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Iran Conflict 2026
5JUN

Hormuz open to friends, shut to enemies

3 min read
08:43UTC

Iran's foreign minister told Japanese media the strait is blocked only for hostile nations — the first official articulation of a selective blockade doctrine designed to fracture the coalition arrayed against Tehran.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Selective passage weaponises transit rights as diplomatic currency while denying opponents a unified casus belli.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Japan's Kyodo News: "the strait is closed only to ships belonging to our enemies, countries that attack us. For other countries, ships can pass through the strait." The audience was deliberate. Japan depends on Hormuz for more than 90% of its Middle Eastern crude imports and was granted passage the same week. Araghchi's statement codifies what the IRGC toll system had already established in practice — a selective blockade distinguishing between hostile and non-hostile nations.

Under international maritime law, all vessels hold transit passage rights through straits used for international navigation. A blanket Hormuz closure would unite maritime powers against Tehran and provide clear legal grounds for military enforcement. A selective closure divides them. Nations that joined the 22-country demand for reopening but pledged no warships NOW have a route to continued energy access — provided they keep their commitments rhetorical. Iran's doctrine rewards the gap between words and action that has characterised the international response. The seven-nation statement from 19 March produced no vessels; the expanded 22-nation version tripled the signatories and still produced none .

Araghchi's framing is consistent with Iran's broader negotiating posture. Days earlier, he told The National that Iran does not "believe in a ceasefire" and set conditions including removal of all US bases from the region and reparations . The selective blockade is not a de-escalation offer. Tehran maintains the military closure against US-aligned shipping while building bilateral dependencies with non-aligned states — dependencies that give each country an individual reason to resist joining any enforcement Coalition. For Washington, the structural problem is plain: every nation that secures bilateral passage from Iran has less incentive to challenge Iran's control of the strait.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

International law normally guarantees all ships the right to pass through major straits like Hormuz. Iran is claiming that, because it is at war, it can decide who gets through based on whether their country is an enemy. It has told Japan it may pass; US-allied countries cannot. This is legally contested — UNCLOS does not permit this discrimination — and it is deliberately designed to split potential opponents by giving some of them a reason not to enforce the rules.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

By communicating the policy to a Japanese outlet rather than through formal diplomatic channels, Iran simultaneously sends three distinct messages: to Tokyo (passage is available), to non-aligned states (apply for your own exemption), and to the US (the closure has third-party legitimacy). The choice of venue is itself a diplomatic instrument.

Root Causes

Iran's selective blockade doctrine exploits a structural gap in UNCLOS enforcement: no automatic mechanism exists for enforcing transit passage rights, and enforcement depends entirely on state initiative and collective political will. A selective closure — which gives major powers a financial reason not to enforce — is specifically calibrated to paralyse that will.

Escalation

The public articulation of the doctrine locks Iran in. Araghchi's statement to Kyodo News — a deliberate choice of non-Western media venue — makes selective closure official Iranian policy. Iran cannot quietly reopen the strait to all shipping without a visible public concession, raising the political cost of de-escalation for Tehran regardless of military outcome.

What could happen next?
  • Precedent

    If Iran's selective blockade doctrine is tolerated, it establishes that belligerent states may discriminate among shipping by flag-state political alignment, rewriting the legal architecture of international straits passage.

    Long term · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Non-aligned states granted passage acquire a covert dependency on Tehran: passage can be revoked if their political alignment shifts, creating permanent ongoing Iranian leverage over their energy security.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Risk

    The explicit public statement forecloses quiet diplomatic resolution — Iran cannot reopen the strait to all shipping without a public concession that signals domestic weakness.

    Short term · Assessed
First Reported In

Update #45 · Ultimatum expires; Iran tolls Hormuz at $2m

Al Jazeera· 23 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Hormuz open to friends, shut to enemies
By drawing an explicit distinction between hostile and non-hostile nations, Iran converts a military closure into a diplomatic instrument that penalises coalition membership and rewards strategic ambiguity.
Different Perspectives
Israel
Israel
IDF Chief Eyal Zamir declared on 3 June there was no ceasefire for his forces, and strikes killed at least 10 civilians and one Israeli soldier on 4 June. The IDF killed Hezbollah's chief engineer and warned three south Lebanon villages to evacuate on 5 June, advancing into ground the unsigned Washington framework has not caught.
Hezbollah / Lebanon
Hezbollah / Lebanon
Naim Qassem rejected the Washington Lebanon framework on 4 June as "absurd, humiliating and insulting", blocking a ceasefire instrument that required Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani before any Israeli withdrawal. Over one million Lebanese remain displaced; the framework's collapse prolongs that toll.
Iran
Iran
Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly coupled the Lebanon ceasefire to the Iran-US nuclear track on 4 June, carrying IRGC authority rather than his own civilian mandate. The IRGC delegation has sent no HEU counter-proposal since Araghchi confirmed no progress that same day; Mojtaba Khamenei's 21 May order to keep the 440.9 kg stockpile inside Iran remains operative.
United States
United States
Rubio placed the Iran-US deal at 95 per cent complete on 4 June while the administration signed no Iran instrument and OFAC designated only Cuban targets. Trump separately disclosed and rejected an airlift plan to collect Iran's HEU stockpile, claiming the material is "entombed", a claim the IAEA cannot verify.
China
China
Beijing's MOFCOM Blocking Rules constrain OFAC enforcement on the mainland; China has not corroborated Trump's verbal account of any bilateral summit, and the rial's failure to hold its Rubio bounce, combined with the IRGC's stablecoin rail closure, increases Chinese yuan-denominated oil-payment exposure through Hormuz.
Bahrain
Bahrain
The IRGC struck Bahrain on 3 June as its sirens sounded and its PAC-3 magazine neared exhaustion; excluded from Rubio's 2 May emergency resupply, Bahrain received a 50-round Federal Register notice on 1 June on an 18-month delivery timeline, meaning it is defending the US Fifth Fleet headquarters on the last rounds it has.