17JUN

12,300 Targets Struck; Strait Still Closed

2 min read

09:37UTC

The US has fired more Tomahawk missiles than in any campaign in history and destroyed 155 Iranian vessels. The Strait of Hormuz remains shut.

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ConflictDeveloping

Key takeaway

Record-breaking bombing has not shifted Iran's posture or reopened Hormuz.

CENTCOM reported on 1 April that US forces have struck over 12,300 targets and fired 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles in Operation EPIC FURY, the most in any single US campaign in history ¹. 155 Iranian vessels have been destroyed. B-52 bombers now fly overland inside Iran , a transition from the standoff-only strikes of the war's first 30 days.

The numbers are imposing. The outcome is not. Hormuz remains closed. The toll system operates . Eleven vessels transited on 31 March, 93% below the pre-war baseline ². ACLED concludes that 'full capitulation remains unlikely' and 'the only clear path to decisive victory would be a change of government' ³. Heavy bombing has reinforced Iran's siege mentality rather than breaking it.

CSIS counts 850 Tomahawks expended ⁴. The US Navy's total Tomahawk inventory before the war was approximately 4,000. At current consumption, the stockpile question joins Israel's Arrow-3 depletion as a constraint on sustained operations.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

The US has now struck more targets and fired more cruise missiles than in any war in American history. It has also destroyed 155 Iranian naval vessels. Despite all of this, the Strait of Hormuz is still closed. The question this raises is whether more bombing will change the outcome. The evidence so far says no: Iran is firing fewer missiles per day than at the war's start, but it has not changed its fundamental position.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The bombing has not changed Iran's strategic calculus because the campaign was designed around target categories, not political outcomes. CENTCOM is striking what it can locate and destroy; Iran's decision to keep Hormuz closed resides in a small number of IRGC commanders whose locations are either unknown or protected by anticipated US domestic opposition to decapitation strikes.

Russia's provision of satellite imagery showing US warship and aircraft locations increases Iran's ability to absorb the campaign by reducing tactical surprise. An adversary that knows where your aircraft are cannot be coerced by those aircraft in the same way as one operating without that intelligence.

The 850 Tomahawk expenditure rate also matters structurally. At pre-war inventory of roughly 4,000, the campaign has consumed 21% of the total supply in 34 days. The US cannot sustain current strike rates indefinitely without accepting munitions constraints that will become visible to Iran and its partners.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources from Ireland and United States

Ireland

United States

Primary parallel: Operation Rolling Thunder (Vietnam, 1965-68), the longest US strategic bombing campaign before this war. The US dropped more tonnage on North Vietnam than in the entire Second World War in the Pacific; North Vietnam's war-fighting capacity was degraded but its strategic posture did not change. ACLED's 'siege mentality' finding maps directly onto the documented North Vietnamese response to sustained bombardment.

Counter-parallel: The 1999 NATO Kosovo campaign succeeded with 78 days of bombing and no ground troops. The difference: Milosevic had no allied power providing intelligence and the campaign had unified Western political backing. Iran has Russian satellite imagery and China has not joined Western sanctions.

Consensus view: ACLED and RAND both find that aerial campaigns against adversaries with dispersed command structures and high ideological cohesion produce attrition but rarely capitulation. CSIS analyst Tom Karako notes the 850 Tomahawk expenditure leaves the US Navy at roughly 21% of its pre-war Tomahawk inventory, a constraint that will tighten before the strait reopens.

Counter-view: Heritage Foundation analysts argue the B-52 overland transition signals a qualitative escalation that prior targets did not; Iran's remaining command nodes and energy infrastructure are now reachable at higher ordnance loads per sortie, which prior missile strikes could not achieve.

Key tension: Whether the remaining target set can achieve political change that 12,300 previous strikes did not, or whether Iran has already absorbed the campaign's peak leverage.

First Reported In

Update #55 · The Last Door Closes

Irish Times / Majorca Daily Bulletin· 2 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

B-52s over Iran; 50,000 US troops in

CENTCOM's B-52 overland missions from 31 March are the latest escalation within the 12,300-target campaign; the cumulative figure is reported for the first time this update.

Occurred 31 Mar 2026

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This Event

12,300 Targets Struck; Strait Still Closed

The most intensive US bombing campaign ever has failed to change Iran's strategic calculus or reopen Hormuz.

Led to

US Strikes Civilian Bridge; Eight Commuters Killed

CENTCOM's 12,300+ target campaign expanded to include civilian transport infrastructure for the first time with the B1 bridge strike.

Occurred 3 Apr 2026

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First US jet downed; officer missing

CENTCOM's claim that Iranian air defences were largely destroyed made the F-15E shoot-down operationally and politically devastating, directly contradicting 35 days of official messaging.

Occurred 3 Apr 2026

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Different Perspectives

Lloyd's Market Association

War-risk underwriters price the Houthis' Red Sea attacks because the group announces its targets in advance, but the unclaimed Damietta drone gives insurers a hit with no author to price against. An attack nobody claims costs shipping more than one that is claimed, since premiums are set against a known pattern, not raw damage.

US Central Command

CENTCOM has announced no strike on Iran since resuming bombing on 30 July within hours of an IRGC salvo on Jordan, and centcom.mil did not respond to requests to confirm any pause. The command has gone quiet before while a larger operation was being weighed, so silence alone proves nothing about what it has or has not done.

Hengaw

Hengaw recorded at least 67 executions in Iran during July, of which the state acknowledged only eight, and reported the 1 August execution of protest detainee Arvin Kheirkhahan at Shahrud with no advance notice to his family. A family's first notice of a death sentence is now usually the instruction to collect a body.

Egypt

Egypt's government asked media on 2 August to report the Damietta attack accurately, named no author, and said no findings will be published before its own investigation concludes. Cairo holds the debris and jurisdiction over an attack on its own soil, and naming a culprit now would pull it into a dispute it has avoided for five months.

Iran's Foreign Ministry

Araghchi called the Hormuz talks with Oman final-stage on 2 August, four days after his own deputy rejected Oman's lane proposal, and denied the Damietta drone strike as an Israeli false flag while two Iranian officials privately claimed it for Tehran. Iran's public position now contradicts itself on both files at once.

Bahrain and Kuwait

Bahraini and Kuwaiti aircraft flew their own strikes on Iranian depots in July with Emirati air cover behind them, and Ynetnews reports some Gulf capitals wanted the 2 August strike to proceed rather than stop. States that have already taken fire see a closing window on Iranian weakness, not a reason to pause.