CREA data analysed by German NGO Urgewald showed Russia earned €6 billion in fossil fuel revenues in the first two weeks of the Iran conflict, with daily earnings running 14% above February's average at €510 million per day1. The surge coincides with Washington's 30-day sanctions waivers on Russian oil and the 65% rise in Brent Crude to approximately $103 by 18 March.
The revenue translates into military capacity on a specific and measurable scale. At reported manufacturing costs of $20,000–$50,000 per Shahed-136 drone2, a single day's oil revenue could theoretically purchase thousands of units. Daily drone volumes had already tripled from 2025 averages of 2,000–3,000 to nearly 9,000 by early March, with 9,616 recorded on 17 March alone. Oil prices in the strait of Hormuz fund drone production; drone production sustains the rate of fire on Ukrainian positions.
Russia's January financial position looked materially different. Oil and gas revenues had fallen 32% year-on-year, and the recruitment deficit — 31,700 personnel lost against 22,700 recruited in January — suggested a war effort under both financial and demographic strain. The Iran conflict eliminated the financial constraint. At €510 million per day, Russia earns in two weeks what its January revenue shortfall implied it could not sustain. The money does not solve the recruitment gap, but it funds the equipment, ammunition, and Iranian-supplied drones that compensate for infantry losses with firepower.
The CREA figures measure revenue from fossil fuel sales, not profit, and not all revenue flows to military procurement. But the direction is clear: every week the Iran conflict continues, Russia's war economy operates further from the constraints that sanctions were designed to impose.
