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Iran Conflict 2026
21MAY

South Africa silent on Iran strikes

4 min read
09:55UTC

The country that took Israel to the ICJ over Gaza has not criticised Washington for striking Iran. The difference: the ICJ case cost nothing. Criticising the US costs billions.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

South Africa's silence on the Iran strikes exposes the selective application of its international-law advocacy and signals that economic and diplomatic dependencies on Washington constrain even its most principled foreign-policy postures.

South Africa — which brought the genocide case against Israel to the International Court of Justice over the Gaza campaign — has not criticised Washington for the strikes on Iran.

The silence is a departure from the position Pretoria established in December 2023, when it filed the ICJ application arguing that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza. That filing was the most consequential legal challenge to Israeli military operations in decades and positioned South Africa as the leading voice of the Global South on Middle Eastern conflicts. The expectation — among supporters and critics alike — was that Pretoria would apply similar scrutiny to the US-Israeli campaign against Iran. Brazil has condemned the strikes and called for adherence to international law . South Africa has not.

The reasons are structural rather than ideological. South Africa depends on preferential US trade access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) — a programme the Trump administration has already signalled it may revoke. South Africa's economy contracted in 2024 and is growing below 1%; losing AGOA eligibility would cost billions in export revenue and accelerate an already severe unemployment crisis. The ICJ case against Israel carried no economic cost — Israel is a minor trade partner for South Africa. Criticising Washington carries a direct and measurable one. South Africa's silence does not represent a change in principle. It reveals where principle meets leverage — and where leverage wins.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

South Africa made global headlines in late 2023 by taking Israel to the world's top court, arguing it was committing genocide in Gaza — a bold move that positioned the country as a defender of international law, particularly for Muslim-majority and Global South nations. Now, with the United States and Israel conducting large-scale strikes on Iran that the UN Secretary-General has described as violations of the UN Charter, South Africa has said nothing critical of Washington. This is striking because the legal arguments South Africa made at The Hague — about proportionality, civilian harm, and the prohibition on aggressive war — apply at least as readily to the current strikes. The silence suggests that South Africa's principled stance has limits, and those limits appear to be drawn around the willingness to confront American power directly.

Deep Analysis
Synthesis

South Africa's silence is not merely a diplomatic abstention — it is a data point that recalibrates the meaning of its ICJ action against Israel. That filing can now be read less as a universal commitment to international humanitarian law and more as a specific act of Palestinian solidarity, one that aligned domestic political imperatives with a convenient legal vehicle. The current non-response reveals the asymmetry: South Africa will challenge Western power at The Hague when the cause has deep domestic resonance and the economic cost is manageable, but will not do so when the primary target of criticism is the United States itself. This matters beyond South Africa. It signals to other Global South states that selective engagement with international law — weaponising it against some actors while exempting others — is the operative norm, not the exception. It also suggests that the January 2026 BRICS trilateral pact, already shown to be hollow by BRICS's refusal of Iran's emergency meeting request, has failed to create even a shared normative framework among its members. Iran's diplomatic isolation is therefore deeper than the headline BRICS non-response suggests: even states with historical solidarity ties and formal multilateral commitments are declining to pay the political cost of standing with Tehran when Washington is on the other side.

Root Causes

Several structural forces explain South Africa's restraint. First, economic dependency: the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides South Africa preferential access to US markets, and the Ramaphosa administration has sought to avoid the deterioration in bilateral relations that open criticism of Washington would trigger. Second, internal ANC factional dynamics: the governing coalition contains voices that prioritise economic stabilisation over foreign-policy adventurism, and a public confrontation with the United States at a moment of domestic economic stress is politically risky. Third, the distinction between the Palestinian cause and Iran: Palestinian solidarity has deep emotional and rhetorical resonance within the ANC, tied directly to apartheid-era analogies, while Iran does not command the same domestic constituency. Criticism of the Gaza campaign could be presented domestically as anti-colonial; criticism of the Iran strikes would require a more abstract defence of Iranian sovereignty. Fourth, strategic hedging: South Africa is simultaneously a BRICS member and a country that depends on Western capital markets and multilateral financial institutions — it has consistently sought to avoid being forced to choose sides, and silence is the operational expression of that preference.

