24JUN

Pezeshkian shuts the missile track early

1 min read

09:14UTC

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ruled out any negotiation over Iran's ballistic missile programme on 23 June, closing one of the deal's three deferred tracks before the talks window opened.

← Back to Iran and Oman claim the strait; US says no Jump to analysis ↓

ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Pezeshkian closed the missile track before talks began, narrowing the deal's agenda from inside Tehran.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ruled out any negotiation over Iran's ballistic missile programme on 23 June ¹. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding deferred three of its hardest questions, enrichment levels, the 440.9 kg uranium stockpile and ballistic missiles, to a 60-day talks window . Pezeshkian's statement closes the missile track before that window has even opened.

Pezeshkian heads the civilian government, but the IRGC controls the ballistic missile programme, so the president is ruling out talks on an arsenal he does not command.

Read alongside the IRGC's refusal to open its nuclear sites, the pattern is consistent: Iran is narrowing the deal's agenda from inside before Washington can widen it. Khamenei had already endorsed the MOU with stated red lines on the stockpile . With the missile track shut by the president and the enrichment track gated behind the unmet Lebanon ceasefire, the 60-day window is contracting faster than it can be scheduled.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

On 23 June, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Iran would not negotiate over its ballistic missile programme under any circumstances. This matters because the Islamabad ceasefire agreement; signed on 15 June; deliberately left three big issues for later talks: Iran's enrichment level, its nuclear stockpile, and its ballistic missiles. Pezeshkian just ruled out discussions on the third of those three. There is an important catch: Pezeshkian is the elected president, but he does not control the missiles. Iran's ballistic missile programme is run by the IRGC; the powerful military force that answers to the Supreme Leader, not the civilian government. So when Pezeshkian rules out missile talks, he is publicly aligning himself with the IRGC's position rather than announcing a capability he actually governs.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Pezeshkian's ruling-out of missile talks before the 60-day window officially opens reflects the civilian government's limited authority over the IRGC's weapons programmes. The ballistic missile fleet; including Shahab, Emad and Fattah-series missiles; was built and is operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force, not the Army or civilian defence ministry.

Pezeshkian stating the position publicly is structurally defensive: he absorbs the political cost of the IRGC's red line so that Araghchi's negotiating team does not have to refuse the missile track in a live session, where a refusal would be directly linked to a collapsing deal.

Sources:Al Jazeera

Mentions:Masoud Pezeshkian →Iran →Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding →Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) →Islamabad →Washington →Lebanon →

First Reported In

Update #137 · Iran and Oman claim the strait; US says no

Al Jazeera· 24 Jun 2026

Read original →

Different Perspectives

Turkiye

Erdogan followed the Pakistani delegation to Jeddah for an instrument that has not been signed. Ankara's entry widens Saudi Arabia's defence architecture beyond the existing Pakistan pact, adding a second non-Gulf military partner mid-conflict.

Oman

Muscat is the corridor's broker but has published nothing about the arrangement Fars describes on its behalf. The account leaves Oman administering outbound traffic only, a narrower role than the shared route its mediation has rested on since 1979.

Pakistan

Islamabad sent Sharif, Munir and Dar to Jeddah to widen a defence commitment it has honoured in cheaper registers since March, when Dar invoked the Saudi mutual defence pact. Jeddah tests whether that hedge becomes a binding trilateral instrument with Turkiye.

United States

Washington rejected the Majlis Hormuz bill outright while CENTCOM's own tally kept climbing to 49 vessels redirected since 14 July. Both instruments tightened in the same week Trump promised the strait would reopen soon.

Iran

Iran's foreign ministry is selling a phased Hormuz corridor through Oman and denying any percentage cargo tariff, while its own Majlis is legislating fines to 20% and a bar on Israeli-linked cargo. The two accounts, from the same government, do not agree with each other.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh published a target forecast, not an attribution, for the campaign it says the Najran strike previewed. That keeps an Article 51 case available while it formalises a trilateral defence architecture with Pakistan and Turkiye.