Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Iran Conflict 2026
1JUN

Thousands march in Tehran under blackout

2 min read
08:32UTC

Thousands rallied in Tehran chanting 'no compromise, no surrender' hours before President Pezeshkian's televised apology to Gulf neighbours — an apology his own political system then repudiated.

ConflictDeveloping

Thousands marched through Tehran on Friday waving Iranian flags and images of the late Ayatollah Khamenei, chanting 'We'll fight, we'll die, we won't accept humiliation' and 'No compromise, no surrender, destruction of Israel.' The demonstrations occurred hours before President Pezeshkian's televised apology to Gulf neighbours — an address whose conciliatory tone was contradicted within hours when IRGC forces struck Dubai, Saudi oil facilities, and Bahrain .

Whether the marches were spontaneous or IRGC-organised is impossible to verify. Iran's internet blackout, now in its ninth consecutive day, has severed the independent reporting channels — social media, encrypted messaging, citizen journalism — that made verification possible during the January 2026 protests . Both readings produce the same operational conclusion. If spontaneous, the war has genuinely mobilised popular sentiment against any form of capitulation. If organised, the IRGC is manufacturing the public mandate it needs to override a president who has twice attempted de-escalation — first with the apology to Gulf States, then by announcing that forces 'should not attack neighbouring countries' — and been ignored both times.

The marchers' slogans track precisely with the hardliner statements that followed Pezeshkian's address. Conservative media activist Meisam Nili declared 'any ceasefire is treason.' Qom lawmaker Mohammad Manan Raeisi called the president's remarks 'humiliating.' The alignment between street chants and elite rhetoric — whether coordinated or coincidental — leaves Pezeshkian isolated between Trump's unconditional surrender demand, which he explicitly rejected , and a domestic political and military establishment that treats his attempt to de-escalate with neighbours as betrayal.

For foreign ministries assessing Iran's internal dynamics, the picture is a system in which the elected president lacks the authority to deliver on any diplomatic commitment he might make. Pezeshkian can neither accept Washington's terms nor persuade his own security apparatus to honour the more modest restraint he has publicly promised. The January crackdown , for which Pezeshkian later apologised , demonstrated that Iran's security forces operate independently of presidential authority in domestic matters. The current war is demonstrating the same independence in external affairs.

First Reported In

Update #27 · Israel kills 41 on failed 1986 airman raid

TRT World· 7 Mar 2026
Read original
Causes and effects
This Event
Thousands march in Tehran under blackout
The demonstrations — whether spontaneous or IRGC-organised — show the visible Iranian public face of the war is not ready for de-escalation, narrowing the political space for any diplomatic off-ramp Pezeshkian might attempt.
Different Perspectives
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Human rights monitors (Hengaw, Amnesty International, Iran HRM)
Monitors documented a second death sentence for Zahra Tabari, 68, reported cemetery record deletions at Behesht-e Zahra, and a poll showing 81.5% of medical residents want to emigrate, against a background of 200+ confirmed executions since February. Iran's security courts operate at uninterrupted wartime tempo regardless of the diplomatic track.
Pakistan (mediator)
Pakistan (mediator)
Islamabad carried Trump's revised MOU demanding HEU destruction to Iranian negotiators, formally inheriting the role of sole active mediator after Oman's forced withdrawal. Pakistan lacks Oman's banking infrastructure for frozen-asset routing and carries its own regional stakes, making it a less structurally neutral broker.
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait intercepted Iranian missiles and drones for a second time in days on 1 June, with air-raid sirens sounding nationwide, after invoking Article 51 self-defence on 28 May following the Ali Al Salem ballistic-missile strike. The repeated interceptions test whether Kuwait's domestic politics can sustain hosting US forces as a de facto co-belligerent.
China (PRC)
China (PRC)
Beijing sent scholars to Shangri-La rather than its defence minister and addressed Taiwan without mentioning Iran, maintaining bilateral energy corridor protection with Tehran while refusing diplomatic exposure at multilateral forums. Trump barred China as an HEU custodian on 27 May, removing Beijing from the deal architecture while China continues supplying DPI hardware that caps Iran's internet.
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's of London / war-risk underwriters
Lloyd's held its Hormuz war-risk designation at $10-14 million per voyage while Brent recovered to $93.91, maintaining the structural divergence from futures pricing that has persisted since late May. Underwriters require a UN Security Council resolution or government certification letter, not diplomatic optimism.
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar)
Five Gulf states wrote to the IMO on 21 May rejecting Iran's PGSA transit authority over international waters; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not confirmed participation in the European Hormuz mission. The GCC is navigating between US security guarantees and exposure to Iranian fire, with no Gulf state formally co-belligerent except Kuwait.