Escalation

South Africa's non-response does not itself escalate the military situation, but it has a structurally escalatory effect on the diplomatic landscape: it reduces the credibility and cohesion of any potential Global South coalition that might exert normative pressure on Washington to de-escalate or accept a ceasefire framework. If the most prominent non-Western champion of international law will not apply its own stated principles when the United States is the actor in question, the diplomatic isolation of Western powers that some anticipated from this conflict is significantly diminished. This weakens Iran's diplomatic position and removes one potential pressure point on the US-Israeli campaign. Over the medium term, it also invites other states to treat South Africa's future invocations of international law as instrumentalised rather than principled, reducing its moral authority in multilateral forums including the UN Human Rights Council and the ICJ itself.

What could happen next?
1 meaning2 consequence2 risk1 precedent
  • Meaning

    South Africa's silence confirms that its ICJ action against Israel was a targeted act of Palestinian solidarity rather than a universal commitment to international humanitarian law enforcement.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    South Africa's credibility as a neutral mediator or principled international-law advocate is materially diminished, reducing its effectiveness in future multilateral forums including the UN Human Rights Council.

    Medium term · Assessed
  • Risk

    Domestic political opponents — particularly the Economic Freedom Fighters and pro-Iran voices within the ANC left — may exploit the perceived inconsistency to damage the Ramaphosa government's foreign-policy standing ahead of the next electoral cycle.

    Short term · Suggested
  • Precedent

    If the leading Global South champion of international law will not criticise US military action, the normative constraint on Washington's freedom of action in the region is weaker than pre-conflict assessments suggested.

    Immediate · Assessed
  • Consequence

    Iran's diplomatic isolation is deeper than aggregate BRICS non-response figures indicate; even historically sympathetic states are unwilling to absorb the bilateral cost of public solidarity with Tehran against Washington.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Risk

    South Africa's hedging position may become untenable if the conflict escalates and non-alignment is no longer read by Washington as benign — forcing a harder choice between AGOA access and BRICS solidarity obligations.

    Medium term · Suggested
First Reported In

Update #6 · Pentagon produced no evidence for Iran war

Globe and Mail· 1 Mar 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
South Africa silent on Iran strikes
South Africa's restraint exposes the boundary between principled international legal action and the economic leverage that constrains it. The Global South's ability to challenge Western military operations depends on whether it can afford to.
Different Perspectives
Turkey (Shakarab consideration)
Turkey (Shakarab consideration)
Ankara serves as one of two Western-adjacent Iran back-channels while Turkish national Gholamreza Khani Shakarab faces imminent execution on espionage charges in Iran. President Erdogan cannot deflect the domestic political crisis that a Turkish execution would trigger, which would force suspension of the mediating role.
Germany (Bundestag gap)
Germany (Bundestag gap)
Belgium, Germany, Australia, and France committed Hormuz coalition hardware on 18 May. Germany's Bundestag authorisation for the coalition deployment remains pending, creating a constitutional gap between the commitment announced and the parliamentary mandate required to operationalise it.
IEA and oil market analysts
IEA and oil market analysts
The IEA's $106 May Brent projection met the market in one session on 20 May as Brent fell 5.16% on diplomatic optimism. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley's two-layer premium framework holds: the kinetic component compressed; the structural insurance component tied to Lloyd's ROE remains unresolved.
Hengaw
Hengaw
Documented the dual Kurdish execution at Naqadeh on 21 May, the two Iraqi-national espionage executions on 20 May, and Gholamreza Khani Shakarab's imminent execution risk. The 24-hour cluster covers two executions at one facility, the first foreign-national espionage executions, and a Turkish national whose death would suspend Ankara's mediation.
Lloyd's of London
Lloyd's of London
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United Kingdom and France (Northwood coalition)
United Kingdom and France (Northwood coalition)
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