serves a practical purpose for China. Framing its warship deployment as part of pre-planned exercises makes it appear less like a reactive intervention and more like a routine event. This gives Beijing maximum deterrence effect — making the US think twice about operations near Chinese vessels — whilst minimising the political commitment that would follow from an explicitly military response.

Deep Analysis

Synthesis

Conducting exercises simultaneously with the Chinese fleet deployment creates deliberate strategic ambiguity: outside observers cannot distinguish which Chinese vessels are in an exercise posture and which are in an operational deterrence posture. This ambiguity is itself the strategic asset — it compels US planners to treat all Chinese vessels as potentially operationally relevant, maximising the deterrence footprint from a modest deployment without China explicitly declaring an operational role.

Root Causes

The Maritime Security Belt format emerged in December 2019 specifically as a counter to the US maximum pressure sanctions campaign against Iran. All three participating states face US secondary sanctions exposure and share a structural interest in demonstrating collective resistance to unilateral US economic coercion. The exercises are not primarily about military interoperability — interoperability gains are limited by incompatible communications systems — they are a recurring political statement about multipolarity.

Escalation

The exercise framework provides procedural legitimacy for sustained Chinese and Russian naval presence in Hormuz beyond the immediate conflict. If the war extends into weeks, the format could justify rotating fresh forces through the strait indefinitely — converting a crisis response into a permanent structural feature of Hormuz's security environment that outlasts any ceasefire.

What could happen next?

Meaning
Continuing pre-planned exercises during active conflict signals China and Russia regard the war as within acceptable bounds of their strategic partnership with Iran.
Immediate · Assessed
Risk
Deliberate ambiguity between exercise and operational posture increases miscalculation risk for US commanders uncertain whether Chinese vessels have a combat-support role.
Immediate · Suggested
Precedent
Exercise continuation during wartime normalises trilateral military presence in Hormuz, establishing a baseline that will be politically difficult to reverse after the conflict ends.
Long term · Suggested

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Belgium

Belgium

Primary parallel: NATO held Exercise Reforger annually near Warsaw Pact borders throughout the Cold War, deliberately blurring the training-operations boundary during Berlin crises and Soviet interventions. Exercises proceeding during crises sent unmistakable signals about alliance cohesion and military readiness without requiring formal activation of Article 5.

Counter-parallel: The CSTO's failure to intervene militarily during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, despite prior exercise coordination, demonstrates that trilateral exercise posture does not guarantee operational follow-through — exercises signal alignment, not commitment.

Why it’s relevant now

The Warsaw Pact parallel holds in one direction: exercises near an active conflict normalise military presence and raise the cost of adversary action. The CSTO counter-parallel warns against reading exercise coordination as a mutual defence guarantee — a distinction Beijing will be careful to preserve.

Consensus view: The Stimson Centre's China programme has characterised Maritime Security Belt as a 'demonstration of alignment without alliance' — the three states signal coordination without mutual defence obligations that would constrain Beijing's independent decision-making or drag China into a war it has not chosen.

Counter-view: The Valdai Discussion Club (Moscow) frames the exercises as evidence of a functioning multipolar security order, arguing that Western criticism of trilateral exercises whilst NATO holds exercises near Russian borders reflects structural double standards rather than principled objection.

Key tension: Whether the exercise format has evolved from political signalling into genuine operational coordination — specifically, whether participating states share targeting data or rules of engagement that would constitute de facto co-belligerence.

First Reported In

Update #31 · Iran moves to heavy warheads; China deploys

Modern Diplomacy· 10 Mar 2026

Read original →

Different Perspectives

South Korean financial markets

South Korea, which imports virtually all its crude oil, is absorbing the war's economic transmission most acutely among non-belligerents. The second KOSPI circuit breaker in four sessions — with Samsung down over 10% and SK Hynix down 12.3% — reflects an industrial economy unable to reprice energy costs that have risen 72% in ten days. The market response indicates Korean industry cannot sustain oil above $100 per barrel without margin compression across manufacturing, semiconductors, and shipping.

Migrant worker communities in the Gulf

The first confirmed civilian deaths in Saudi Arabia — one Indian and one Bangladeshi killed, twelve Bangladeshis wounded — fell on communities with no voice in the military decisions that placed them in harm's way. Migrant workers live near military installations because that housing is affordable, not by choice. Bangladesh and India face the dilemma of needing to protect nationals who cannot easily leave a war zone while depending on Gulf remittances that fund a substantial share of their domestic economies.

Azerbaijan — President Ilham Aliyev

Aliyev treats the Nakhchivan strikes as a direct act of war against Azerbaijani sovereignty, placing armed forces on full combat readiness and demanding an Iranian explanation. The response is calibrated to maximise international sympathy while stopping short of military retaliation — Baku cannot fight Iran alone and needs either Turkish or NATO backing to credibly deter further strikes.

Oil-importing nations (Japan, South Korea, India)

The Hormuz closure is an existential threat. Japan, South Korea, and India receive the majority of their crude through the strait — they will bear the heaviest economic cost of a war they had no part in.

Global South governments (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa)

Neutrality was possible when the targets were military. 148 dead schoolgirls made it impossible — no government can explain that away to its own citizens.

Turkey

Has absorbed three Iranian ballistic missile interceptions since 4 March without invoking NATO Article 5 consultation. Each incident narrows Ankara's political room to continue absorbing without Alliance-level response.